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COST STRUCTURE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERS

CAPT CDR Liviu BARCĂU

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this paper is to underline the European Union's aim and concern related to unify the ways that their member state use to elaborate their national specific defense cost structure. I would like also to mention the importance of creating a good common practice, at least and starting at the EU's level, for the member states to approach the breakdown defense costs.

I. THE EUROPEAN UNION APPROACH TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

The European Defense Agency was established as the responsible entity at the European Union's level to manage the above mentioned issues.

I.1. The European Union Agency

The European Defense Agency was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July, 2004, «to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defense Policy as it stands now and develops in the future».

FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

The European Defense Agency, within the overall mission set out in the Joint Action, is ascribed four functions, covering:

- Developing defense capabilities;
- Promoting Defense Research and Technology (R&T);
- Promoting armaments co-operation;
- Creating a competitive European Defense Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defense, Technological and Industrial Base.

All these functions relate to improving Europe's defense performance, by promoting coherence. A more integrated approach to capability development will contribute to better defined future requirements on which collaborations - in armaments or R&T or the operational domain - can be built. More collaboration will, in turn, provide opportunities for industrial restructuring and progress towards the continental-scale demand and market, which industry needs.

On this basis, the Agency's tasks include:

- To work for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to defining and meeting the capability needs of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP);
- To promote European defense-relevant R&T, as vital both to a healthy defense technological and industrial base and to defining and satisfying future capability requirements. This will involve pursuing collaborative use of national Defense R&T funds, in the context of a European Defense R&T Strategy which identifies priorities;
- To promote European cooperation on defense equipment, both to contribute to defense capabilities and as a catalyst for further restructuring the European defense industry;
- To work, in close cooperation with the Commission, on steps towards an internationally competitive market for defense equipment in Europe.

The Agency's «comparative advantage» should be its ability to comprehend all these agendas, and relate them so as to realize their synergies.

Its special position should allow it to develop uniquely cogent analyses and proposals across the range of its activities.

I.2. The National Defense Data

The European Defense Agency (EDA) is collecting national defense data on an annual basis. The National Ministries of Defense of the Agency's 26 participating Member States (all

the EU Member States, except Denmark) provide the data. EDA acts as a custodian of the data.

The data have been accounted for. The data are broken down, based on a list of indicators approved by the Agency's Ministerial Steering Board. This list has four sections:

A. General (macro-economic data to show how defense budgets relate to GDP and overall government spending):

- Population;
- GDP;
- GDP per capita;
- Total general government expenditures;
- Total defense expenditures.

B. Reform (major categories of defense budget spending):

- Total number of military personnel;
- Total number of civilian personnel;
- Military Personnel Breakdown (Army, Maritime, Air Forces, All other personnel);
- Total Personnel Expenditure;
- Infrastructure/construction expenditure;
- Defense equipment procurement expenditure;
- Defense R&D expenditure;
- Defense R&T expenditure (Subset of R&D);
- Operation & Maintenance expenditure;
- Operation Costs (Deployed);
- Defense Expenditure "Outsourced";

C. European collaboration (for equipment procurement and R&T to show to what extent the Agency's participating Member States are investing together):

- Collaborative defense equipment procurement expenditures (of which European collaboration);
- Collaborative defense R&T expenditure (of which European collaboration);
- R&T Expenditure under EDA.

Related to this topic, in November 2007 the Ministerial Steering Board approved four collective benchmarks for investment:

- Equipment procurement (including R&D/R&T): 20% of total defense spending
- European collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment spending

- Defense Research & Technology: 2% of total defense spending
- European collaborative Defense R&T: 20% of total defense R&T spending.

These benchmarks are collective: they apply to the total sum spent by all participating Member States together. They are voluntary in the sense turning them into national targets is optional, and there are no timelines for realizing these benchmarks.

D. Deployability (military deployed in crisis management operations to show the ratio between deployments and the total number of military):

- Average number of troops deployed;
- Troops available for deployment (Deployable/Sustainable).

Data collection is based on definitions approved by the participating Member States. The Definitions below have been shortened and edited for publication purpose.

- **Macroeconomic Data:** GDP, General Government Expenditure and Population are based on data from EUROSTAT.

- **Total defense expenditure** is defined as total Ministry of Defense expenditure and defense related expenditure from other sources (other Ministries special budgetary lines).

- **Civilian personnel:** The authorized strength of all civilian personnel on 31 December of each year employed by all military establishments and the armed forces.

- **Military Personnel:** Authorized strengths of all active military personnel on 31 December of each year; includes all personnel in uniform who can operate under military command and can be deployed outside national territory.

- **Internal Security Military Personnel:** gendarmerie-type forces, financed by the MoD budget, but dedicated solely to internal security tasks.

- **Personnel Expenditure:** all personnel-related expenditure for military and civilian personnel, including from non-MoD sources.

- **Infrastructure:** construction of fixed military installations, including country's share in multinational funded military construction/infrastructure.

- **Equipment Procurement expenditure** includes expenditure for all major equipment categories, that are not included in O&M spending.

- **Research and Development (R&D) expenditure:** any R&D programs up to the point where expenditure for production of equipment starts to be incurred.

- **Research and Technology (R&T) expenditure:** Subset of R&D – expenditure for basic research, applied research and technology demonstration for defense purposes.

- **Investment:** Equipment Procurement and R&D (including R&T).

- **Operation and Maintenance (O&M) expenditure:** covers O&M (spare parts and supplies) of major equipment; other equipment and supplies; and costs related to maintaining utilities and infrastructure.

- **Operation Costs** are incremental (= extra) costs limited to deployed operations outside the EU Member States territory.

- **Outsourcing:** is defense expenditure for which services have been contracted at the central level with service suppliers from outside the MoD and/or Armed Forces.

- **Collaboration:** agreement by at least two Ministries of Defense for project or program contracts.

- **European Collaboration:** subset of Collaboration; agreement by at least two EU Member States Ministries of Defense for project or program contracts. Possible non-EU partners share in such contracts is lower than 50%.

- **Average number of troops deployed:** Average number of troops deployed throughout the year by all EDA participating Member States (All forces)

- **Deployable (Land) Forces:** (Land) Forces troops prepared for deployed operations (the NATO 50% target).

- **Sustainable (Land) Forces:** (Land) Forces troops undertaking or planned for sustained operations (the NATO 10% target).

II. COST STRUCTURES COMPARISON BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERS AND THE US

II.1 Cost structure within EU

a) A comparison of GDP, Overall Government Expenditures (OGE), and Defense Expenditures (DE) expressed in real terms (Table 1).

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union			
GDP	12.272	11.584	- 5.6 %
DE	201	194	- 3.5 %
Romania			
GDP	137,0	115,8	- 15.74 %

DE	2,1	1,6	- 23.81 %
France			
GDP	1.956,9	1.921,57	-1.81 %
DE	45.4	39.2	-13.66 %
Germany			
GDP	2.440,94	2.406,67	- 1.4 %
DE	31.7	36.1	+13.9 %
Poland			
GDP	361,5	308,6	- 14.63 %
DE	6.0	5.4	- 10 %
Greece			
GDP	243,14	236,22	- 2.85 %
DE	6.2	6.0	- 3.23 %

(Billions of Euros)

Table 1 – GDP, Overall Government Expenditures and Defense Expenditures within EU

From the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the effects on the defense expenses have been visible at the level of the European Union, although the negative effects on the defense area have been different from one country to another. The overall decrease in the EU defense expenditures over the period has been of -3.5 %, with larger cuts in the case of Romania, Poland, France and other countries and smaller cuts in countries such as Greece. An exception to this trend is Germany, with an actual increase of 13.9% of the defense expenditures in real terms. The explanation to this unusual evolution derives from the more stable economic situation and a larger economy.

b) Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of Overall Government Expenditure (Table 2)

This indicator presents the level of national interest for the defense sector, as it represents the share of the state budget expenditures allocated each year for the purpose of ensuring national defense. This share may vary from year to year, but it usually presents a picture of both the importance given by the government to the defense area as opposed to other areas funded by the state. In this sense, as shown in the table below, the average percentage allocated for defense in the EU decreased slightly from 3.52% to 3.31%. Romania's share of the budget allocated for defense has been situated around the EU average, with a slight decrease from 3.9% to 3.44%. A larger share of the budget is allocated for defense by Greece – around 5%, reflecting the country's long standing tense situation between this country and its neighbor Turkey.

	2008	2009
European Union	3.52 %	3.31 %
Romania	3.90 %	3.44 %
France	4.41 %	3.67 %
Germany	2.90 %	3.15 %
Poland	3.83 %	3.93 %
Greece	5.67 %	5.03 %

Table 2 – Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of Overall Government Expenditure

c) Defense Expenditures per capita (Table 3)

This indicator estimates the defense weight distributed on each citizen, providing a glimpse on the overall contribution of each taxpayer to ensuring the national defense. In this respect, Romania is situated below the EU average.

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union	409	392	- 4.15 %
Romania	96	75	- 21.90 %
France	710	608	- 14.37 %
Germany	386	441	+ 14.25 %
Poland	157	142	- 9.55 %
Greece	551	535	- 2.91 %

(Euros)

Table 3 – Defense Expenditures per capita

d) Investment Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures (Table 4)

The indicator provides information about the defense sector modernization. A higher percentage indicates a focus on acquisition of more modern equipment, but it also indicates in an indirect way that a particular country gives a higher importance to the defense sector (expressed in larger financial allocations), as defense equipment and investment expenditures in general are more expensive than investments in other areas. This is reflected in the table below, with larger and more economically developed countries like France and Germany allocating a larger percent of the defense budget for investments, while Romania is situated

below the EU average, with 17% in 2008. The drastic reduction with 8% in 2009 reflects the first effects of the economic crisis, as countries are forced to cut their overall budgetary expenditures and renounce to the investments for the future to balance the budgets on the short run.

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union	39 %	41 %	+ 2 %
Romania	17 %	9 %	- 8 %
France	21 %	27 %	+ 6 %
Germany	21 %	17 %	- 4 %
Poland	15 %	20 %	+ 5 %
Greece	35 %	35 %	0 %

Table 4 - Investment Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures

e) Personnel Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures (Table 5)

This data offers another view of the same issue, as the personnel expenses are usually difficult to cut on short term without a drastic reduction in the personnel, with negative effects on the effectiveness of the activity. When the overall defense budget is cut, a larger share of the personnel expenses is usually a sign of an attempt to reduce other medium to long term expenses and to focus the activity on the present. In this respect, Romania is situated above the EU average, with an increase of the share of personnel expenses in 2009.

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union	53 %	51 %	- 2 %
Romania	69 %	76 %	+ 7 %
France	56 %	48 %	- 8 %
Germany	54 %	50 %	- 4 %
Poland	63 %	55 %	- 8 %
Greece	43 %	48 %	+ 5 %

Table 5 - Personnel Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures

f) O&M Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures (Table 6)

The O&M share of the expenditures from the defense budget is an indicator of the levels of operation, as they refer to the expenses needed to ensure the activities of the military

(exercises, applications, missions etc). A serious drop in this type of expenditures is usually a reason of concern, as it raises the question of the effectiveness of the activity without its support elements.

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union	40.4 %	44.9 %	+ 4.5 %
Romania	12.7 %	9.6 %	- 3.1 %
France	19.1 %	22.7 %	+ 3.6 %
Germany	Non reported	Non reported	Non reported
Poland	14.1 %	15 %	+ 0.9 %
Greece	19.8 %	12.9 %	-6.9 %

Table 6 - O&M Expenditures as a Percentage of Defense Expenditures

g) Investment per Military (Table 7, Figure 1)

The investment per military is another indicator portraying the degree of modernization of the armed forces, calculated as the investment expenses correlated to the number of military personnel. A high number indicate a highly modernized armed force, where the restructuring process has ended, the number of personnel in the military is stabilized and a greater emphasis is placed on ensuring the effectiveness through investments in modern equipment and military systems. A drop in this number from one year to another is an indicator of postponing this type of modernization towards later years in order to deal with current financial difficulties.

	2008	2009	Trend
European Union	23.274	24.522	- 5.40 %
Romania	4.697	2.030	- 56.78 %
France	27.474	43.519	+ 58.40 %
Germany	25.858	25.453	-1.57 %
Poland	6.865	11.087	+61.50 %
Greece	15.998	15.989	- 0.06 %

(Euros)

Table 7 - Investment per Military




Figure 1

Source: Defense Data 2009

(http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/EDA-factsfigures-2009_21_2.sflb.ashx)

II.2. EU versus USA approach (Table 8, Figure 2)

	Europe	USA
Total Defense Expenditures	€194 Bln	€ 498 Bln
Defense Expenditure as a % of GDP	1,67%	4,90%
Defense Expenditure as % of Total Government Expenditure	3,3%	11,7%
Defense Expenditure Per Capita	€ 392	€1662

(2009 Figures)

Table 8 – Defense Expenditures indicators (EU and USA)

Defence Expenditure Breakdown in Percentages




Figure 2

Source: European – United States Defense Expenditures 2009

(http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/EU_-_US_Defence_Data_2009_v0_3.sflb.ashx)

An important difference that we can observe is the personnel expenditures weight within EU and USA defense expenditures approach. The percentage offered to this category emphasizes one of the following two possibilities:

- The importance conferred to the military against the other defense category;
- The budgetary constraints that force the allocations to be small, fact that conducts to the increase of the percentage allocated to the personnel expenditures (crisis or wrong management effect).

We also should underline that US assign 31 % of the defense expenditures to the Investment, while EU assign 21.1 %. That indicator shows the national interest to modernize the Defense sector.

III. European Union Defense Expenditures 2010/2009 Analysis

General Indicators

1. Defense spending decreased marginally between 2009 and 2010 (-0.2%). Of the 26 members, 15 reduced their defense budget during 2010. Also, defense spending as part of total government spending has decreased for the fifth year in a row, from 3.3% to 3.2%.

2. When we measure “real growth” by applying a deflator percentage the percentage of total defense expenditure clearly goes down considerably (-2.5%).
3. National defense budgets as a proportion of GDP continue to vary significantly: the (NATO) target to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense is met by 4 pMS; and 5 pMS spend less than 1% of GDP on defense.
4. More than 5.2% (similar value as in 2009) of all defense expenditure is originating from non-MOD sources. In some cases it is not clear from which sources the money is coming and on what conditions or for which purposes it is made available to the MOD.

Reform Indicators

5. Personnel numbers have decreased, both military and of civilian. This may be the result of on-going restructuring and measures taken to reduce personnel expenditure as a result of financial constraints.
6. Personnel expenditure shows that collectively Europe continues to devote a large amount of total defense expenditure to personnel, some 51% (similar to 2009 but still the lowest value since EDA started collecting this information in 2006). There is wide divergence among the pMS on personnel expenditure; twelve spend more than 60% of their budgets on personnel, and half of them more than 70%; only 8 spend less than 50% of their budgets on personnel.
7. Investment in defense has increased due to a significant increase in Equipment Procurement (14%). R&D on the other hand decreased significantly (-30%) while R&T also decreased, by -8%. R&D (incl. R&T) and equipment procurement investment can show significant annual fluctuations due to the setting up or ending of R&D and procurement programs. On equipment procurement as a proportion of total defense expenditure there continues to be a wide divergence of national percentages (5 pMS below 10%, and 7 above 20%).
8. R&T expenditure has reduced in total volume from €2 258 in 2009 to €2 077 in 2010. The R&T percentage (as part of total defense expenditure) has decreased again to 1.07% (in 2009: 1.16%), well below the agreed benchmark of 2% (see also the section on benchmarks below).
9. The figure for Operation Costs (Deployed) shows that in 2010 pMS spent more on troops’ deployment. This increased by 6%, and amounted to 5.4% of total defense expenditure. The fact that the average number of troops deployed decreased between 2009 and 2010 suggests that deployments have become more costly.
10. As for 2009, in 2010 there was an increase in the figure for Outsourcing although the number of pMS reporting a figure for outsourcing was lower. Of the 26 pMS, 11

reported a total of €15.4 bln or 8% of total defense expenditure (2009: 7.3%), which represents an increase of 9%.

European collaboration Indicators

11. Collaborative equipment procurement decreased by 3%, and collaborative R&T by 18%. A small number of pMS account for the largest part of these collaborations (5 pMS for 94% of equipment procurement collaborations; and, for R&T, 7 pMS for 95% of collaborations).
12. European collaborations form the major part of equipment procurement collaborations (94%) and of R&T collaborations (93%). In 2010 European equipment collaborations accounted for 20% (2009: 22%) of total equipment procurement spending. European R&T collaborations made up 11.8% (2009:12.8%) of total R&T spending. Between 2009 and 2010 there was a decrease in R&T expenditure under EDA of 11.7% mostly due to a reduction of pMS expenditure on Category A and Category B projects.

Deployability Indicators

13. The average number of troops deployed throughout the year decreased slightly (-2%). However, there is wide variety among pMS (14 of them show decreases, 11 of them increases).
14. There is a slight decrease in the number of sustainable (Land Forces) personnel. The ratio between sustainable and the pool of deployable (Land Forces) personnel – the (NATO) 50% target – has remained stable at 1:4.2, below the 1:5 (NATO) usability ratio.

Benchmarks

15. The collective percentages for the period 2006 to 2010 are the following:

	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>Approved Benchmarks</u>
Equipment Procurement + R&D	19.3%	20.5%	20.8%	21.1%	22.1%	20% of Total Defense Expenditure
R&T	1.32%	1.25%	1.23%	1.16%	1.07%	2% of Total Defense Expenditure
European Collaborative	20.9%	18.9%	21.2%	22.0%	20.4%	35% of

Equipment						Equipment Procurement
European Collaborative R&T	9.6%	13.1%	16.6%	12.8%	11.8%	20% of R&T Expenditure

16. From the evolution of expenditure against these benchmarks two trends can be observed:
- Since 2006 there has been a steady reduction in the share of R&T against Total Defense Expenditure (down to 1% against the 2% benchmark).
 - The proportion of defense investment (equipment procurement and R&D) against Total Defense Expenditure is slowly but steadily increasing and has been above the 20% benchmark since 2007.
17. Concerning the evolution of European Collaborative Expenditure as a proportion of overall expenditure, the trend has been mixed:
- Equipment procurement decreased in 2007, but then increased in 2008 and 2009 (the highest value since EDA began gathering data). However it decreased in 2010, reaching a value below that in 2006 (and still below the 35% benchmark).
 - As for European Collaborative R&T Expenditure there was an upward trend between 2006 and 2008 but it has decreased since then.

CONCLUSIONS

It can be easily noticed that the EU member states, as well defined entities, act using their specific rules, also in the defense field. Thus and so it is explained the different, sometimes opposite, and apparent illogical trends ascertained after the national defense reports analysis. These different evolutions were mentioned and outlined within this paper.

In this respect we can draw very good conclusions, as follows:

Although the European Union comprises 26 member states, each other with a proper vision and a specific, national way to deal with the economic issues, the comprehensive analyses elaborated during the past years demonstrate that EU acts as a coherent system, proving stability.

To that effect, the macroeconomics indicators trends at the EU level evolve slowly and stable, without sudden jumps. And that happens even if the member states evolutions are often opposite.

In the mean time we should underline the importance of the efforts done by the European Organizations to elaborate and implement within the EU member states a good common practice to deal with the national major issues, like the defense matter approach.

The annual, constant and advanced analyses that European Defense Agency does contribute in an essential way to the above mentioned purposes.

In this respect we should mention the recommendations towards the member states to adopt and use the same definitions for the defense terms, and with the same importance, the defense analyses findings which are distributed to the member states in order to improve their national vision.

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ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM

LTC Florin BOLOJAN

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, terms like planning and programming became usual in many fields of activity. In each organization, from the smallest firm to the biggest corporation, it has been developed a strategic process. If to the small enterprise level, this process could be not so elaborated and included only the owner's thinking on necessary actions needed to increase future revenue, reduce rising costs, or meet emerging competition, for larger organizations, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and his staff will ensure similar guidelines on the same topics, but detailed planning documents, analysis, and the development of options and strategies are usually left to a strategic planning staff. Even though there are differences in scale and formality, the need of planning for the future is generally accepted for many reasons. In his book, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Harvard Business Professor Henry Mintzberg pointed several motivations that corporations, and their planners, have for establishing and maintaining strategic planning processes. Organizations must plan to: (1) coordinate their activities; (2) ensure that the future is taken into account; (3) be rational; and (4) establish control. Of these considerations, the second is the most significant for all organizations, particularly those in highly competitive and dynamic markets, who want to ensure they are preparing for inevitable changes, preempting those that are undesirable, and controlling those that are controllable.

Actions taken for accomplishing these objectives presume a degree of coordination, rationalization, and control by the corporate core. After carefully analyzing its components, Mintzberg describes a strategic planning process as, "a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions."

This definition present very precisely the aspiration of the first military department in the world that introduced and developed the strategic planning process, that is American

Department of Defense (DoD), and this was named, at the beginning, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, better known as "PPBS."

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For the first time, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) were established to the Department of Defense level in USA by the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in 1962. The actual system differs a lot to the from the 1962 initial system, that include now, in its usual name – the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

Before McNamara period, Services prepared their single-year budgets and sent them, annually, to be approved by the Congress. Along with McNamara appointment as a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in 1962, came his experience about controlling organizations - the main objective being planning for more than one year (i.e., multi-year programming). In this system, he requested every Service to develop their multi-year programming into only one document, named the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). He established that the SECDEF is the only authority allowed to approve any kind of changes in the mentioned document. This way, if a Service wished to complete, delete, or modify a part on the FYDP, it had to address to SECDEF, in order to obtain the approval. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was design, under these circumstances, to approve, disapprove, or modify a requested change for FYDP.

The reaction from Services to this control was to increase the number of change requests addressed to OSD, this way amplifying the probability that some of their requests being approved. As a result to increasing of change requests, at the level of OSD was created the Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Office, which had, as a main responsibility, analyzing the change requests and proposing to the SECDEF only that those change requests that deserved to be taken into consideration. During the time, anyway, this objective approach had to be correlated to the realities of limited resources. In the same time, focusing on technical merit started to be changed, step by step, in an analysis and evaluation on affordability, made by OSD. As an effect, many of proposals submitted by the Services and disapproved by OSD was a result of lower affordability more than a technical problem.

Under these circumstances, it was necessary to improve the system in order to enforce main rules about change proposals, regarding to calendar element, volume and value of them. The final product was a developed PPBS framework, where changes had been submitted by the Services, under OSD guidance, in a multi-year program supported on a cyclical basis.

The actual state of PPBS in the U.S. Army result from internal OSD actions, made in order to determine the system to be more responsive, and also as an effect of external pressures applied on OSD for doing things in different manner.

Today, the PPBE is concerned on decision-making regarding the process of resource allocation, and consist of a very large scale of activities that support both Department of Defense (DOD) and Army.

In 1981, Army realizes the importance of the execution phase and included it in the name of the process, and re-titled it as PPBES. After a long period of time, in 2003, DoD has decided to replace PPBS to PPBE process. At the end, Army made the same thing and changed PPBES with PPBE process, so we can see today for this process only one name – PPBE – used both by the DoD and by the Army.

To some, the process is a model of management; to others, a classic case of bureaucratic excess.

II. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM IN ROMANIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES) of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense (MND) was introduced initially by Governmental Decision nr.52/1998, later improved by Law no.63/2000 on Romania's national defense planning, and then replaced by Defense planning Law no.473/2004.

PPBES's main objective is to use the available resources in an efficient way in order to accomplish the military capabilities. Beside its main objective, PPBES has to assure not only the domestic management requirements but also the drawing up of the planning documents required by NATO. In fact, PPBES is the tool that efficiently integrates the efforts of the structures involved in the defense resource management.

II.1. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System, part of defense planning

Defense planning is one of the basic functions of state, directly related to decisions on defense, in close correlation with other management functions. His area of coverage includes various forms and ways of creating and using economic and military potential national security.

According to the Law no.473/2004, defense planning is a complex of activities and measures to promote national interests, the definition and objectives of Romania's national security defense. Defense planning is done based on political decisions of the President, Parliament and the Romanian Government and the measures and actions taken at other institutions, which, by law, have responsibilities in defense. At the same time, defense planning includes all activities that establish the amount, structure and the allocation of human, material and financial resources materialize the basic objectives of Romania's national security defense.

Romania's accession to Euro-Atlantic structures imposed creation/revision of the legislative, regulatory and organizational requirements needed to implement specific objectives and performance of defense planning process at national, departmental and ministerial.

By the same law, there are established mandatory documents that states develop national defense system. The main documents that states the National Defense System are:

- a) National Defense Strategy;
- b) The Government Program;
- c) The Defense White Paper;
- d) Military Strategy.

Based on these documents, planning is done on medium and long term and is called "multiannual planning ", and aims to:

- a) determining the main directions of development of the Romanian Army;
- b) establishing requirements to equip the force structure;
- c) military mobilization and operational levels of military structures.

To achieve the objectives of defense, and defense planning implementation process, along with Law no. 473/2004 there are:

- a) Law no. 500/2002 regarding public finance;
- b) State Budget Law for the reference year;
- c) Specific planning documents for MND:
 - Defense Planning Guidance;
 - Instructions, stipulations and specifications regarding the operation of **PPBES** within the MND.

II.2. Purpose and advantages of implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System

Once implemented, PPBES has the following general areas of action:

- to identify forces and military capabilities and determine the term and how they will be achieved and costs, providing a real opportunity to achieve the goals by allocating the necessary funds;

- to ensure an efficient use of allocated resources;

- to demonstrate to Parliament and citizens that defense spending of public money allocated fairly and efficiently.

It also allows the planning system: the adoption of comprehensive performance measurement methods, establish performance metrics, budget process focusing on results, can standardize the physical unit costs, resource efficiency, transparency in public resource use.

The purpose of this system is:

- to achieve compatibility between the objectives incumbent Romanian Army and the resources that the country may allocate in peacetime;

- to ensure planning and programming in a unitary way, for activities aimed at achieving objectives and management in an integrated system of human, material and financial resources allocated;

- to strengthen responsibility at all levels of the Army in meeting approved programs and efficient use of available resources.

Among the *advantages* created by the implementation of PPBES, there are:

- achieve consistency between national security objectives and available resources, ensuring civil society control over the military;
- institutionalization of rights and duties of the state political leadership in national security issues and interoperability with the defense planning of NATO member countries;
- creating conditions for development of a rational process, transparent, objective and accurate resource allocation;
- sizing of military forces in accordance with the tasks set them by the political leadership of the state and provide the framework for an institutionalized process, but flexible;
- control facilitation and review the allocation of resources and ensuring free movement of budgetary information;

- ensure full understanding of the costs for achieving military strategy and evaluation of military equipment endowment;
- creating a database to support resource allocation decisions;
- systematic approach to commitment of time and effort involved in resource allocation activities;
- providing a communication mechanism between the various organizations who share common interests, but often have goals and professional language, provisions for the efficient, ways of fixing the amount of investment made different;
- is constituted as a tool to medium and long term planning, which can be used by any organization and is a process - arbitrary barrier resource allocation;
- allows a unitary approach to general problems of the Government and permit prioritization decisions in a rational way at the level of ministry.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation for forces, activities and resources within MND is a set of measures and actions that determine, establish, monitor and evaluate activities for the creation, training and modernization of the army, in relation to missions that are set by the constitutional decision structures of the country and available resources.

Operation of PPBES requires a relationship of collaboration, interactive and continuous between all the structures involved, the activities taking place in an independent way: planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation.

III.3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System phases

PPBE process is a complex cyclic process, organized in phases, providing identification and development of the necessary capabilities for the force structure and allocation of the related resources in order to implement the objectives of the defense planning process as required by NATO, EU and other international bodies, and for the missions of Romanian Army.

Each step is well defined and is represented by specific actions and measures in a position to ensure smooth running of this process (fig. 1).

Thus, in the *planning* stage:

- are developed concepts, studies and plans necessary to implement the short term, medium and long term security objectives and requirements of the National Strategy Defense, White Paper, Military Strategy;

- are identified and established the necessary capabilities for the following periods - 5, 10 and 15 years;
- are assessed priorities in allocating resources to ensure the optimal balance of forces, equipment and the training of military structures;
- are provided resources needed to implement personnel policies, training of forces, equipment operation and maintenance, infrastructure and modernization of equipment.




Fig.1. PPBES phases.

Stage **Programming** provides:

- development of major programs (MP) according to the objectives and priorities set by Defense Planning Guidance (DGP);
- establishing the necessary capabilities planned for 6 years, going to MP, to meet the objectives of defense.

On the **Budgeting** phase:

- based on the limits approved by the Government, the MND elaborate the budget, held on MP and budget holders;
- are established resources required to perform the capabilities from the MP.

Execution phase composition is specific structures of each PM, subordinated to each program director, who must answer the question "have the objectives achieved? ".

Planning structures from the MP develop throughout the PPBE process *evaluation* activity, reflected by analysis and synthesis regarding the evaluation of development stage for the major program (MP), and other related plans.

In order to ensure optimal and functional PPBE system, all activities and documents related to the four stages must efficiently correlate.

III.4. The cycles of Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System

PPBE processes calendar runs on a horizon about 24 months of which: stages of planning, programming and budgeting have duration of approximately 12 months and assessing a period of 12 months, which overlaps with the budget implementation stage. Basically, in a year the 4 phases of PPBE processes overlap but for different planning cycles – at least 2 cycles in different stages of planning (fig. 2).

Evaluation of program development stage is the link between the stages system, activity that should provide the necessary data to substantiate the defense planning documents specific to each stage.

Implementation of the PPBE documents at MND level is done through specific phases/stages, arising from the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).




Fig.2. PPBES Cycles.

III.5. The main documents of Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is the main document for the PPBE process; that represents the legal basis for the specialized structures of MND; it plans force structure and capabilities, harmonizes resources according to objectives, and establishes policies and sartorial programs. This is the reference for the planning period to the level of entire MND.

DPG includes the following main elements:

- defense policy objectives;
- general objectives of the MND, specific objectives and areas of defense planning priorities in resource allocation;
- MND major programs;
- distribution of financial resources on programs;
- other dispositions.

Based on DPG, program managers elaborate Major Programs (MP) and Modernization and Training Annual Plan (MTAP).

Major programs are specific documents that include all concrete actions and measures undertaken for the establishment, upgrading, equipping, training, maintenance of peace and prepare for crisis and war military units, providing optimal conditions for personal life, providing logistical support and reserves for mobilization and war, the creation and maintenance of infrastructure for military action in defense of NATO, participation in international cooperation with other countries and annual resources to achieve them.

Major programs are developed for a period of six years, are reviewed annually and are based on:

- general objectives of the MND and specific areas of defense planning for each major program, according to priorities set out in the DPG;
- budget of MND, estimated for 6 years, and funding sources: state budget and own revenue;
- allocation of financial resources on the major programs, taking into consideration the nature of expenditure, according to NATO classification;
- execution for major program budgets for the past year and preliminary budgets for major programs on current year.

Development, coordination and monitoring of major programs are the responsibility of planning structures from MND, and program managers are responsible for the implementation of their programs.

Modernization and Training Annual Plan (MTAP) is a picture of the first year from major program, adapted to the real budget. It has the same structure like MP, and it is, in fact, an extract from MP for the first year, adjusted to the entire factor that affects the program. Elaborating the MTAP met, from the beginning, the goals and objectives from MP correlated with precise quantity for resources.

Both MP and MTAP have as a main role resources planning for assumed capabilities and their development under the new requirements.

The budget for MP. According to the fiscal-budgetary Strategy and the Law no.500/2002 regarding public finance, based on the limits of expenditure established by the Ministry of Public Finance (MPF), MND prepare budget drafts, taking into consideration commitments to NATO and force structure needs. The budget project is sent to Ministry of Public Finance, and, after that, along with overall budget, to Parliament for approval.

According to the budgetary calendar, MND - as a main credit holder - must submit the budget draft to MPF until July 31. After approval by the MPF of project budget for the entire main budget holders, the government is developing the state budget and promotes it to the Parliament until October 15. This is discussed in the budget-finance committees from the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, than is subject to debate by Parliament, which approved it until 15 December.

Periodically, according to defense planning calendar in the MND, planning structures prepare reports on the state of both MP and MTAP, which are materialized at the level of program manager in *evaluation reports*.

The conclusions and proposals drawn from these reports are translated into "lessons learned" which, on the one hand should be able to limit or eliminate dysfunctions during the PPBE process, and secondly to ensure improved the medium and long term process.

III.6. Specific aspects within Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System

During the development of the process, specialists from PPBES identified some aspects that could be taken into consideration, in order to improve the system operation. Some of these could be:

- the complexity of the process aiming at integrating the effort of the structures responsible for the management of the defense resources; at the same time, this process should be conducting in an unitary way;

- harmonizing of main strategies and concepts, consistent with the medium and long term objectives of the Romanian Army's transformation process;
- development of annual priority objectives of force structure, based on priorities and projects included in the DPG, that should take into consideration realistic opinions within the system;
- identifying the needs of the Romanian Army based on capabilities and develop an experimental program phase from at least 2 years; based on real results, adjust the system through the real needs, that could be capabilities based, or not, at this stage of evolution;
- harmonization of different annual planning documents to MP and MTAP (Ex.: International Activities Plan);
- the tendency, showed sometimes, to make major decisions with a strong impact upon the resources outside the PPBES;
- the delays in the drawing up of the documentation of one stage influences the entire schedule, all the other activities of the following stages; in this case, translation of entire schedule should be necessary;
- lack of personnel with expertise in planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation;
- creating an attractive system for planning members, taking into consideration that the period for training specialists it is a long one, and the outputs from inside the system are not encouraging;
- need for periodically training, to very specific problems, regarding especially the details requested by MP and MTAP; this training should be performed by a single authority, which should be the one that conduct the system; the training should be compulsory for new members of the program manager offices;
- defining more precisely the rules for the system operation, starting with the requirements for the documents and ending with specialists requirements;
- developing one or more costs catalog necessary to establish realistic estimates of all actions and measures that are included in the major program (exercises, applications, operation & maintenance activities and international missions, etc) and allocate the time required by this complex activity;
- taking steps to develop a cost estimating applications for functional areas;
- promoting and supporting the benefits resulting from the application of "the concept of PPBE system."

CONCLUSIONS

Present paper intended to highlight very few points from the bigger picture, which is PPBES in generally, and in our army, especially. Even though it has almost fifty years since it was born in U.S. Army, it still grow and develop continuously. So, what can we say about our system and process, which has, with only effective ten years, a lot to show, to do and to growth, in order to be understood and used in a very effective manner?

From the beginning, PPBES is a tool that tries to efficiently integrate the efforts of all the structures involved in the defense resource management; to obtain the best results, all these structures should understand and apply its principles.

Even if the system is young, it was finally created speaking about the structures, the rules and the workers (specialists) inside the system, and it has realized his main attribute, which is to use the available resources in an efficient way in order to accomplish the military capabilities, fulfilling the gap between the planning and budgeting phases.

Of course that, taking into consideration, on one hand, the complexity of the process and of the system, and in the other hand, aspects that could be subject of transformation, improvement can be done a long period from now on, even we are thinking about capability based planning, that could be a challenge for the system, in a positive way.

Above all, the need to do things better and in an efficient manner will help the system to reach higher standards on the way of optimizing the performance.

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION WITHIN THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

LTC Cezar VASILESCU

1. INTRODUCTION

Having in mind the tendency of terrorist organization to attack elements of the physical infrastructure (twin towers of World Trade Center, Pentagon building, the transportation system from London or Madrid) or elements of virtual infrastructure (the financial information management system within the World Trade Center) a high priority is to define the Critical Infrastructure concept.

We can elaborate a definition of the Critical Infrastructure concept which has as a fundamental element Romania's new security strategy and focuses its demarche on the guarantee of the individual and collective security, in accordance with current European norms [1].

We appreciate that a Critical Infrastructure represents the totality of physical or virtual entities which damaging or destruction significant affects the flow of products or services necessary for a state or community normal functioning.

No.	Critical Infrastructure Definitions
1.	<i>"Systems and physical or virtual values with such an importance that their disruption / destruction might have a negative impact on the security, economical security and health and public safety status" [2]</i>
2.	<i>" ... the infrastructure which damaging or destruction affects the health, safety, the nation's level of living or the environment of the affected nation" [3]</i>
3.	<i>" ... physical installations and information technology, networks of services and the values which in cases of ceasing or destruction might have severe consequences upon citizens' health, security and economic welfare or for the good functioning of the member states" [4]</i>
4.	<i>" ... those physical resources, services and information technology equipments, networks or values which destruction or disruption might have a negative impact upon the health status, security or economic prosperity of the Canadian people or the good functioning of the state" [5]</i>
5.	<i>"... systems or highly important installations which destruction or damaging causes a prolonged absence of services, significant disturbance or public order or other dramatic consequences" [6]</i>
6.	<i>"... each material or virtual asset which is vital for the good functioning of the economy and society" [7]</i>

Table 1. Various definitions of the Critical Infrastructure concept.

Facing such a variety of approaches and ideas, we consider that a national perspective upon the Critical Infrastructure concept needs to underline those common parts of various definitions and also the specific differences.

2. THE TYPOLOGY OF RISKS AND THREATS AGAINST THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

With the new millennium, the transition from the old world order based on a bipolar logic to new global security architecture determines the coexistence of positive phenomenon with those that could generate risks and threats. The confrontation between those values, beliefs and perceptions make our contemporary society to remain profoundly disturbed.

We can remind some of the major tendencies that influence the construction of the new international security equilibrium, such as: the acceleration of regional integration processes related with economic and financial aspects; the persistence of states' disintegration and the emergence of regional entities that intervene to obtain a more advantageous position in the new security configuration.

In the current globalization context no state could remain isolated or neutral. In this context, the manifestation forms of the principal tendencies generate opportunities but also new threats and risks. The notions of risk and threat have different approaches based on the theory or doctrine it represent, without a rationality marker which could serve as a universal criterion.

With the exception of the academic environment, the identification of the semantic signification of those contents is correlated with the situations types on which it references (Table 2).

The threat represents:

- *“A situation, fact or risk that could put in danger someone's or something's existence or integrity”* [8]
- *“A direct oriented risk which targets a certain system, a certain process, a person, country, alliance or process”* [7]
- *“Any event with the disruption or damage potential of the Critical Infrastructure”* [4]
- *“The deliberate or accidental materialization of a risk against Romania's national security”*[9]

From the precedent definition analysis and in accordance with the national specific, our opinion is that a threat represents, through intentionality and direction, a potential risk that jeopardize good functioning of the critical sector or critical infrastructure element we wish to protect.

The enumeration of the most used national and international definitions in the domain allows us to move on to the risk and threats typology of Critical Infrastructure,

through the perspective of the negative effects prevention against the goods and services flows distributed to the people.

There is a diversified typological space of the risk and threats against the Critical Infrastructures due to the criterion diversity that could be taken into consideration (Table 2).

Classification Criterion	Types of Risks and Threats
The relation between the risks and threats specific properties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ symmetric ▪ asymmetric
The nature of risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ with direct effects upon critical infrastructure; ▪ with indirect effects upon critical infrastructure;
The speed of risks and threats development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ critical; ▪ sensitive; ▪ moderate.
The relation between risks and threats regarding the infrastructure element	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ external; ▪ internal.
The actionable inclusion domain of risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ governmental level; ▪ local authorities; ▪ private sector; ▪ people.
The manifestation format of risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ dynamic risks and threats; ▪ static risks and threats.
The generation source of risks and threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ risks and threats generated by natural events (exogenous); ▪ risks and threats generated by technological events (endogenous); ▪ risks and threats generated by terrorist attacks, criminal acts or military actions.
The type of critical infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ physical risks and threats against physical infrastructure element; ▪ risks and threats against cybernetic infrastructure elements.

Table 2. The typology of risks and threats against Critical Infrastructure.

Those classification criteria could be grouped in accordance with:

- the location of infrastructure elements;
- the specific properties of each infrastructure element;
- the format of risks and threats;
- the actionable typological space of the risks and threats;
- the risks and threats ways of appearance and development.

At European Union level the difficulty to recommend a common classification of risks and threats is determined by the existence of a multitude of specific national

characteristics [10]. That leads to a different approach that recommends the identification of certain classification directions that include: all the threats; all threats, but mostly those directly or indirectly related with the terrorist threat; only terrorism and indirect threats generated by it.

3. FUNDAMENTAL TYPES OF RISKS AND THREATS AGAINST CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

During the time with the studies in the domain of Critical Infrastructure Protection became more developed, in national and international specific legislation were included the fundamental types of risks and threats against Critical Infrastructures, such as:

Source	Types of risks and threats
National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, Homeland Security Agency [11]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ natural and technological disasters; ▪ terrorism; ▪ denial of resources access; ▪ mistakes, errors or misuse; ▪ unauthorized systems' users ▪ criminal activities; ▪ industrial espionage; ▪ informational warfare.
A secure Europe in a better world, The European Council Security strategy [12]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ terrorism; ▪ mass destruction weapons proliferation; ▪ regional conflicts; ▪ organized crime; ▪ natural and technological disasters; ▪ climate change; ▪ informational warfare.
Norway NOU Report [13]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ natural disasters and climate change; ▪ infrastructures' vulnerability; ▪ terrorism and organized crime; ▪ administration reorganization and reform, privatization; ▪ the risks regarding maintaining the global communications; ▪ espionage; ▪ interdependencies between infrastructures.
National Supreme Defense Council policy no. 62 / 2006 [14]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ natural disasters; ▪ ecological accidents; ▪ nuclear accidents; ▪ terrorismo.

Table 3. Fundamental types of risks and threats against Critical Infrastructures.

The main difficulty of such a classification originates from the fact that such risks and threats against Critical Infrastructures are difficult to measure in a quantitative way and also hard to spot before they actually happen.

The dilemma is amplified by the fact that there are situations when the sum of those consequences could not be determined by simple adding the individual ones and their cumulative effect exceeds the sum of individual effects, as series of independent events.

We consider useful to find out the validity of the hypothesis according which the risks and threats identification at the level of sectors and elements involved become much more tangible in its actionable aspects.

A typical example is a problem related with an element of energy sector such as a nuclear power plant. In this case, the specific risks and threats are:

- technical malfunctions in the power plant's elements operation;
- time overflow regarding the power plant's life time;
- human error in power plant's operations;
- terrorist attacks;
- attack on the power plant with conventional or nuclear missiles (during war time).

Regarding the risks and threats typology against national critical infrastructure we can enumerate the degrading or destruction of [14]:

- main transport networks of electricity or water supplies;
- main transport communications;
- hydro energetic assets;
- protection systems against accidents and natural catastrophes;
- reserves utilized for emergency, siege, mobilization and war situations etc.

As an effect of multilateral development of human society the risks and threats could not be limited to those well defined. The attacks against the Critical Infrastructures do not clearly belong to a certain typological sphere, but to all of them.

We can notice that an approach based on a tree structure of risks and threats specific to Romania's environment indicates precisely their nature, from the Critical Infrastructure Protection point of view (Figure 1).

Considering the dynamics of Romanian specific risks and threats we could classify those elements in the aforementioned configuration [15].




Figure 1. The structure of risks and threats in the national environment.

Some of the natural symmetric risks and threats are: earthquake, flooding, land slides and drought. Among the natural asymmetric risks and threats there are: dangerous meteorological phenomenon, meteorites and cosmic objects and destructive effects of global warming.

In case of symmetric risks and threats due to human actions we could enumerate: chemical accidents, conventional war, major accidents on communication roads and accidents happened on oil extraction platforms. Among the natural asymmetric risks and threats due to human actions there are: terrorism and organized crime, nuclear and biological accidents, system design, operation and maintenance errors, privatization of national infrastructure elements with ambiguous provisions, informational and network based warfare.

4. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES VULNERABILITIES

The analysis of the problems related with the Critical Infrastructures Protection Assurance underline the necessity to identify the CI vulnerabilities. Lately there was a shift from the classical vision (considering each vulnerable part of a CI element separately) to an integrate approach, which consider also the cumulative effects of the vulnerabilities belonging to the other CI elements from the same domain.

The vulnerabilities might range from the multiple problems of Heathrow Airport infrastructure (which was projected for 45 million travelers per year and actually supports more than 67 millions [16]) to Nigeria's case (where any minor interruption of oil extraction, refining or transport determines unexpected crisis at the state level due to the fact that 76% of GDP come from the oil industry [17]).

Due to those different perceptions and the variety of manifestation forms, the definition of CI vulnerability varies depending on the level of the perspective approached.

No.	Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability
1.	<i>“A characteristic of an element regarding the infrastructure design which makes it susceptible to destruction or incapacity due to a threat” [3]</i>
2.	<i>“The characteristics or dependencies of an equipment, system, mean or IT application that might cause working degradation or destruction as a result of a threat of a certain intensity” [4]</i>
3.	<i>“Status elements like zones, domains, installations, structures, procedures, information and personnel with a high level of threat favor” [18]</i>

Table 4. Various definitions of Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability.

From the definitions formulations we observe the accent put on the issues of an entity (equipment, system, mean or IT application etc.) from an integrated framework in case of an adverse incident occurrence.

The quantitative identification and evaluation methods of a Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability must ensure a proper managerial reaction, without an amplification of negative effects that points out the importance of risk management analysis within any domain of interest.

A brief classification of the CI vulnerabilities could be made according to various classification criteria as follows:

- a. *The capability to bear the effects of internal or external threats*
 - global vulnerabilities with indirect effects on critical infrastructure;
 - specific vulnerabilities with direct effects on critical infrastructure.
- b. *The nature of the vulnerabilities*
 - human nature;
 - of organizational nature;
 - IT nature.
- c. *The risk level*
 - high vulnerability;
 - medium vulnerability;
 - reduced vulnerability.
- d. *The analyzed activity segment*
 - process vulnerabilities;
 - physical vulnerabilities;
 - informational vulnerabilities;
 - personnel vulnerabilities.

The usage of a single classification criterion do not offer a holistic solution to the extent necessary to determine the diminishing (or elimination) of discovered vulnerabilities. Applying the principle “ceteris paribus” - using a single criterion when all the others remain constant represents the only viable starting point in the investigation of the multidimensional national environment of CI vulnerabilities.

An important role for the definition of Romania’s current and future societal vulnerabilities is played by the National Security Strategy which represents a major step for the national CI Protection assurance. It defines the general framework of the

vulnerabilities and permit the discovery and enumeration of the main national CI vulnerabilities such as:

- inadequate or inexistent standardize operation control procedures;
- design of infrastructure elements without considering adequate defense mechanisms suitable for any kind of threats;
- unauthorized access to the control system of infrastructure elements;
- the possibility of using unauthorized command and control channels;
- lack of detection means for an easy and rapid reporting of illegal activities or anomalies.

On the national level misses an institutional framework dedicated to CIP domain's coordination that should elaborate a standard for a periodical evaluation of CI elements and also coordinates the implementation of adequate protective measures.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Critical infrastructure protection represents a domain which scientific and operational content is relatively well determined, with specific research methods from multiple specialties, such as: security and national defense; risk management; defense against the effects of disasters; crime and terrorism prevention or assurance of public order and safety.

This is the reason to conclude that CIP should be a human development invariant factor. Also the managerial aspects approach of CIP represents a necessity and a challenge due to a relatively limited national scientific approach of the problem from the reference domain.

The need for a systemic, profound and broad national approach on the CIP as component of national security determines a need for a comprehensive approach of all subsequent stages (the implementation of protection plans, emergency plans and standardized operational procedures) as basic components of the CIP strategic plan.

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SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS APPLIED IN THE AIR FORCE

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I. CHAPTER: General notions about military aircraft

I.1. Short history of aviation and military aircraft

The production and the improvement of the flying machines were conditioned by the development stage of the science and technology. The level reached by the science and technology in antiquity could not give a proper solution to human aspiration to fly. Many scientists including Archytas from Taranto (430-360 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), and Archimedes (287-212 BC) continued the researches on flying machines, the last of them discovered the law of the floating bodies, law that after more than 2,000 years has contributed to the solving of the balloon flight.

In the Middle Ages when the science and technology progress was strongly prevented, few were those who were concerned about the mysteries of flight, Roger Bacon (1214- 1294) anticipates the production of the first flying machines. During the Renaissance the flight problem was developed by Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), brilliant genius of mankind. His aerodynamics studies, flight of birds and also apparatus flight heavier than the air, went on the flight science. Leonardo da Vinci is the author of an airplane and a helicopter project but also the inventor of the propeller and parachute, too. Da Vinci's researches could not practically solve the flight problem because these went beyond the possibilities of the technique at that time.

The man's first flight with a heavier flying machine than the air was made in America in 1903 by brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright. The flight departure, built by brothers Wright, was not realised by flying machine own means but with the help of a catapult which launched it in the air.

The problem with its own means take-off board would be solved a few years later by Traian Vuia (1872-1950), who on March 8 in 1906 on the field from Montesson near Paris, made the first flight in the world with a heavier flying machine than the air using its own means of board.

Traian Vuia's brilliant achievements were to be continued by Aurel Vlaicu (1882-1913), famous builder and pilot, a flight enthusiast since his childhood when he proposed himself a construction of an aircraft.

On June 6, 1910 – a historic day today- Vlaicu accomplished his first flight with the airplane “Vlaicu I”. Aurel Vlaicu's fame and glory have been fully earned to the international competition from Aspern, the aerodrome from Vienna. To this contest, Vlaicu with the airplane “Vlaicu II” was ranked the first in the tight turn test, to the throwing objects test closer to a marked point and, also he was the second to the landing test in a given fixed point. Returned in his country, he started the construction of a new monoplane”Vlaicu III” .The desire to be the first Romanian that crosses the mountains in a Romanian aircraft production determined him not to wait the construction of a new airplane but to try to do this thing with “Vlaicu II”. On September 13 in 1913, the challenging day, would be fatal for the young pilot who has found his end not far from the village Banesti near Ploiesti- Campina road.

Henri Coanda (1886-1972) considered the father of the jet aircraft, has made a major contribution to the development of the engine aircraft. Thus, the engineer Coanda made a lot of innovations such as: instead of canvas- painted and varnished plywood; fuel tanks and lubricants installed in the higher level of the aircraft; wing slot to the appeals board to obtain an improving bearing; the wheels of the landing train fitted elastic on the flat steel springs that can be in some measure retractable.

The world's first jet aircraft flew at Issy les Moulineaux, near Paris on December 16 in 1910, was piloted by the inventor and manufacturer Henri Coanda. A very important contribution in the dynamics flight brought Coanda by studying the phenomenon later called “Coanda's effect”. By his exceptional creations, the engineer Henri Coanda contributed to the universal science and technology progress especially in the aviation technology field whose development is closely linked to his name.

The date of birth of the Romanian aviation still remains on June 17 in 1910 when Aurel Vlaicu flew for the first time on the land of our country with his own airplane. During the years 1910-1913 the entire flight activity from our country was dominated by Vlaicu's success. His flights were a strong enthusiasm for aviation.

Under these conditions, a Romanian association built at Chitila an aerodrome for the public flights and especially to set up an aviation school, first in our country and unique in south-east of Europe. On August 15 in 1910 during an aviation demonstration was inaugurated the aerodrome, the school in which were four aircraft.

The pilot aviation school began its work after almost a year in April 1911 when on the aerodrome's gate from Chitila entered its first students- six officers –weapon engineers, to whom

the Ministry of War gave the approval to learn how to pilot. Thus in 1911 the Romanian Air Force was founded.

The training of the first pilots was a difficult problem. In those days there was not the flight in a double command that would allow to the instructor to teach the students how to act the commands, how to combine their movement in the air, how to use these while taking-off or landing. At the board of the aircraft there was no flight control instrument or engine operation.

I. Chapter: The leadership concept in the Air Force

II.1. General aspects

The leadership is the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission. The basic concept that the effective leader should keep in mind has two fundamental elements:

- the mission

- the people

This is the leadership concept in the Air Force and in all the stages must take into account these two basic elements. These two are found in the definition of the leadership.

Mission. The first task of the military organization is to accomplish the mission. This is the main goal and anything else must be subordinated to this. Therefore, the first responsibility of the leader or the squadron commander is to lead the people to the successful accomplishment of the mission. The former Chief of Staff of the U.S Air Force, the General Curtis E. Le May emphasized that "No matter how well you apply the art of leadership, no matter how strong is the unit or how high is the moral of your people if your leading action is not completely directed towards the mission, your leadership has failed".

Most missions involve several tasks that must be performed for the unit to accomplish its responsibilities. The leader or the squadron commander must define the mission and also to establish the priorities for various components. In many cases, the mission is defined by a higher echelon. However, the leader should materialize the main direction of the objectives that his people will accomplish. When it is possible, the leader must involve the unit personnel in defining to these objectives to ensure their support. The individual involvement is very important when it is asked from each total effort. In the case of an aviation squadron it cannot talk about the squadron mission without the effective participation of the squadron commander. The objectives must be stimulating but also realistic. The objectives that are not realistic displease even the most determinate people.

The leader must establish reasonable and acceptable performance standards for each job to make sure that these are accomplished. These standards must be well matched with the mission and clearly defined for each people.

People. People accomplish the mission. They are the hand of the organization and without their support a unit will fail. All the aviation pioneers and those who followed after them knew that the real power of the Air Force is represented by its people. The mission is not done by machines, it is accomplished by people. The best weapons have a lower value without well trained and motivated people. Those of us who are in the leadership role have a special responsibility in that of developing and sustaining high quality people who will lead the Air Force in the future. The squadron commander or a leader's responsibilities include also the support of the unit personnel. The successful leaders continuously ensure that their people's needs are promptly and appropriated satisfied.

The French Colonel Jean-Noel Perego writes about command in his reflections: "Head-leader for two years and a half I was able to implement an action plan that was the result from 22 years experience at troops and that from all 29 years of work; I was supported by a fundamental idea:"man is a human being with three dimensions and the commander must take them into account".

First dimension, horizontal, is social; it puts in contact with others; it allows the appearance of that feeling which is called "cohabitation"; it is expressed in active solidarity.

The second dimension, the interior one, the inner, is that of the individual consciousness enriched by culture and reflection; it allows the mind formation and also a proper and a clear expression.

The third, vertical, is transcendental; puts the man in the cosmos and for those who already have met- ensure the relationship with God".

This is the man, total human being recognized as a "*person*" who the chief 'takes into account'; this is the man to whom he will give orders.

Clearly, the two parts of the leadership **concept - mission and people** are right now two very complicated elements. Successful leaders who are able to effectively master this complex concept have certain characteristics or special features.

II.2. The features of an effective Air Force leader

The effective leaders have certain characteristics that are fundamental elements for the management approach. The desirable qualities list for a leader is practical an infinite one. Many characteristics, such as honesty, are expected from all the military professional members, there are six features that are vital for the Air Force leaders.

Integrity - a total commitment to the highest personal and professional standards. A leader must be honest and fair. Integrity means the establishment of a set of values and adherence to these. The Head-leader of the Air Force, the General Charles A. Gabriel said: "Integrity is the

fundamental premise of the military service in a free society. Without integrity the moral pillars of our military power public trust and self-esteem are lost”.

Loyalty - a tridimensional feature that includes loyalty to subordinates. First of all, the leaders must prove loyalty before expected that the unit members to be loyal. The General George S. Patton Jr. emphasised the loyalty importance by saying: “Loyalty from the top to subordinate levels is more necessary but much less common”.

Commitment - complete devotion for duties. A leader must prove total commitment to the country, to the Air Force and to the unit he belongs to. The dedicated service is the hallmark of a military leader.

Energy - enthusiasm and effort of taking the initiative. Throughout the history, the successful leaders have demonstrated the importance of the mental and physical energy. They energetic approached the assigned tasks. Their training included physical and psychological elements and that made them able to look and act very carefully. Once the action course was determined they had perseverance and strength to remain on duty until the task was accomplished.

Decision – the will of action. A leader must trust him-self to take timely decisions. The leader must effectively communicate to the unit the decision that he took. The decision taken, of course, includes the acceptance of the responsibility. Leaders are always responsible when things go well but also when these are not going well.

Altruism – sacrificing personal ambitions for a more important cause. Leaders should be concerned about the task and its accomplishing and also about the welfare of the subordinates. Air Force leaders are not allowed to pursue their own comfort or advantage before the mission and people who they are working with. The acceptance of the sacrifice is intrinsic to the military service. Altruism also includes courage to face and overcome the difficulties. Although courage is often seen as a disinterested desire to face physical dangers as much important is, verifiable and more likely every day, the moral courage that a leader should have in taking difficult decisions. Altruism requires courage and character strength to confront a difficult situation without trying to pass another person.

II.3. The leadership principles applied in the Air Force

The leadership principles are rules or thoughts that have been treated, verified, tested over the years by the success got of the leaders. The most important of these principles are the following:

- *To know your functional tasks.* People will follow a competent person who has the necessary knowledge to successfully accomplish the mission. The Air Force leader should have a large vision on the unit mission and he has to be able to convince all the members of the unit that their tasks are correlated with the accomplishment of the mission.

- *Know yourself.* Knowing your own strengths and weaknesses, too is important in the leadership success. The leader must know his personal capabilities and limitations. An Air Force member can and will be an effective leader if he identifies his forces, increase them and consciously strives, reduces and minimizes the periods in which his style is inappropriate.
- *Give example.* The leader must set standards for the unit. People will follow the standards provided by the leader's personal behavior but also by his appearance. The subordinates will see the positive but also the negative features of the leader. The arrogance or domination do not impose respect but only resentment. The self-discipline also means physical shape. People who are in a good physical condition are better prepared for any mission. To be an example in the Air Force means also the support of some physical conditions standards. That is why the military leaders must be examples of professional behavior, appearance and physical condition.
- *Care for people.* The military leader must find out the subordinates requirements and must be sensitive to human needs. Are the people properly accommodated? Are they well fed? Are they promptly paid? Are there personal problems for which they need help? When people are concerned about these conditions, they cannot focus their attention on the task and the mission will suffer.
- *Communicate.* The information must flow continuously in the unit. Communication is a product that has two ways. An informed leader is able to realistically asses the progress of the unit for accomplishing the mission.
- *Educate.* People must be adequately trained to accomplish their tasks. The Air Force staff is trained by the professional military and development education, by the technical training schools and the training through the task is accomplished. The informal training, the practice and personal experience in a military unit are crucial means of strengthening of the formal training.
- *Equip.* It is also leader's task to ensure that the military unit is properly equipped. In the same way as a flight crew is not expected to engage in a battle without a well armed device, people should not be sent poorly equipped at the office or in any other mission. The management responsibilities include the identification of the needs, securing reserves and then obtaining the weapons, tools and necessary equipment.
- *Motivate.* The biggest military leader's obligation is the subordinates' motivation in getting high performances. Motivation is the force that ensures the success of the

leadership. Actually, the capacity of generating enthusiasm for the mission may be the most important element in leadership. The people's motivation depends on the understanding of their needs and the activity that puts in agreement these needs with the requests of the unit. Most of the people will work for an organization that takes care of them but also for the missions that they trust in.

- *Accept the responsibility.* The General Curtis E. Le May was asked to give a leadership definition in a word. After a few moments of thinking, the general said: "If I should define in a word the leadership, I would define it through responsibility". The leader is obliged to justify the consequences. Any attempt to deny the responsibility for failure destroys the credibility as a leader and erodes respect and loyalty.
- *Develop teamwork.* The leader must put together in a cohesive team a collection of individual performers that works for accomplishing the mission. The mission of the unit will suffer if each person from organization 'does by himself the job' by isolation. The leader must know how to match together different functions from the unit and also how these must act in harmony. To reach the mission's requests he must create and maintain an atmosphere of teamwork and coordination. The teamwork is achieved when people put the mission of the unit before other objectives.

III. Chapter: The squadron commander status as a manager

The squadron commander is definitely a manager. The affirmation is, first of all, sustained by the fact that he is the leader in the integrated air base. Secondly, having a managerial position, he has direct subordinates whom he influences in their actions and behaviors, too. Thirdly, the squadron commanders as managers directs organizational structures and material components, too. Whichever definition of managers is taken into account, the squadron commander has clearly this status.

III.1. The content and the important skills of the squadron commander

The conception of the Ministry of National Defense on the model of the officer states that this must, at the end of his training school, dispose these capabilities: people and military organizations' leader, military specialist or professional, fighter, educator and citizen.

These capabilities formed through the training system during the studying years are developed more or less in the ulterior evolution according to the professional stages that the person covers.

When the aircraft flying officer reaches the squadron commander it is assumed that he has well developed the military specialist capabilities, but also as a fighter and a citizen and it is required the development and consolidation of the leader and educator' capabilities, too because he is going to have to subordinate a fairly large number of people.

As for the ability of people's leader and organizational structures a squadron commander must:

1. *Be:*

- a personality with a strong and positive character attached to the pilot's conduct having developed at the medium stadium, biological, psychological, social and cultural dimension of the personality;
- an open mind able to solve creatively problems, to have the capacity of analyze and synthesize the processes and phenomenon he faces;
- a standard of behavior consistent with social and moral normality, to be the follower and preacher of moral values such: beauty, truth, duty, responsibility

2. *Know:*

- the main elements of subordinated organizational structures and the interaction between them that can assure the success in the leadership;
- the performances that are asked by the squadron, performances that the commander of this type of unit must have materialized in the general and operational objectives formulated in all the areas that he draws;
- to know himself but also the subordinates by mastering the recommended means of psychology and pedagogy knowledge;
- to know his functional responsibilities stipulated in the job description and in the current military regulations and especially the concrete achievements of them so that the efficiency to be maximum;
- to know very well the air base from which the squadron makes part;

3. *Do:*

- a more accurate definition of the unit goals by a correctly and concretely formulation of the operational and general objectives;
- a clear definition of the directions of action, he must take right decisions, to plan the squadron's activity, to solve current problems that unexpectedly appear, to pursue the performance standards of the unit, to supervise the subordinates, to evaluate them, to train them and advise them in times when they confront social or professional difficult problems;
- well clot teams and to form individualities;

-an appropriate motivation of the subordinates and to correct their actions;

This leadership competence is absolutely necessary to a squadron commander because an effective management is the successful key of a military organization starting from the training until the battle. The Air Force unit commander has missions to accomplish, missions that for him represent in the same time a proposal and a challenge.

III.2. The contents, the importance and the significance of the squadron commander professional skills and capacity

The squadron commander professional quality is given by two basic competences on the model of the officer: specialist military and fighter skills. Being in the possession of the specialist military skills, the squadron commander must:

1. *Be:*

-an efficient user of the aircraft;

-a coordinator of the operation and maintenance activities of the aircraft equipment and other resources from the unit he commands;

2. *Know:*

-laws and principles of the fights in the army;

-the management theory of the air and the fight actions in any weather conditions during the day or night;

-variants of weapons and possibilities of the aircraft fight;

-organization, equipment and the way of possible air enemy's action;

3. *Do:*

-the interpretation of the possible enemy's actions;

-to take quickly decisions on the air hitting targets and to transmit to the subordinates;

-to use the performance standards in the aviation technique;

-to interpret the fight actions of the patrol in the conception of the air base;

-to introduce, if it is necessary, changes in the tactical use of the fight aircraft;

-to maintain and operate with the subordinates the fight equipment technique

Being in the possession of this competence of fighter, the patrol commander must:

1. *Be:*

-a good performer of the missions that he gets and resistant to physical and mental effort;

-a good partner in the fighters team that the patrol aircraft has;

2. *Know:*

-the theory, in general, of the fight using weapons, and especially of the air fight;

- the theory of firing using board weapons;
- the theory and the management of the air navigation and aircraft routing;
- the issue of the aviation regulations;
- the human and social meaning of the armed fight and the rules of the international humanitarian law that must be respected in the fight;
- the principles of operation and the use of the aircraft and its weapons;
- the management rules of the patrols or of the fight groups aircraft;

3. *Do:*

- permanently tactical field analysis;
- the efficient use of the protective equipment means;
- the aircraft piloting and the subordinates directing in combat;
- to act in accordance with the received missions for his unit;
- to overcome the effect of the stressors and unexpected situations;
- his best in leadership of the subordinates in fight;

The quality of professional squadron commander is actually given by the fighter skills and also by the military specialist. The professional model of the commander is the synthesis of the pilot profession, the result of the evaluation of the complex connections between the professional domain and also the social, technical and informational environment.

The quality of professional squadron commander must include also the pilot's profession. This notion gives to any military commander the power and the authority necessary in the leading of the troops but they must act in order to protect the citizens and national interests. The squadron commander next to his authority must also have the sacred belief that the subordinates lives not to wasted in vain or discriminated neither by the abuse of power. This can happen only if the professional pilots adopt and adhere to an ethical behavior in this respect.

III.3. The squadron commander duties

The patrol commander directly subordinates to the squadron commander, he executes the training of the subordinated military crew, he is responsible of the military crew training and he is required to:

- to know the flight training level, the skills and the psychophysics status of each pilot from the squadron;
- to be well prepared as a pilot but also as a flight instructor given that it is trained the military crew;
- to take all the measures for the fulfillment of the tasks set out in the training flight;

- to continuously improve his methodological skills for the leading of the squadron flight flight;
- to form flight instructors necessary for the training of the squadron pilots in all weather conditions;
- to respect the documents what regulate the preparing of the fight flight ensuring the continuity of the crew training;
- to periodically check the properties correctness of the flight missions by the subordinated staff;
- to establish for each day or night flight on the base of the patrol commanders proposals the missions that are going to be executed by the pilots and to make the graphical plan of the squadron flight in accordance with the fight training plan and the unit commander's indications;
- to lead the training for the flight of the squadron personnel and to report to the unit commander about the planned flight missions;
- to follow the progress of the flight on the planned schedule and to control the quality of the execution of the missions by the subordinated personnel;
- to analyze with the subordinated personnel the typical mistakes in the piloting technique, air navigation, the use and the aircraft operations in fight to prevent their repetitions;
- to report to the unit commander about the completion of the flight;
- to lead the flight analysis when this was organized by the squadron;
- to organize, to prepare and to lead the methodical and tactical flight training of the subordinate pilots

III.4. The functions that a squadron commander always performs

The objective necessity of the leadership of an organized human community is determined by the apparition and the deepening of the social division of labor where it is produced the increasing specialization and demarcation of the leadership. To this contributed the biological and then gradually economical and social inequality between the members of a community which led some of them to take the leadership role.

Leadership always was a process of people's orientation in a sustained effort. Today, the leadership does no longer represent an exclusively practical activity based on experience and intuition but it became a certain form of intellectual work having a certain function based on a continuously increasing fund of knowledge.

Leadership has a social character and is realized on the established relationships between the participants at work to the development of an activity.

Leadership represents the action done by him on the system led to keep its functional status and its stability in a structure to adapt it to the changing conditions of existence and moving from the existing state in another desired state in accordance with specified purposes.

Leadership presents two essential aspects:

- *technical and organizational* that consists in the actual leadership of people by using appropriate methods and techniques;
- *social and economic* determined of the ownership, of the economic policy of the State, of economic levers used

Any leadership process assumes the following general sequence of actions: the analysis of the situation, problem formulation, the establishment of the evolution direction, setting targets, establishing priorities, evaluation of resources, allocation of the resources, choosing the methods, taking the decision to act, the organization of the action system, the achievement of the action, the achievements' control and taking the correction decisions.

The sequence of the mentioned actions and also the fact that the last actions prefigure the first of the next leadership process gives it a cyclical aspect.

The actions made by the leader represent its functions and all of them form the leadership process.

The management function is a basic concept in the management knowledge, a set of the cyclical leadership phases homogenous in terms of the content that define and coordinate each of this in a certain way the activities from a system.

Generally, the notion of the attribute designates an activity, an obligation of accomplishing some tasks or operations what can assign to a manager, departments or individuals that are dimensioned by the system's structure and its influenced factors.

In the analysis of leadership process should be considered:

- the essence of leadership remains the same whatever the level of reference and the management object is;
- leadership content that varies in function of these two: level of reference and the management object

The achievement of the leadership process presupposes the accomplishment of some specific actions that are grouped in a few defining functions for the role of every leader whatever his position is. It does not exist unanimity regarding the delimitation of these functions and their numbers, this is a reality confirmed by some famous authors who propose or offer different range of the functions. Some examples:

- H. Fayol: provision, organization, command, coordination, control;

- L. Gulick: planning, organization, staff management, proper management, coordination, evidence, preparing budgets;
- H. Koontz, C O. Doonell: planning, organization, staff, leadership, control;
- W. J. Duncan: planning, organization, control;
- H. Church: projection, equipment, command, evidence, operation;
- H. B. Maynard: planning, execution, control;
- V. Afanasiev: provision, organization, activation, coordination, control.

In our country a quasi-unanimous consensus of the specialists has been reached regarding the sharing of the leadership process in five functions: prediction, organization, training, coordination, control. The actions that give content to the functions are specified in their ensemble only to the leaders, these being the essential element, that, differentiate by those of execution. In this delimitation must be considered, in the same time, two aspects:

- the fact that any leader especially a squadron commander is concomitant an performer;
- the fact that in any performer's activity there are elements that are found in the management functions but these elements show only leader's own activity not the others as it is in the case of the leadership activity.

The main characteristics of these functions are:

- to exercise in all the organizations whatever their dimensions are and to all the hierarchical levels of these;
- have contents and different ways of manifestation in relation to the level to which the exercise is;
- are important and different shares in the leadership process, the attributes were defined through rules and other normative acts as: provision, planning, organization, command, coordination and control.

The functions that a squadron commander always accomplishes come first of all from the management functions taking into account that he is a people's leader and organizational structures. These come from military rules being of interior or fight order and are found materialized as functional attributes and tasks in the squadron commander's job.

CONCLUSIONS

Before the final goal of the Army ”- *the victory* -“ there was an intermediate target that was in a nodal point to which a great part of the processes that run through the military body shed

in reaching of a high training for fight to which our forces may enter with confidence in the theatre of action where we were sent.

Such a level “readiness” requires a concentrated effort that involves several activity segments between it is distinguished the continuous, intense and focused process of training.

This process has a major task of producing human resources - *fighters and leaders* - competitive, confident, disciplined and adaptable.

Given the ever-increasing diversity of requirements which the “*product*” will have to face, the process is face with new challenges. To these it is added the old problem of resources: time, budget and staff never seem to be sufficient. It is necessary a continuously adaptation of the process to entering or out constrains, in the same time maintaining the direction- the level of “combat readiness”.

The squadron commander acquired more responsibilities due to the increasing complexity of tasks that he is able to perform in the context of a new battlefield. In this respect he must know and apply the management method when preparing for the fight, he must be also able to plan, organize, coordinate and check the squadron in all the missions that are going to appear.

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FUNDAMENTAL ROLES AND PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

LTC Constantin DUȚĂ

INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

As can be seen, the world today is present as a network of organizations that appear, and grow or disappear. Under these circumstances, people are a key resource, a valuable resource to all organizations which provides development and their competitive success and thus survival. Without the actual presence of people who know what, when and how to do, is simply impossible for organizations to achieve their goals.

Therefore organizations involve people and ultimately depend on human effort. The essence of any organization is human effort and the efficiency and effectiveness are influenced, to a large extent, by the behavior of people within the organization. People are active resources of the organization because of their potential, experience and passion, their initiative and development which actively contribute to increasing efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.

Human resources are the only resource of producing and reproducing all the other resources available to an organization. As a result, organizations are increasingly concerned about the quality of human resources at their disposal on which the success of the organization.

Efficacy of all other resources available to an organization increasingly depends on the effective use of human resources. Of all categories of resources of an organization, human resources synthesize and express best what specific type of human activity to management.

I. THE ROLES OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In the literature, the management is defined as “the art of making things happen through people” or “put on others to do the job”. The essence of management is to “achieve predetermined objectives through other people”. So, the organization’s employees contribute decisively to the achievement of the organizational goals. Hence the importance that HRM has within an organization because involves people and decision about them.

Human Resource Management (HRM) is the management of an organization's employees. ¹ The goal of HRM is to ensure that the organization is able to achieve success through employees.

Since the strategic capability of an organization depends on its human resource as a capability, a modern HRM have a resource - based strategic approach. By managing its employees in a long-term perspective, organizations integrate HRM issues into its strategic plans and develop coherent and mutually consistent policies to put those plans into practice. Thus, HRM has a strategic role through human resource planning in order to achieve the organization strategic goals. It identifies the human resource needs in terms of quantity and quality for satisfying requirements of the organization.

Human resource planning is dealing with forecasting future needs, analyzing the availability and supply of employees, drawing up plans to match supply to demand and monitoring the implementation of the plan. HRM plans are connected to the employment, development and reward of people in organizations and the conduct of relationships between management and the workforce.

The areas of HRM are:

- Organization design and development
- Human resource planning
- Recruitment and selection
- Development and training
- Employee reward
- Employee relations
- Health , safety and welfare
- HR administration
- Fulfillment of statutory requirements
- Equal opportunity issues.

Dave Ulrich defines HR by what it delivers and considers that HR deliver excellence in four ways:²

¹ Armstrong M. - *A handbook of human resource management practice* (10th ed.), Kogan Page, London, 2006.

² Ulrich D. - *Human Resource Champions*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1996.

- “Strategic partner - Aligning HR and business strategy: ‘organizational diagnosis’
- Administration Expert - Reengineering organization processes: ‘shared services’
- Employee champion - Listening and responding to employees: ‘providing resources to employees’
- Change Agent - Managing transformation and change: ‘ensuring capacity for change’”.

The key role of HR function is to enable the organization to achieve its objectives by taking initiatives and providing guidance and support on all matters relating to its employee. The aim is to ensure that management deals effectively with everything concerning the employment and development of people and the relationship between management and the workforce. Another key role for the HR function is to play a major part in the creation of an environment which enables people to make the best use of their capacities and to realize their potential to the benefit of both the organization and themselves.

II. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Nowadays, very significant aspects guide the human resources management which is important for any organization to be flourishing.

The principles of human resource management are the basics of all functions of HRM. As an example, human resource specialists should make the selection of employees based on candidate’s merit, without any kind of discrimination or favoritism, each candidate being treated in a fairly manner and crystal transparency no matter whom their name is and where they come from.

Researchers agreed that there are ten main principles of HRM such as:

1. Comprehensiveness

Added value is created by people who create visions, define values and missions, set goals, develop strategic plans, and implement those plans in accordance with the underpinning values. Having in mind that human resources is the most valuable resource, people should be motivated and managed effectively in all aspects by taking care of their needs in order to do their work well.

2. Cost - effectiveness

The organization should develop sustainable reward system that can satisfy organization's needs but the payment of its employees should be related to their performance, contribution, competence or skill in order to motivate them to achieve higher levels of performance.

3. Control

To ensure that productivity and quality of organization's employees is achieved and maintained, managers should control periodically if their employees are doing the right job. This control should be made in a carefully manner because the employees do not need to controlled more tightly that is necessary.

4. Coherence

The activities carried out by Human Resources managers should be in accordance with the needs of the organization and employee abilities. All the plans of human resources management have to meet the mission and vision of the organization. One approach to achieving coherence is to start from an all-embracing objective, for example to develop a well-motivated, committed, skilled and flexible workforce. Coherence means that the key aspects of HR strategy are mutually supportive. For example a broad-banded pay structure reflects the organization structure and defines career progression path, which can indicate continuous development needs.

5. Communication

A good two-way communication is required so that management can keep employees informed of the policies and plans affecting them, and employees can react promptly with their views about management's proposals and actions. Networking should be encouraged in the sense of people communicating openly and informally with one another as the need arise.

6. Creativity

Any organization should be well prepared for the new challenges. In this way, a proactive approach to HRM is needed by stimulating creativity in order to increase organizational effectiveness. HR specialists should play an innovation role introducing new processes and procedures which are fitted with organization's needs.

7. Competence

Unique talents among employees, including superior performance, productivity, flexibility, innovation, and the ability to deliver high levels of personal customer service, are ways in which people provide a critical ingredient in developing an organization's competitive position.

8. Credibility

In order to maintain its credibility, the organization should define the role of each its employee so that all of them know how they will play their role in achieving the

organization's goals. By putting in place new strategies, the managers will ensure that all employees have a coherent sense of direction to a common objective.


9. Change

Any organization should be able to make changes in response of the dynamic environment in which it operates. Changes may be forced on an organization by competitive pressure, acquisitions, investments, new technology, markets, cost reduction, decision to downsize or outsource work. Changes may be made in what drives the organization, in the relationship between or among organizational parts, in the ways of doing work or in norms and values.

10. Commitment

To be more effective, an organization should pay more attention to employee commitment. Managers can use communication, education and training programmes, initiatives to increase involvement and "ownership", and the development of performance and reward management systems. By keeping their employees highly motivated, managers can get attachment and loyalty from them.

A systematic framework is designed for Human Resource Management in a Business Context based on the ten 'C' model.



These ten principles have been chosen because they are all measurable in some way and the essence of HRM lies in the tension and balance between them.

III. THE ROLES AND RESPONSABILITIES OF HUMAN RESOURCE SPECIALISTS

Human resource management involves all line managers and team leaders but human resource specialists exist to make essential contributions to the processes involved. HR specialists provide services, support and, as necessary, guidance to managers and employees in all HR functions. These activities of HR specialists involve taking on a number of different roles such as: the reactive/proactive roles, the organization's partner role, the strategist role, the interventionist role, the innovation role, the internal consultancy role, and the monitoring role.

The reactive/proactive roles

HR specialists can play a mainly reactive role at the operational level. They do what they are told or asked to do, respond to requests for services or advice, and provide the administrative system required by management.

At the strategic level, HR specialists play a proactive role. They act as an organization's partners, develop integrated HR strategies, intervene, innovate, act as internal consultants and volunteer guidance on matters concerning upholding core values, and ethical principles.

The organization's partner role

By taking this role, HR specialists share responsibility with their managers for the organizational success. They serve a long-term strategic purpose, and have the capacity to identify opportunities, to see the broad picture to see how their role can help to achieve the organization's objectives.

The strategist role

In this role, HR specialists address major long-term issues concerning the management and development of people and the employment relationship. They are guided by organization's plans but they contribute to the formulation of the plans. They point out the human resource implications of those plans. Also, HR specialists have a strategic approach to managing people by striving to achieve strategic integration and fit.

The interventionist role

HR specialists observe and analyze what is happening in and to their organizations and what organizational processes have an impact on people. They can formulate proposals on what

should be done to solve the problems. For instance, they may intervene with proposals on job design, team building, training, communications, etc.

The innovation role

If HR specialists have a proactive approach, they will want to introduce new processes and procedures which they believe will increase organizational effectiveness.

The internal consultancy role

By taking this role, HR specialists identify needs as they arise in the development of HR processes or systems, for example performance management, personal development planning or new pay structures.

The monitoring role

HR specialists have a delicate, even a difficult monitoring role to play because they have to ensure that policies and procedures comply with the legislation and that they are implemented correctly by managers. They may also act as the guardians of the organization's values concerning people.

The extent to which any of these roles are carried out depends on the position of HR specialists in the organization, the expectations of management on the contribution HR should make, and the specialist's own capacity to make an impact, exert influence and demonstrate that the services, guidance and advice provide add value.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

HRM should have as a key element the organization's employees and the relationship between them, taking into account that they are individuals with different personalities, goals, mentality, education, value systems and behavior that contribute significantly to meeting organizational objectives. The strategic role of HRM in an organization lies in the art of making coherent plans for attracting, retaining, developing and motivating people and helping to build up a suitable culture and climate. Therefore, by applying the ten principles of HRM in a balanced manner, the role of HR specialist is increasingly important in a modern organization. The fulfillment of HRM functions is based on the involvement of all parts – managers, HR specialists and employees, each of them having clear responsibilities in this domain.

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RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE FACTORS AND WORKING STYLE

LTC Ovidiu GEORGESCU

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the organizational climate is the most comprehensive assessment of various organizational dimensions, as this term includes evaluations of the employees on how to materialize the policies, practices and organizational procedures.

The general organizational climate is concerned when you want a first assessment of attitudes and opinions of employees, the general moods, a collection of general information about the positive or dysfunctional aspects related to work organization, interpersonal relations, leadership styles system, motivation, etc.

In this case the main topic of analysis is to see whether the assessment of organizational climate is influenced by working style factors and the style of management.

I. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

Organizational climate is an important concept in organization and management psycho-sociology. It refers to all social and human characteristics of the organization as a complex system, namely decision-making practices (hierarchical), the functioning of governing bodies, making the social functions of the unit's overall strategy to boost work performance and participation to leadership, cooperation between work teams, between departments, services, offices, etc. hierarchical relationships.

This concept means the variable factors that influence the activity and the sensitive behavior members of the organization and its functional structures, such as: rules and regulations, organizational or environmental constraints, motivation strategies, methods and techniques of information transmission. The psychosocial climate is defined as a sustainable internal environment of what is collectively felt by its members and influences their opinions, attitudes and behaviors. This is a complex psychosocial function with several variables including organizational factors, actions manager, group behavior and external factors of the organization.

In this respect, a definition of an extensive nature has Herseni T., revealing that both at the level macro sociologic, micro sociologic and (organizational) meet a specific psychosocial environment, believes that it is a "collective consciousness results plan very complex of all human activities...., from system selection, employment, promotion, supervision, control and sanction, to working style, by caring for people, respect their aspirations, level of morality".

Organizational climate is dependent on the characteristics of the organization (organizational structure, business profile, age of the members of the organization, existing traditions, personnel policy, etc.), the characteristics of human resources (education level, age, cultural level, etc.) and the organization's management (impact factor with the largest effects on organizational climate which determines the essential characteristics of doing things in a specific way). The climate is a subjective reaction to all its manifestations and group factors that determine an individual not to act directly, but mediated by how they are perceived in terms of members' personality, especially the attitudes, beliefs and ideals, as their consistency or inconsistency result in different degrees of what is expected from individuals and collective organization they belong and what they offer practically.

Organizational climate as perceived primarily by members of the organization will determine a specific behavior. People do not behave similarly in different types of organizational climates and not infrequently their orientation goes first.

Also, components that define organizational climate and leadership refer to the level of education and culture, moral character, communication system, and inter-group cohesion.

Defining the organizational climate is achieved due to the rise of the constituent variables without which understanding of the concept would certainly be difficult. Thus, Mihaela Vlăsceanu (2003) speaks of the organizational environment, defining it in a broader sense as a set of "things, people, conditions (resource constraints) or influences (cultural, political, legal) that interfere with functioning", while noting the complexity of defining the organizational environment and the existence of a variety of economic environment (goods, services, labor and financial market etc.).

E. Peacock (1999) defines organizational climate as "the intellectual and moral atmosphere that reigns in a group, all collective perceptions and emotional states exist within the organization. It expresses the general feeling of confronting climate of employee expectations and working and living conditions offered by the organization, and is a state of collective psychology, a group phenomenon, a state of collective contagion that objection in what we might call the internal human environment the organization."

By synthesizing existing meanings in literature, Dulea G. (2008) defined organizational climate as a collective mental state, a provision of mental relatively stabilized among the members of the group.

The concept of "organizational climate" will be addressed through the perspective of a standardized test, "Eco System", built and completed by Constantin Ticu in 2006. Given the Romanian reality with its specific and research data, the author went into its construction in how Romanian employees think.

The system involves assessing factors or conditions that ensure a good return on organization, which contribute to creating a climate conducive to individual and collective performance. It takes stock of the "mood" in each department / division and across institutions, an assessment of "personality profile" of it.

In this respect, several issues require attention that defines specific organizational culture and climate and cohesion of military teams. First, they have found that the main system of norms and values promoted in the army is generally their whole society, but, in practice, it takes on nuances, interpretations, evaluations and specific effects depending on the military. The inter-human relations in the Army, given its contents and purposes, is strictly regulated, directed, managed and controlled to meet all requirements of the military objectives, the details of whether the actions of armed struggle against reality, convergence efforts, subordination unconditional and prompt execution of orders and dispositions, of cohesion subunits, the requirements of military discipline.

A series of values and attitudes have obvious importance in the work group, respectively: hierarchy, authority, discipline (obedience), loyalty to the commander, organization, cooperation, attitude toward missions and tasks received and the attitude towards group interests, power, esprit de corps, etc. In this respect, a great responsibility belongs to commanders in everything they undertake in order to persuade, and at the same time, it requires an attitude of receptivity to rules and principles of conduct and specific to the military life. By all that is, by all that said, he must fight for the respect of the military, to create a true worship to all property coming into the legality and utility of social and institutional.

II. THE WORKING STYLE

Man is a complex entity and unique in its own way of thinking and expression. Each individual is the product of three important factors - heredity, environment, education. By heredity is passed then the genetic potential is exploited during our becoming under the

influence of environmental conditions in which we grow, live and work under the influence of constantly acting upon us.

Everyone has their own life style, a certain way to behave, a specific way to work, to drive. All these characteristics are the result of temperament (inherited), the character traits (acquired through education), the knowledge acquired, the skills, abilities, habits and beliefs that is animated, as well as his motivation, his state of health and prevailing emotional mood.

Although the style of work that leadership arises joint and combined based on personality traits, it becomes itself a fundamental feature of the individual concerned. Thus, there are industrious people, thorough in everything they do, cautious, careful with details, cooperative, with a sense of responsibility, punctuality, and others are slack off, scattered, careless, indifferent, etc. Interest in knowledge management style is practical, it depends on return business owner and also allows the person to provide behavioral characteristic situations.

The close connection between working style, leadership and the quality of the results was noticed in ancient times. Personal style, which is constant in the conduct of a person, is found in all links in management literature. As a result, there are special heads performance in one or several areas, but mediocre in others.

The management style is attributed to personality traits, but in different proportions in relation to their degree of consistency with the situation, the boss concerned and the group he leads. By the way we relate to others, commanders (chiefs) are divided into two groups: some advocates of the so-called theory "X", and some of the theory "Y".

McGregor, the author of this classification particularly useful for understanding others and ourselves, argues that proponents of the theory of "X" consider their subordinates subordinate cherish suspicion, are reluctant to work and change and do not want to take on responsibilities. Hence the need for continuous surveillance, direction, and control.

Followers of the opposing theory "Y" state that taken together, people are loyal, responsible, eager to assert themselves, ready to show initiative, in short they deserve trust, autonomy and independence.

Beyond the attitude of the boss, subordinates are naturally divided themselves into two groups: some behave according to the predominant view "X", others offering a predominant image type "Y".

Arădăvoaice G. (1998) defined the following types of work styles: authoritarian, democratic, permissive (Laissez-faire) method and dispersed.

Kummerov (2002) describes the psychological types and combinations of them found in the organization from several perspectives.

In terms of how to obtain and direct energy and the person, one can choose between extraversion introversion, direct their energy outward or inward and get in these areas. Personnel who prefer extroversion focus outward, they get performance when discussing their ideas with others. This behavior can occur in several ways: initiative, expressive, friendly, participant, enthusiastic, sociable.

Those who prefer introversion are focusing inward and like to create their own work space, that is, work individually for performance. Modes of expression at work: welcoming, reserved, intimate, reflective, quiet, independent.

Constantin T. (2002) in the development of personality assessment plan employees demonstrates the importance of cognitive style, knowledge, besides knowing the differences between the sexes, the skills, work-related psychological qualities.

The examined cognitive styles are adaptive and innovative (Kirton, 1976 as cited in Constantin, 2002). The first apply to solve a task, the road being used elsewhere. Instruction does not accept the changes. He is fastidious and resolute.

The innovative people solve tasks in new ways, which we find at work, adapting to the existing rules. They prefer policy strategies and challenging radical changes, and perceive change as new opportunities.

III. THE PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESES OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to verify and describe relationships between organizational climate factors, working style and leadership style applied in one structure of the Ministry of Defense.

Research hypotheses:

H1: There are differences between the assessment of organizational climate factors made by employees who believe better results are obtained when working independently and those who believe better results are obtained when working in teams.

H2: There are differences in how the assessment of existing incentive motivation among employees who are oriented excessively to solving tasks and those who are uninterested in the quality and accuracy of tasks.

H3: There are significant differences in the way of assessing the degree of satisfaction with the nature and importance of their work between employees who are excessively oriented to solving tasks and those who are uninterested in the quality and accuracy of tasks.

H4: There are significant differences in the assessment of attachment to the institution between employees who are excessively oriented to solving tasks and those who are uninterested in the quality and accuracy of tasks.

H5: There are significant differences between organizational climate factors assessments made by employees with less seniority in the institution and those made by employees with greater seniority.

IV. THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

The research strategy was chosen as the study standard. Data were collected using three questionnaires mentioned below.

Instruments used:

a. Questionnaire Eco System (Organizational Climate Assessment, conducted by Constantin Ticu, 2006)

ECO system examines 14 organizational climate factors that are quoted most frequently in the literature as having a major impact on individual and collective performance. For all these factors are strong and diverse empirical studies that prove their impact on performance or the factors associated with organizational performance.

Employees should evaluate whether behaviors described are present in individual work, collective or across companies / institutions.

b. The questionnaire SM 08 (Constantin Ticu carried out) 08 SM style questionnaire investigating work. Factors evaluated are presented as 10 pairs dichotomous. Adaptive, innovative, flexible planned it; Individuals-collectivist Dependent-Independent, Involved-Detached, Innovator, Conservative, Prudent, imprudent, intuitive-analytical-heuristic algorithms, Inductive-deductive. Has 100 items and scores for each factor separately reported in a benchmark.

An estimation was made by calculating the fidelity instrument's Alpha coefficient Crombach, resulting in that the test is homogeneous and has a high fidelity internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.921$).

c. CL questionnaire (to assess the leadership style)

It is designed to evaluate the management style classic model, which determines two distinct directions of orientation leader: task orientation and people orientation. The questionnaire is taken from the literature and adapted to the Romanian military.

Research variables:

a. Independent variables:

- *Work style:* Adaptive-innovative, flexible planned it; Individualist-collectivist Dependent-Independent, Involved-Detached, Innovator, Conservative, Prudent, imprudent, intuitive-analytical-heuristic algorithms, Inductive-deductive.
- *Leadership style:* task oriented, focused on the person.

b. Dependent Variable:

- *Organizational climate factors*

After checking the normality distribution for all variables SPSS procedures specific to each type of analysis were applied.

Thus, calculating the coefficients of significance were interpreted results, thus validating / invalidating assumptions made and the findings were made.

V. THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

1. H₁: To verify this hypothesis we used the t test for independent samples. Levene test of the observed value of $p = 0.725 > 0.05$ for all organizational climate factors, so it is not statistically significant, showing us that the variances are equal.

In SPSS tables that are not significant differences in assessing organizational climate factors made by employees who prefer an individualistic style and those who prefer working in a team.

In conclusion we believe that a hypothesis is not confirmed, which means that employees with different working styles did not assess organizational climate of the institution where they work.

2. H₂.


ANOVAs

	F	Sig.
motivation	3,161	,046

Since Levene test $p = 0.725$ showed that > 0.05 , not significant test results that are similar or homogeneous variances.

From the table we see that $p = 0.046 < 0.05$, this means that there is a significant difference between the three groups.

We find that there is a significant difference between the average motivation scores of subjects who are excessively oriented towards solving tasks than the average scores of the subjects not interested in motivation and rigorous quality tasks. This is seen in the chart below.



In conclusion we consider that hypothesis 2 was confirmed, which means that employees excessively interested in solving tasks oriented motivational system evaluates existing institution as more stimulating than the quality employees disinterested and rigorous tasks.

3. H₃: ANOVAs


	F	Sig.
Satisfaction	3,312	,040

Levene test value was $p = 0.462 > 0.05$, not significant test results that are similar or homogeneous variances.

From the table we see that $p = 0.040 < 0.05$, this means that there is a significant difference between the three groups.

We find that there is a significant difference between the average satisfaction scores of subjects who are excessively oriented towards solving tasks than the average satisfaction scores for quality and accuracy disinterested subject's tasks.

In conclusion we consider that Hypothesis 3 was confirmed, which means that employees excessively oriented to solve the tasks have a high degree of satisfaction with the nature and importance of their work for freedom of action, recognition and support received, while uninterested employees quality and accuracy tasks have a lower degree of satisfaction. This is seen in the chart below.



4. H4:

ANOVAs


	F	Sig.
Identification	3,175	,045

Levene test p value = 0.605 is > 0.05 , not significant test results that are similar or homogeneous variances.

From the table we see that $p = 0.045 < 0.05$, this means that there is a significant difference between the three groups.

We find that there is a significant difference between the average scores in identifying subjects who are excessively oriented towards solving tasks, to identify the subjects' average scores on the quality and rigor disinterested tasks.

In conclusion we consider that the hypothesis was confirmed in April, which means that employees excessively oriented to solve the tasks have a high degree of identification with the institution, sharing goals and values, identifying with her and are interested in the smooth running of the organization in greater than the quality and rigor disinterested employee's tasks. This is seen in the chart below.



5. H₅:

ANOVAs


	F	Sig.
Task	3,697	,014
Support	3,203	,026
Overloading	2,742	,046



Levene test value is $p = 0.879$, $p = 0.580$, $p = 0.216$, in all cases is greater than 0.05, the test is significant that the variances are similar or homogeneous.

From the table we see that $p = 0.014 < 0.05$, $p = 0.026 < 0.05$, $p = 0.046 < 0.05$, this means that there is a significant difference between the four groups.

We find that there is a significant difference between the average scores of the burden, support and overload of subjects who are older than the institution, compared to average scores on *task, support and overload* of subjects with less seniority in the institution.

This is shown in the next graphics.





We conclude that the hypothesis number 5 was confirmed, which means that:

- the employees with less than one year seniority believe that the institution's objectives and tasks are clear and precise, while the employees older than assess the objectives as being less clear and precise;
- the employees with less than one year seniority believe that in the institution there is a high support for performance while the older ones consider the support at a low level;
- the employees with less than one year seniority believe that evaluation of the institution is less objective, while the older employees appreciate the evaluation being more objective.

Conclusions

Following the analysis of the organizational climate, resulted a "snapshot" of the factors which contribute to compose a favorable or unfavorable performance of both individual and collective performance in the institution.

Employees of the institution consider that there is a good organizational climate. However, four factors were assessed as deficient and the institution did not pay much attention to their negative consequences for individual and collective efficiency. They are:

- The quality of decision-making system;
- Performance conditions offered;
- Equity in relations with employees;
- The conditions for organizational learning.

Other factors have been found to be satisfactory, favorable to the quality of professional activities in which he invested with some organizational resources efficiently.

It was found that there are strong links between working styles, leadership style and organizational climate factors analyzed. In organizational research in the military system, the application of this procedure (ECO system) could relate to:

- Checking the relevance of organizational climate factors and identifying the relative weight to create a stimulating environment;
- Checking the relationship between organizational climate and organizational performance factors;
- Identifying links with other psychological variables, collective and individual.

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NATO ENLARGEMENT FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

LTC Valentin-Gabriel GEORGESCU

INTRODUCTION

The “open door policy” adopted by NATO in which candidate states can become members of alliance is mentioned by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states “*The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty...*”. This was reaffirmed by the new NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The decision of inviting potential new members for taking part in membership dialogues is taken through consensus by all the members of the alliance.

While four nations were joining the alliance between 1949 and beginning of the '80s (Turkey and Greece – 1952, Germany – 1955, and Spain – 1982), the accession of new members starting with the end of the Cold War was a spectacular one, both from the numeric aspects but also from the political impact one. Twelve other states – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – joined NATO in three successive rounds¹, and others have expressed their willing to become future members of the alliance (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Georgia and Ukraine²).

Although NATO enlargement is considered a continuous process, it must be seen in the light of geopolitical contexts, namely the stages in which this expansion has taken place. Thus, during the Cold War, when NATO's role and objectives were clearly determined by the existence of the threat from the Soviet Union, NATO enlargement had a purely military reason, aiming to achieve a balance of power and geographical military distribution of force.

¹ Since 1949, NATO's membership has increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement.

² FYROM, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are currently the only countries with a Membership Action Plan.

During the ending stage of the Cold War, the geopolitical context caused some changes in the enlargement philosophy. Consequently, the defining moment of NATO enlargement was the management of an "empty space" resulted from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and loss of its influence on countries in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, a number of states, even some of the former Soviet republics, have asked to become part of NATO, considering that the ongoing reforms in these countries could approach the system of Western political, moral and economic values, and that joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the best guarantee of their security.

The third stage of NATO enlargement was determined by the events of 9/11 (2001), revealing a stable Euro-Atlantic space but under asymmetric threats from the outside, so that the enlargement in this geopolitical context having a new reasoning.

I. CONSIDERATIONS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

I.1. The NATO enlargement from the transatlantic relationship perspective

In a broader sense, *transatlantic relations* means all the political, diplomatic, economic, military, cultural, moral and other established between Europe and North America within national or multinational, either directly or through various institutions and organizations.

Transatlantic relations must be seen in the broader exchange of values between Europe and the USA. Sometimes, even the content is disputed, claiming that Americans do not share values with Europeans, but institutions. According to some opinions, values raised concern to the separation between legislative and executive power, justice, independence and rule of law, which are common on both sides of the Atlantic. According to others, it should be mainly considered the social and moral values, which often differ or are perceived differently.

In September 1995, NATO developed a study on its expansion to analyze and explain "*why*" and "*how*" this expansion would take place in the future. The results of this study were presented to interested partners and also made public.

Regarding the question "why" is needed an expansion of the alliance, the study shows that with the Cold War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO enlargement was both a necessity and an important opportunity to strengthen the security of the entire space Euro-Atlantic without creating new dividing lines.

The study shows further that NATO enlargement would increase stability and security of all countries within the Euro-Atlantic area by supporting and encouraging the democratic reforms, to include the establishment of democratic and civilian control over the armed forces, strengthening the means of cooperation, consultation and building of consensus that are characteristic to the relations amongst its members, and also promoting a good neighbour policy. The study also highlights that NATO enlargement would enhance its ability to contribute to European and international security.

Regarding the answer to the question "how" will the enlargement process be held, the study has confirmed that any future expansion will be in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Once admitted to the alliance, new members will enjoy all rights and will assume all the obligations deriving from their membership.

With the entry into this new century, NATO has sought to adapt the international environment changes constantly. Thus, NATO agreed to participate in peacekeeping missions under UN and OSCE missions even outside its traditional area. At the same time, NATO has trained Iraqi security forces, provided logistical support to the African Union mission in Darfur, coordinated efforts to limit the effects of the tsunami in Indonesia, and provided humanitarian assistance to the United States following Katrina hurricane and also to Pakistan following the devastating earthquake of 2005. In August 2003, NATO had to take command in southern Afghanistan, within the ISAF³ mission, in a time when the Taliban rebels violence raised to the top after the launch of Operation "Enduring Freedom" by the United States in the late 2001.

During the '90s, NATO has encouraged the development of a European Security and Defense Policy on the "capabilities separable but not separate" deciding on a territorial expansion by accepting new members and developing strategic relationships with its former adversaries, to include Russia.

Following the launch of the "War on Terror" by the United States, in response to the attacks of 9/11 (2001), a more frequently question has occurred whether NATO should predominantly pursue a global agenda or to focus only on its Euro-Atlantic core nucleus, considering the threats come from areas outside its traditional geographical area. If in the '90s there were built assumptions on the US Senator Richard Lugar dichotomy, like "NATO - out of area, or out of business", as it was considered as being difficult to find or justify the "raison d'être" of NATO if the alliance does not rise to the challenge in Afghanistan, today's question is whether NATO should or should not extend to global scale, from Vancouver to Tokyo and Wellington.

³ International Security Assistance Force

Looking back to the early post-Cold War era, we can see that the origin of this question is found in the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991, which is clearly underlined that Euro-Atlantic security space should be considered in a global context. Today, this question has become a vital one, since the alliance is facing threats of a global nature to the security, such as international terrorism and organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the collapse occurred in some regions due to "failed states", disruptions in providing constant energy resources, etc.

Given the above issues, the question that naturally arises is the perspective of NATO to become a global organization and how it could be influenced by a possible global process?

I.2. NATO after 9/11. Differences within the transatlantic relationship

Late 2001, NATO invoked the provisions of Article 5 for the first time in its history, and just two years later entered the war by taking over command in Afghanistan within the ISAF operation.

Although NATO allies have joined the American and British forces at a later stage of the operation "Enduring Freedom", the campaign highlighted a number of differences between the transatlantic partners. First, the US decision to limit NATO's military role in Afghanistan highlighted the US dissatisfaction on the decision making process within the alliance. One of the lessons learned from Kosovo, especially in the view of the Pentagon and the Republican Party, was that despite the relative effectiveness of NATO action to stop the conflict, NATO proved to be an inappropriate organization to conduct a war. Lieutenant General Short of the US Air Force, who was responsible for the execution of the air campaign during Operation "Allied Force" conducted by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, said the complaint that *"political interference from NATO member states was counterproductive to meet the established military objectives."*⁴

In addition, the US complains on the low level of interoperability within NATO showed the large gap between the military capabilities of allies. Former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson stressed that *"air operation in Kosovo has shown how dependent are European allies of US military capabilities."*⁵ These differences are largely the result of different strategies during the Cold War. While NATO's European members were preparing to fight against a possible attack by the Warsaw Pact countries, the United States have focused intense efforts on the design forces and logistical support on long-distance firepower.

⁴ Daalder, Ivo H. și Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo.*

⁵ Yost, David S. "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union".

It is considered the US are spending for defense a higher percentage of GDP and allocate money more efficiently than its European allies do, whose forces are more expensive because of the duplication of national defense capabilities. According to former defense secretary general of the United States, William S. Cohen, *"the European NATO members spend 60% comparing with the US spending on capabilities and contribute with 10 % only"*⁶.

Undoubtedly, the United States continues to assume a disproportionate share of the costs of alliance security and unfair share of responsibility for its actions as a result of imbalance between the US and other allies, in terms of their military capabilities. In the absence of an accepted leader for the security policy in Europe, which could accelerate the European Security and Defense Policy, a military operation without the participation of the United States seems to be impossible to take place today.

Another difference that characterizes the transatlantic relationship is the geopolitical one. Henry A. Kissinger, former adviser to the US President on national security issues, noted in 1973 that Europe remains a major regional power, while the United States is a global one. Indeed, while the US strategy planners aim to far regional powers such as China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea or India, Europe is concentrated on Central and South-East and its "periphery", namely Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Transforming an unreformed NATO alliance into a global one could lead to failure, because it would further widen the gap between the capabilities of the alliance and would reduce their level of interoperability. In addition, a global NATO would inevitably compete with the United Nations legitimacy on the global security arena, which would attract more than likely, negative reactions from Russia and China. From the internal viewpoint, a NATO-oriented globalization that would allow members to invite states from a non-Euro-Atlantic space, such as Israel, Australia or Japan, to join its inflexible structures would eventually lead to a decision-making process very difficult and complex or even impossible in the way it is stated by the foundation treaty, involving different geostrategic interests and security.

The territorial integrity of the Euro-Atlantic space is no longer in danger today. Instead, instability and collapse of state structures of Euro-Atlantic space elsewhere threatens security by terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instant access to energy resources, migration, climate change and pandemics. So NATO must focus on these global challenges beyond its traditional area and act against these threats directly to their source. As long as there is consensus that it is neither desirable nor imaginable to turn NATO into a global security institution, the alliance's area of operation should be defined also in the future

⁶ Yost, David S. "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union".

in global terms. As said by the former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "*the alliance must be an alliance with global partners, not a global alliance.*"⁷

II. DEFENSE SPENDING AND CONTRIBUTIONS

II.1. Theoretical aspects on defense spending

Security is a common good of any society. It is well known the national armed forces are financed by all taxpayers through the national defense budget, which is integral part of the state expenditure. Every single soldier, every weapon and every kilometer by military transport become possible only if they have been entered into the national defense budget. Accordingly, if procurement of certain weapons or certain activities have not been foreseen in the budget, they will not be taking place. Therefore, both the size of the state defense budget and its use are reflecting the national plans for development of the armed forces as well as the current defense capabilities of that state.

The size of the national defense budget and its change from year to year shows the nature of the perceived threats to national security as well as about the interests, which it is ready to defend by military means. The use of national defense budget also indicate which branches of the armed forces are considered to be priority areas, allowing to draw up certain conclusions about the state's military arsenal and fighting capabilities.

Theoretically, two lines of logic could be used when deciding how much should be spent for defense. Firstly, this could be done by estimating the needs for deterring or repelling the real or perceived external threat. Secondly, by assessing the realistic ability of the state budget to finance national defense efforts. In the former case, external threat and our understanding of it determines our decisions on allocations for defense, in the later – our understanding of the acceptable cost and the restrictions imposed by the scarcity of resources in the budget.

The first type of approach is normally favoured and driven by the military, who, having assessed the size and nature of external threats, draw up defense plans and estimate resources needed for the implementation of those plans. Such estimates are then presented to the politicians as the necessary prerequisite for the military to successfully carry out its duties.

The second option is preferred by politicians who have to decide in the end on how much of the national budget should be allocated for defense and how much for other purposes. Therefore, politicians like to come up to the military with a certain figure,

⁷ Press conference at the NATO's informal meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, 27 April 2006.

indicating the ceiling for what can be allocated for defense in the coming year(s). The military authorities are asked to make sure that their defense development programs stay within the established limits.

Real life experience has showed there is no magic number which we must or which we can not spend on defense, as there are no obvious limitations for increasing or decreasing national defense spending. Every developed state within two-three years could significantly increase their defense expenditure and, having made appropriate changes in tax rates and monetary policy, could do so without causing severe inflation. On the other hand, there is no national security program, which has to be implemented regardless of its price. Because the list of items which the military may wish to obtain would be almost endless. How in this case (if the cost would not matter) one could draw a line between the things which are absolutely necessary for the armed forces and which (for the time being) are not.

Defense is only one of the multiple areas financed by the state. The lists of “indispensable” items are long, if not endless, also in the other areas financed from the national budget. The state can (and should) decrease defense expenditures if it becomes clear that the society needs other items more. The politicians and only they have to make a decision and bear full responsibility for the choice.

In the countries that are members of an integrated military alliance, the process of formulation of a defense budget is influenced by additional factor – commitment to contribute to the collective defense effort and the deriving financial implications. Successful functioning of military alliance requires that each member makes adequate contribution to the promotion of Allied interests also in terms of budgetary contributions. The national and the collective defense and resource planning requires close co-ordination.

For that purpose NATO has established dedicated political and military institutions (NATO Headquarters and Commands) as well as intergovernmental consultation mechanisms (North Atlantic Council – NAC, NATO functional committees). These institutions and consultation mechanisms, at least in theory, may influence national decisions both on the size of defense expenditures and on their use. Through the formulation of common defense policy and strategies to counter the identified threats, these forums also play a role in forcing the allied members to undertake comparable financial commitments in the implementation of the agreed policies and strategies.

II.2. The NATO budgets


The NATO member states contribute to the activities of the alliance both directly and indirectly. The biggest contribution today is considered to be the indirect one, by participating in the NATO-led operations based on the principle "costs lie where they fall"; that means NATO members contributing with troops and/or equipment to a NATO operation will pay for their own expenses. Besides that, certain commonly conducted activities are paid from one of the following types of NATO budgets:

1. The *Civil Budget*, which provides financial support to civil headquarters and civilian personnel from NATO Headquarters. NATO's civil budget is financed by all member states, usually through their ministries of foreign affairs. For instance, the US contribution is provided through the State Department's budget (Contributions to International Organizations). The US current assessment is 21.7394%. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 through FY2011, the US contributed 66.1 million USD, 1.9 million USD, and 80.9 million USD, respectively.

2. The *Military Budget*, which covers all costs related to the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO HQ, Strategic Commands and NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) program. NATO's military budget is, in most years, the largest of the three accounts. More than half of the funds are used to pay for operational and maintenance costs of the IMS, its headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and subordinate commands in different NATO geographical areas, to include the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Casteau, Belgium, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, USA. This budget also covers the costs of administering the alliance's military-related activities and organizations, including the international military headquarters; the Airborne Early Warning and Control

International Military Budget 2009 - Budget Authorisation (BA1)

(All figures in Euro at 30 September 2008 parities)



System (AWACS) fleet operations, which accounts for a significant portion of the US share (US contributions to the AWACS program is 40.0%); the NATO pipeline (referred to as the Central European Operating Agency); and the Maintenance and Supply Agency.

Figure 1. NATO's Military Budget in 2009

The level of the NATO military budget is reviewed and approved annually by the North Atlantic Council. Individual member state contributions to the budget are based on a cost-sharing formula.

The contribution of the United States to NATO's military budget is provided through the Department of the Army's Operations and Maintenance account (Support for Other Nations). The US share is approximately 25%. In FY2009 through FY2011, the US contributed 408.1 million USD, 425.3 million USD, and 462.5 million USD, respectively.

3. The *NATO Security Investment Program* (NSIP) which finances joint C4ISR capabilities, strategic transport, storage, investments in air, fuel, port and airport facilities, aid navigation, etc.

The civil budget and the military budget are supervised by the Budget Committee, while the NATO Security Investment Program by the Investment Committee.

The NSIP budget today involves the collective financing of a wide variety of NATO support functions, including, for instance the C4I hardware and software, surveillance and intelligence capabilities, logistics activities, training installations, harbors and airfields, transportation, and storage facilities for equipment, fuel, and munitions. Its work is managed by the NATO Infrastructure Committee, and individual projects are implemented by host countries or NATO agencies or commands. In the light of fiscal constraints being experienced by all nations in the wake of the global financial crisis, NATO has had to postpone many of the long-term defense investment requirements, focusing instead on requirements for the current operations, especially the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

Because NSIP projects may be located in any of the member countries, this program has tended to be somewhat more politically sensitive than the other two. Infrastructure and other NSIP projects are decided upon through a priority planning process. Specific projects are generally awarded on the basis of competitive bidding, and, once completed, undergo through a NATO-controlled inspection and auditing process.

III. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

III.1. The financial implications of NATO enlargement

Although techniques for calculating the costs of NATO enlargement exist and are applied during the studies that are made whenever new rounds of enlargement are decided, the task of making calculations is not easy, since this is more than making a sum of the expenditures that are necessary to achieve the required level of equipment, training, military infrastructure, etc. The trick is to determine the “required level” for the Armed Forces of the new members as well as for Allied support to the new members. NATO military planners are doing that for each NATO member on a regular basis and, thus, should be in a position to do so with respect to any new candidates. The problem here is again political. The availability of such information to the candidates could frustrate them by establishing too high requirements for their economies to handle. Another risk could be that candidates, rushing to meet the military requirements, could damage other sectors of the national economies, trying to do too much in a too short period of time. Finally, such information could pose a risk to NATO if one or more candidates would achieve all the requirements before NATO is politically prepared to admit it. Thus, the determination of the “required level” was the major area where all studies on the costs of NATO enlargement have to make assumptions

The NATO members agree to share their obligations on providing the necessary common military and civil capabilities, however the military programs and defense expenses are left to the discretion of each member state. The amounts allocated to each member of the alliance depend on the individual strategies of long-term military modernization and general economic situation. An indirect measure to ensure the common military capabilities within the alliance and share the common obligations is represented by the agreements on the defense budget allocations (in percentages) in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

According to the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the NATO enlargement in March 2004 generated costs for the 19 existing allies at that time of 2.7 billion USD for 2004-2013. From this amount, the US had 650 mil. USD. Those costs did not contained the modernization of the armed forces and the technologization of the weapon systems of the new members, which falls under national responsibility, although it is possible to receive additional funds from outside, reimbursable and non-reimbursable through different mechanisms or financial assistance provided by third countries.

When speaking about the financial issues related to NATO enlargement, the widely used term “costs of NATO enlargement” can be understood in both a broad and a narrow sense. It is very important to make a distinction between those two in order to be clear which one is discussed.

The costs of NATO enlargement in their broad sense could be called “political” costs, since they embrace all real and perceived positive and negative implications associated with the admission of new members into the alliance.

The sum of positive and negative elements, which include military-strategic, economic, cultural and even psychological factors, will determine whether one or another candidate will or will not be invited to join the alliance. Decisions on NATO enlargement are exclusively political in character. NATO enlargement costs in their broad sense could not be expressed in terms of money (even though the term “costs” are usually with financial expenditure). They can only be defined in terms “acceptable” or “not acceptable”.

The costs of NATO enlargement from the narrow sense perspective are related to military and technical integration of the new member into the collective defense system. They first refer to the investments which have to be made into the defense forces and defense infrastructure of the new members to bring them to a specific level of NATO forces and to integrate them into the alliance structures. Such costs include procurement of weapons and equipment, military training, preparation of military infrastructure and meeting of different other specific objectives defined by the NATO military planners. These enlargement costs are far from being decisive in the enlargement process but they have caught greater public attention as they can be expressed in the easily understandable terms of money. Therefore one is asking about the costs of NATO enlargement one normally expects a rather short answer in numbers rather than a long lecture about Russian sensitivities, spread of democratic values or relationship between NATO membership and history of the post-communist countries.

The costs of integration of any new member to the alliance will consist of the following components:

- strategy chosen for the defense of the NATO alliance;
- force and infrastructure requirements for the implementation of the chosen strategy;
- cost-sharing principles for covering the costs of enlargement.

The accession of new members takes effect on costs from several perspectives. Although apparently the common costs to support the alliance are divided amongst more states, the reduction to the percentages of individual contributions are just 1 - 2% for a state with a large contribution such as the US, which has an annual contribution of approx. 28%. This reduction is thought to be insignificant for other countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, which together contribute to the common funding with 3.7 %. The GDP of the seven states which joined NATO in 2004 is approx. 40% of the GDP of the three states that joined the alliance in 1999, leading to a cumulative contribution of 1.5% of the

NATO common funding for all the seven countries together. From this analysis it can be deduced that a lower contribution of the future candidate countries from the GDP perspective would lead to a slight decrease of the contribution to the common funding for the current member states.

The direct contributions of the member states to the common funding represent just a small percentage of each member's overall defense budget and, generally, their scope is to finance the spending of NATO's integrated structures. The contribution to the common funding of the alliance of the potential new members is established at the level of NATO Senior Resource Board and is based mainly on the GDP of each candidate country.

The countries' percentage shares to the common funding are negotiated among the members, and are based upon per capita, gross national income and several other factors. The US shares to the three NATO budgets have fallen over the past three decades, currently ranging from about 22-25%.

Member State	Civil Budget	Military Budget	NSIP
Albania	0.0763	0.0556	0.0763
Belgium	2.1413	2.5187	2.2904
Bulgaria	0.3055	0.2327	0.3055
Canada	5.9532	6.1286	5.5000
Croatia	0.2686	0.1958	0.2686
Czech Republic	0.9010	0.7734	0.9010
Denmark	1.2619	1.6098	1.5020
Estonia	0.1014	0.0771	0.1014
France	11.9201	8.7227	11.6200
Germany	14.8411	18.2432	15.5360
Greece	0.8000	0.7967	1.1029
Hungary	0.6850	0.7037	0.6850
Iceland	0.0658	0.0497	0.0450
Italy	8.5000	8.3093	9.0189
Latvia	0.1367	0.1038	0.1367
Lithuania	0.2048	0.1557	0.2048
Luxembourg	0.1534	0.1402	0.1534
Netherlands	3.3271	3.4211	3.3516
Norway	1.4282	1.4865	1.5180
Poland	2.3284	2.4214	2.3284
Portugal	0.9000	0.7187	0.7500
Romania	0.9651	0.9005	0.9651
Slovakia	0.4068	0.3098	0.4068
Slovenia	0.2376	0.1809	0.2376
Spain	4.6195	4.2513	4.5595
Turkey	3.1374	2.6177	3.1374
United Kingdom	12.5944	9.1285	11.5478
United States	21.7394	25.7437	21.7499
Total	100.0000	100.0000	100.0000

Table 1. NATO Common Funded Budgets Cost Shares (2011)

As NATO has expanded, it has incurred certain additional costs to address some of the force modernization needs of the new members. These costs are being shared by all, including the new countries. In 2005, the NATO members adopted a new burdensharing agreement, under which the US level was limited to its then-existing share.

Although the cost estimates for the first rounds of enlargement after the Cold War have several years old already, they are official assessments of the minimum infrastructure needed by new candidate countries aspiring to achieve the objectives of NATO's defense strategy. Details of these capability requirements are classified, but the findings on additional costs to last round of enlargement in 2009 is a reasonable basis for the design of future cost analysis. Based on the statistics provided by the United States' Department of Defense including additional costs for the new member states, we can say that the last enlargement with Albania and Croatia cost the other members, in addition their current contributions to the common funding, approx. 1.3 billion USD over 10 years. In addition to these costs, the question is whether potential new members will be able to fulfil their obligations in respect to the provision of military capabilities available to NATO. They will start paying a contribution of 128 million USD to the common funding after a grace period of 10 years. Within the current structure, the military and NSIP budgets, excepting the NAEW&C program, will be approx. 38.8 billion USD for the period 2004-2013. The intergation of the two countries has demanded an additional 7.4 billion USD to these budgets for the next 10 years of integration.

Other potential costs resulting from future enlargement of the alliance are connected to the non-refundable financial aid grants and loans offered by some old members of the alliance, to develop the defense capabilities by providing military equipment, training and participation in (combined) joint exercises. For instance, at the NATO enlargement of 1999, each state which acceded to NATO received through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program a total of 30 million USD per year, and the seven countries in 2004 received 50 million USD each year.

III.2. NATO enlargement and the cost-sharing principles

An indicator which is often used to share collective defense efforts of the alliance is represented by the defense expenditures; this is an indirect indicator often expressed as a percentage of the GDP. Another standard for measuring the contribution of states to collective defense expenditures comes from defense expenditures per capita and the number of reported military population. And finally, today's increasingly important contribution to the global effort to participate in peace support operations is another measure of national contributions to global peace and stability.

Table 2 below highlights some of the indicators used when making analysis on defense expenditures.

Country	Population (mil)	GDP (mil USD)	(bil USD)	Defense spending (% GDP)	per capita (USD)
Member states between 1949-1982					
Belgium	10.3	248	3.2	1.3	312
Canada	31.9	727	8.2	1.1	256
Denmark	5.4	175	2.7	1.5	502
France	59.8	1,418	35.5	2.5	594
Germany	83.3	1,987	29.4	1.5	353
Greece	10.6	132	5.8	4.4	542
Iceland	0.3	8	0	0	0
Italy	57.7	1,175	22.6	1.9	392
Luxembourg	0.4	20	0.2	0.9	402
Netherlands	16.1	420	6.9	1.6	425
Norway	4.5	192	3.6	1.9	804
Portugal	10.1	121	2.8	2.3	273
Spain	40.1	643	7.7	1.2	193
Turkey	67.3	186	9.0	4.9	134
Great Britain	59.8	1,549	36.8	2.4	616
United States	280.6	10,430	350.9	3.4	1,251
Total	737.9	19,422	525.3	2.7	712
NATO enlargement of 1999					
Czech Republic	10.3	69	1.5	2.1	144
Hungary	10.1	64	1.1	1.8	113
Poland	38.6	182	3.6	2.0	93
Total	59.0	316	6.2	2.0	105
NATO enlargement of 2004					
Bulgaria	7.6	13	0.4	2.7	47
Estonia	1.4	8	0.2	2.0	111
Latvia	2.4	7	0.1	1.2	37
Lithuania	3.6	12	0.2	1.9	64
Romania	22.3	40	1.0	2.5	44
Slovakia	5.4	22	0.4	1.9	75
Slovenia	1.9	22	0.4	1.7	192
Total	44.6	124	2.6	2.1	58
NATO enlargement of 2009					
Albania	3.6	8	0.56	2	68
Croatia	4.49	37.9	0.62	2	75
Total⁸	10.14	52.9	1.38	1.9	60

Table 2. Defense spending by the NATO members (2009)

⁸ Source: www.cbo.gov

Analyzing the data in the table above and also taking into account the experience of the last waves of enlargement of the Alliance, we can say that a new membership who can not make a significant contribution to NATO's common funding will not lead to significant reductions in current spending members. On the contrary, a considerable increase in geographical area to be managed by the Alliance, the accession of members with limited financial means, could increase the contribution of other members to NATO budgets and result in a vulnerable Alliance.

The activities of NATO Alliance are financed by the Governments of its member states. Resources are allocated to finance both the operating expenses and specific programs.

There is a clear cut division between the *common or shared* expenditures and *national* expenditures of the NATO members which they use for NATO purposes. Only a small fraction of NATO forces is financed from the common funds (mainly the alliance headquarters and few special units). The main part of NATO forces and infrastructure remain under command, control and financing of the states in which they are located. Such forces are regular participants of joint NATO exercises. They are trained for the tasks they are assigned in the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or, more recently, in NATO-led peace support operations. Even if deployed in a NATO-led operation such as KFOR in Kosovo or ISAF in Afghanistan, these units are continuously financed and logistically supported by the sending states.

Another important part of expenditures consists of costs related to the maintenance of buildings and personnel at the NATO HQs in Brussels and major military Commands. Part of the personnel working in NATO HQ and military Commands has the status of international personnel. They are financed from the common Civil and Military budgets, which consist of the national payments to the common funding. These personnel represent the alliance interests and not those of his or her country. The other part of personnel, which NATO members send to the various political and military committees for co-ordination of policies and activities, represents interests of and is financed directly by the sending states.

All these expenditures i.e. the costs of preparation and maintenance of forces for NATO purposes (including international peace operations), payments to the common funding as well as participation in the daily work of the alliance have to be born in mind by finance planners of the aspirant countries.

As previously mentioned, the largest part of expenditures related to membership in the alliance is covered directly from the national defense budgets of the NATO members. Only a relatively small portion of NATO expenditures is financed from the common funds, which consists of annual contributions of the allies. Those funds are used for the purposes that serve

the interest of all members of the alliance. In addition, certain scientific, industrial and procurement programs are financed by several but not all NATO members. The general principle for deciding the size of the share is that each country has to contribute in proportion to its interest in a particular project.

Except for a few important exceptions, NATO does not conduct centralized procurement of equipment. All main weapon systems, vehicles, ships, aircraft and other equipment are procured and maintained nationally by the members of the alliance. How much and what kind of equipment and capabilities each member has to provide for NATO purposes is agreed in consultations between NATO military planners and each individual member.

As previously showed, from the common funds NATO procures and maintains the AWACS, which consists of an aircraft fleet, equipped with air surveillance radar as well as collective air defense and command and control (C2) systems. These systems are serving the interests of all the allies and the costs are too large to be placed under responsibility of one of the countries.

In each common financed undertaking the cost-sharing formula is agreed among the participants taking into consideration economic and political arguments and with due regard to the financial capabilities of the participants.

Future NATO enlargement will require reviewing the cost-sharing arrangements in all the commonly financed projects which the new members of the alliance will decide to join.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout its existence, NATO has been marked by profound changes and adjustments. From a static alliance, typical of the Cold War times, under changing global security environment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become increasingly dynamic. Summits in Washington, Prague, Istanbul, Riga, Bucharest and Lisbon, the accession of new members, successive changes in military command structure, new types of missions, transformation and geostrategic circumstances were "directed" the evolution of the alliance.

NATO membership implies not only security guarantees provided by other countries – which is the highest possible commitment by other state – it will also require the same commitment from the new members themselves towards the other states in the alliance.

Today, NATO's purpose extends well beyond the mission of collective defense of the Cold War era. Although collective defense remains a core function, the allies now undertake missions against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As in the case of the previous rounds of enlargement, it is more likely NATO to continue encourage any potential future candidate states to develop “niche” capabilities to assist NATO missions, so that to avoid duplication of capabilities and allow a more efficient defense spending.

Future rounds of NATO enlargement will have to consider the new candidates must contribute themselves to the security of the alliance. They will have to know and understand very well how the military of the other allies operate, and also be able to shoulder a proportional share of the burdens. And while they need to not field the same equipment or capabilities as the other allies, they must be able to contribute with modern and capable military forces to NATO operations, wherever its mission dictates.

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RISK MANAGEMENT IN ROMANIAN MoND

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INTRODUCTION

Risk is everywhere and derives directly from unpredictability. The process of identifying, assessing and managing risks brings any business full circle back to its strategic objectives: for it will be clear that not everything can be controlled. The local consequences of events on a global scale, such as terrorism, pandemics and credit crunches, are likely to be unpredictable. However, they can also include the creation of new and valuable opportunities. Many of today's household names were born out of times of adversity.

Risk management provides a framework for organizations to deal with and to react to uncertainty. Whilst it acknowledges that nothing in life is certain, the modern practice of risk management is a systematic and comprehensive approach, drawing on transferable tools and techniques. These basic principles are sector-independent and should improve business resilience, increase predictability and contribute to improved returns. This is particularly important given the pace of change of life today.

Risk management involves a healthy dose of both common sense and strategic awareness, coupled with an intimate knowledge of the business, an enquiring mind and most critically superb communication and influencing skills.

In this paper, I want to explain the principles, procedures, and responsibilities to successfully apply the risk management process to conserve combat power and resources in military operations. This paper applies to personnel during all military activities, including joint and multinational, environments.

This paper is intended to help commanders, their staffs, leaders, and managers develop a framework to make risk management a routine part of planning, preparing, and executing operational missions and tasks. This paper's prime focus is the operational level, the principles of risk management apply to all military activities.

I. DEFINITIONS OF RISK

I.1. General definitions of risk and risk management

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of risk is as follows: „a chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequences” and the definition of at risk is „exposed to danger”. In this context, risk is used to signify negative consequences. However, taking a risk can also result in a positive outcome. A third possibility is that risk is related to uncertainty of outcome.

For the purposes of this discussion, *risk* is defined as „a condition in which there exists an exposure to adversity.” In addition, there is an expectation of what the outcome should look like. Therefore, risk is defined here as follows:

Risk: „A condition in which there exists a possibility of deviation from a desired outcome that is expected or hoped for”.

Other definitions include the restriction that risk is based on real world events, including a combination of circumstances in the external environment. But is not necessary to agree on this limitation. Potential risks that might occur in the future are excluded. In addition, we do not limit the range of risk to circumstances in the external environment. Many crises in the economy and the financial services industry happen because of problems within organizations. These often have to do with problems in the human resource area, which belong in the realm of the behavioral sciences.

The term *risk* is linked to the possibility of deviation. This means that the possibility of risk can be expressed as a probability, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. Therefore, the probability is neither impossible nor definite. This definition does not require that the probability be quantified, only that it must exist. The degree of risk may not be measurable, for whatever reason, but the probability of the adverse outcome must be between 0 and 100 percent.

Another key element of the definition is the “deviation from a desired outcome that is expected or hoped for.” The definition does not say how such an undesirable deviation is defined. There are many ways of building expectations. By projecting historical data into the future, we build expectations. This pattern of behavior can be observed in our everyday lives. Another way of building expectations is to forecast by using information directed toward the future, not by looking back. The definition of expectations is absolute key in the concept of risk, as it is used to define the benchmark. Any misconception of the expectations will distort the measurement of risk substantially. This issue is discussed in full in the auditing and consulting literature, which analyzes the problem of risk and control in great depth.

Many definitions of risk include the term adverse deviation to express the negative dimension of the expected or hoped-for outcome. We do not agree with this limitation, which implies that risk exists only with adverse deviations, which must be negative and thus are linked to losses. Such a restriction would implicitly exclude any positive connotations from the concept of risk. We believe that risk has two sides, which both have to be included in the definition, and that risk itself has no dimension, negative or positive.

Risk management is all coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk. Two main purposes of the risk management are to ensure that adequate measures are taken to protect people, the environment and assets from undesirable consequences of the activities being undertaken, and to balance different concerns, for example safety and costs. Risk management covers both measures to avoid the occurrence of hazards/threats and measures to reduce their potential consequences.

I.2. Definition of risk management in military system

„The risk management in planning the military actions can be defined as the ability to transcend beyond the planning process for the identification and quantification of the proposed finalities and to materialize the ones which maximize the military advantage without prejudicing the overall position of the foreseen military advantage. Provided that the actual trends of the military actions are to translate to more untraditional aspects as humanitarian, social, information, cultural, economic or even diplomatic, the essential tasks of risk management are to determine what hazards present more danger than commanders are willing to accept, consider what control options are available and decide on appropriate actions to reduce (or eliminate) unacceptable risks.”

The concern related to risks management is not new in the military world. In order to take the necessary actions in due time, each structure, and each officer, NCO, corporal or sergeant who intends to achieve certain goals, establishes the specific activities and, at the same time, tries to identify as much as possible of the threats that could prevent him from achieving the goals. Even though we are not familiarized with the concepts of risk and risks management, we act towards this, number of times, either we are aware or not.

Essentially, the risk is a situation or an event that has not taken place yet, but could happen in future, in which cases the achievement of the a priori established results is menaced or intensified. The risk is the doubt related to achieving the desired results and must be considered as a combination between the probability to happen and the impact it would cause if materialized. Therefore, this new perspective involves a review of all the activities,

commensurate with the risks.

I.3. Related terms and differentiation

Frequently, terms such as *peril*, *hazard*, *danger*, and *jeopardy* are used interchangeably with each other and with the term *risk*. But to be more precise about risk, it is useful to distinguish these terms:

- *Peril*. A peril creates the potential for loss. Perils include floods, fire, hail, and so forth. Peril is a common term to define a danger resulting from a natural phenomenon. Each of the events mentioned is a potential cause of loss.

- *Hazard*. A hazard is a condition that may create or increase the chance of a loss arising from a given peril. It is possible for something to be both a peril and a hazard at the same time. For instance, a damaged brake rotor on a car is a peril that causes an economic loss (the brake has to be repaired, causing financial loss). It is also a hazard that increases the likelihood of loss from the peril of a car accident that causes premature death. Hazards can be classified into the following four main categories:

- *Physical hazard*. This type of hazard involves the physical properties that influence the chances of loss from various perils.

- *Moral hazard*. This type of hazard involves the character of persons involved in the situation, which might increase the likelihood of a loss. One example of a moral hazard is the dishonest behavior of a person who commits fraud by intentionally damaging property in order to collect an insurance payment. This dishonest behavior results in a loss to the insurance company.

- *Morale hazard*. This type of hazard involves a careless attitude toward the occurrence of losses. An insured person or organization, knowing that the insurance company will bear the brunt of any loss, may exercise less care than if forced to bear any loss alone, and may thereby cause a condition of morale hazard, resulting in a loss to the insurance company. This hazard should not be confused with *moral hazard*, as it requires neither intentional behavior nor criminal tendencies.

- *Legal hazard*. This type of hazard involves an increase in the severity and frequency of losses (legal costs, compensation payments, etc.) that arises from regulatory and legal requirements enacted by legislatures and self-regulating bodies and interpreted and enforced by the courts. Legal hazards flourish in jurisdictions in which legal doctrines favor a plaintiff, because this represents a hazard to persons or organizations that may be sued. The American and European systems of jurisprudence are quite different. In the American system,

it is much easier to go to court, and producers of goods and services thus face an almost unlimited legal exposure to potential lawsuits. The European courts have placed higher hurdles in the path of those who might take legal action against another party. In addition, “commonsense” standards of what is actionable are different in Europe and the United States.

For a risk manager, the legal and criminal hazards are especially important.

Legal and regulatory hazards arise out of statutes and court decisions.

The hazard varies from one jurisdiction to another, which means global companies must watch legal and regulatory developments carefully.

II. GENERAL FEATURES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS

II.1. Quantitative risk assessment

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) (also referred to as Probabilistic Risk Assessment _ PRA) is a key tool used in these new approaches. A QRA systemizes the present state of knowledge including the uncertainties about the phenomena, processes, activities and systems being analyzed. It identifies possible hazards/threats (such as a gas leakage or a fire), analyses their causes and consequences, and describes risk. A QRA provides a basis for characterizing the likely impacts of the activity studied, for evaluating whether risk is tolerable or acceptable and for choosing the most effective and efficient risk policy, for example with respect to risk-reducing measures. It allows for the calculation of expected values so that different risks can be directly compared.

Common practice in probabilistic risk assessment avoids, however, the aggregation of the two components and leaves it to the risk evaluation or management team to draw the necessary conclusions from the juxtaposition of loss and probabilities. In addition, second-order uncertainties are introduced via different types of uncertainty intervals to make the confidence of probability judgments more explicit.

Some of the basic tools used for analyzing the probabilities and risk are statistical estimation theory, fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA). These tools belong to the following main categories of basic analysis methods:

a) Statistical methods: Data are available to predict the future performance of the activity or system analyzed. These methods can be based on data extrapolation or probabilistic modeling.

b) Systems analysis methods: These methods (which include FTA and ETA) are used to analyze systems where there is a lack of data to accurately predict the future performance of the system. Insights are obtained by decomposing the system into subsystems/components for which more information is available. Overall probabilities and risk are a function of the system's architecture and of the probabilities on the subsystems/ component level.

II.2. Risk management and risk assessments

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is often associated with system analysis methods, but in this paper we interpret QRA (PRA) as any risk assessment which is based on quantification of risk using probabilities.

A number of new and improved methods have been developed recently to better meet the needs of the analysis, in light of the increasing complexity of the systems and to respond to the introduction of new technological systems. Many of the methods introduced allow for increased levels of detail and precision in the modeling of phenomena and processes within an integrated framework of analysis covering physical phenomena, human and organizational factors as well as software dynamics. Other methods are devoted to the improved representation and analysis of the risk and related uncertainties, in view of the decision-making tasks that the outcomes of the analysis are intended to support.

The traditional risk assessment approach used in QRAs can be viewed as a special case of system engineering. This approach, which to a large extent is based on causal chains and event modeling, has been subject to strong. It is argued that some of the key methods used in risk assessments are not able to capture "systemic accidents".

The traditional approaches, mostly based on viewing causality in terms of chains of events with relatively simple cause-effect links, are based on assumptions that do not fit these new types of systems: These approaches to safety engineering were created in the world of primarily mechanical systems and then adapted for electro-mechanical systems, none of which begin to approach the level of complexity, non-linear dynamic interactions, and technological innovation in today's socio-technical systems. At the same time, today's complex engineered systems have become increasingly essential to our lives. In addition to traditional infrastructures (such as water, electrical, and ground transportation systems), there are increasingly complex communication systems, information systems, air transportation systems, new product/process development systems, production systems, distribution systems, and others.

Risk assessment covers risk analysis and risk evaluation.

Risk analysis is a methodology designed to determine the nature and extent of risk. It comprises the following three main steps:

1. Identification of hazards/threats/opportunities (sources)
2. Cause and consequence analysis, including analysis of vulnerabilities
3. Risk description, using probabilities and expected values.

This definition of risk analysis seems to be the most common, but there are others. One of these considers risk analysis as an overall concept, comprising risk assessment, risk perception, risk management, risk communication, and their interactions. This interpretation has been often used among members of the Society of Risk Analysis.

Expressing risk also means to perform sensitivity analyses. The purpose of these analyses is to show how sensitive the output risk indices are with respect to changes in basic input quantities, assumptions and suppositions.

The sensitivity analyses can be used to identify critical systems, and thus provide a basis for selecting appropriate measures.

Having established a risk description (risk picture), its significance is then evaluated (risk evaluation). Is the risk high compared to relevant reference values or decision criteria? How does alternative A compare with alternative B? Risk analysis is often used in combination with risk acceptance criteria, as inputs to risk evaluation. Sometimes the term “risk tolerability limits” is used instead of risk acceptance criteria. The criteria state what is deemed as an unacceptable risk level. The need for risk-reducing measures is assessed with reference to these criteria. In some industries and countries, it is a requirement in regulations that such criteria should be defined in advance of performing the analyses.

The decision-making basis will seldom be in a format that provides all the answers that are important to the decision-maker. There will always be limitations in the information basis and the review and judgment described means that one views the basis in a larger context. Perhaps the analysis did not take into consideration what the various measures mean for the reputation of the enterprise, but this is obviously a condition that is of critical importance for the enterprise. The review and judgment must also cover this aspect.

The weight the decision-maker gives to the basis information provided depends on the confidence he/she has in those who developed this information. However, even if the decision-maker has maximum confidence in those doing this work, the decision still does not come about on its own. It is often difficult to make decisions when the risk is high. The decisions encompass difficult considerations and weighting with respect to uncertainties and values, and this cannot be delegated to those who create the basis information. It is the responsibility of the decision-maker to undertake such considerations and weighting, and to make a decision that balances the various concerns.

III. NATURE OF RISK

Recent events in the world have brought risk into higher profile. Terrorism, extreme weather events and the global financial crisis represent the extreme risks that are facing society and commerce. These extreme risks exist in addition to the daily, somewhat more mundane risks mentioned above.

Evaluating the range of risk responses available and deciding the most appropriate response in each case is at the heart of risk management. Responding to risks should produce benefits for us as individuals, as well as for the organizations where we work and/or are employed.

Within our personal and domestic lives, many of the responses to risk are automatic. Our ways of avoiding fire and road traffic accidents are based on well-established and automatic responses. Fire and accident are the types of risks that can only have negative outcomes and they are often referred to as hazard risks.

Certain other risks have established or required responses that are imposed on us as individuals and/or on organizations as mandatory requirements. For example, in our personal lives, buying insurance for a car is usually a legal requirement, whereas buying insurance for a house is often not, but is good risk management and very sensible. Keeping your car in good mechanical order will reduce the chances of a breakdown. However, even vehicles that are fully serviced and maintained do occasionally break down. Maintaining your car in good mechanical order will reduce the chances of breakdown, but will not eliminate them completely. These types of risks that have a large degree of uncertainty associated with them are often referred to as control risks.

As well as hazard and control risks, there are risks that we take because we desire (and probably expect) a positive return. For example, you will invest money in anticipation that you will make a profit from the investment. Likewise, placing a bet or gambling on the outcome of a sporting event is undertaken in anticipation of receiving positive payback. People participate out of choice in motor sports and other potentially dangerous leisure activities. In these circumstances, the return may not be financial, but can be measured in terms of pride, self-esteem or peer group respect. Undertaking activities involving risks of this type, where a positive return is expected, can be referred to as taking opportunity risks.

IV. RISK ARCHITECTURE, STRATEGY AND PROTOCOLS (RASP)

The most important component of the RASP is the risk management policy. The risk management policy will set out the overall strategy of the organization towards risk management, define risk management roles and responsibilities and set out the protocols that should be followed.

The risk architecture, strategy and protocols create the *risk framework* that supports the risk management process. British Standard BS 31100 provides notes on the risk management framework that state that it should include the objectives, mandate and commitment to manage risk (strategy), and the organizational arrangements that include plans, relationships, accountabilities, resources, processes and activities (architecture), and that the framework should be embedded within the organization's overall strategic and operational policies and practices (protocols).

Most large organizations will document their risk protocols as a set of risk management guidelines.

The range of guidelines that are required will vary according to the size and complexity of the organization. The types of documentation that will need to be kept are as follows:

- risk management administration records;
- risk response and improvement plans;
- Event reports and recommendations;
- risk performance and monitoring reports.

IV.1. Risk management framework:

Risk management architecture

- Committee structure and terms of reference
- Roles and responsibilities
- Internal reporting requirements
- External reporting controls
- Risk management assurance arrangements

Risk management strategy

- Risk management philosophy
- Arrangements for embedding risk management
- Risk appetite and attitude to risk

- Benchmark tests for significance
- Specific risk statements/policies
- Risk assessment techniques
- Risk priorities for the present year

Risk management protocols

- Tools and techniques
- Risk classification system
- Risk assessment procedures
- Risk control rules and procedures
- Responding to incidents, issues and events
- Documentation and record keeping
- Training and communications
- Audit procedures and protocols
- Reporting/disclosures/certification

The working relationship between risk management and internal audit is critically important. Risk management expertise rests in the assessment of risk and the identification of existing and additional controls. Internal audit has its expertise in the evaluation of controls and the testing of their efficiency and effectiveness. Successful implementation of a risk management initiative will require close co-operation and understanding between risk management and internal audit. The RASP should set out the details of how this close co-operation will be achieved in practice.

The risk architecture defines how information on risk is communicated throughout the organization.

The risk strategy defines the overall objectives that the organization is trying to achieve with respect to risk management.

The risk protocols are the systems, standards and procedures that are put in place in order to fulfill the defined risk strategy.

Following the 1649/2011 Order of the Public Finance minister, the Managerial/Internal Control became a system by which the leadership of an organization can control all the specific activities of the organization. This is specific to every commander, at his hierarchic level.

The Managerial/Internal Control is aimed at monitoring the military organization goals establishment and achievement, actively contributing to that. It must be applied to all the military structures and all the activities run within. The commander is the one to accelerate

the implementation of this type of control, by permanently adjusting the tools, procedures, and techniques commensurate with the changes in the military structure.

In the same time can identify and implement the actions to reduce to a minimum the risks attached to the activities necessary to fulfill usual tasks.

IV.2. Risk management architecture

The risk management structure of an organization can be described as the risk architecture. The risk architecture sets out lines of communication for reporting on risk management issues and events. It is vital that the risk architecture reinforces the fact that the responsibility for managing risks remains with the owner of that risk. So that risk management can be fully embedded into the processes and operations of an organization, a clear statement of risk management responsibilities is required. Also, as part of the analysis of each significant risk, risk management responsibilities need to be clearly allocated to the following aspects of managing that risk:

- development of risk strategy and standards;
- implementation of the agreed standards and procedures;
- auditing compliance with the agreed standards.

The risk architecture can be represented diagrammatically as a means of identifying the committees with risk management responsibilities and the relationships between those committees.

The importance of the risk architecture of an organization will be discussed later in this Part and examples of typical risk architectures will be provided.

IV.3. Risk management strategy

It is important for an organization to have a clearly establish strategy in relation to risk management. The strategy needs to be based on the overall approach of the organization to risk and risk management. An important component of that risk strategy will be the arrangements for ensuring risk management input into strategy, projects and operations.

In order to establish the risk management strategy, important decisions will need to be made about the risk appetite of the organization. Risk appetite will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. The risk appetite will be based on the opportunity investment, control acceptance and the hazard tolerance of the organization.

It is important that the risk appetite is within the total risk capacity of the organization. Decisions will need to be taken on how the risk capacity will be calculated. Also, thought will

need to be given to how the total risk exposure of the organization will be recorded and used in decision-making processes. Measurement of the total risk exposure of an organization is an important feature of operational risk management, as discussed in a later chapter. There are important decisions to be made in relation to the risk processes that will be adopted by the organization, as well as decisions about the design and implementation of the risk management initiative that will be undertaken in order to fulfill the requirements of the risk strategy.

IV.4. Risk management protocols

The risk management policy will set out responsibilities for risk as well as the arrangements for implementing the policy. Risk management protocols will be set out in a series of risk guidelines and these are described in a later chapter.

Procedures and protocols for undertaking the assessment of risks to strategy, projects and operations will need to be established in writing. The organization will also need to produce guidance on the frequency and nature of risk reports and who is responsible for compiling the information. Typically, the risk management protocols will need to be reviewed on an annual basis, so that they are kept up to date. The risk protocols should also describe the extent of record keeping that is required. The range of risk management documentation that may be necessary is extensive and provides an overview of the types of documents that may be appropriate.

V. RISK CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

V.1. Short, medium and long-term risks

Although it is not a formalized system, the classification of risks into short, medium and long term helps to identify risks as being related (primarily) to operations, tactics and strategy, respectively. This distinction is not clear-cut, but it can assist with further classification of risks. In fact, there will be some short-term risks to strategic core processes and there may be some medium-term and long-term risks that could impact operational core processes.

A short-term risk has the ability to impact the objectives, key dependencies and core processes, with the impact being immediate. These risks can cause disruption to operations immediately at the time the event occurs. Short-term risks are predominantly hazard risks, although this is not always the case. These risks are normally associated with unplanned disruptive events, but may also be associated with cost control in the organization. Short-term

risks usually impact the ability of the organization to maintain efficient core processes that are concerned with the continuity and monitoring of routine operations.

A medium-term risk has the ability to impact the organization following a (short) delay after the event occurs. Typically, the impact of a medium-term risk would not be apparent immediately, but would be apparent within months, or at most a year after the event. Medium-term risks usually impact the ability of the organization to maintain effective core processes that are concerned with the management of tactics, projects and other change programs. These medium-term risks are often associated with projects, tactics, enhancements, developments, product launch and the like.

A long-term risk has the ability to impact the organization some time after the event occurs. Typically, the impact could occur between one and five years (or more) after the event. Long-term risks usually impact the ability of the organization to maintain the core processes that are concerned with the development and delivery of efficacious strategy. These risks are related to strategy, but they should not be treated as being exclusively associated with opportunity management. Risks that have the potential to undermine strategy and the successful implementation of strategy can destroy more value than risks to operations and tactics.

V.2. Purpose of risk classification systems

In order to identify all of the risks facing an organization, a structure for risk identification is required. Formalized risk classification systems enable the organization to identify where similar risks exist within the organization. Classification of risks also enables the organization to identify who should be responsible for setting strategy for management of related or similar risks. Also, appropriate classification of risks will enable the organization to better identify the risk appetite, risk capacity and total risk exposure in relation to each risk, group of similar risks or generic type of risk.

As with so many risk management decisions, it is for the organization to decide which risk classification system most fully satisfies its needs and requirements. As well as being classified according to the timescale of their impact, risks can also be grouped according to the nature of the risk, the source of the risk and/or the nature of the impact.

V.3. Examples of risk classification systems

The table with risk classification systems provides a summary of the main risk classification systems. These are the COSO, IRM standard, BS31100, FIRM risk scorecard

and PESTLE. There are similarities in most of these systems, although PESTLE takes a slightly different approach. It should be noted that identifying risks as:

- 1) hazard, control or opportunity;
- 2) high, medium or low;
- 3) short term, medium term and long term should not be considered to be formal risk classification systems.

Standard or framework	COSO	IRM	BS 31100	FIRM Risk Scorecard	PESTLE
Classification headings	Strategic Operations Reporting Compliance	Financial Strategic Operational Hazard	Strategic Program Project Financial Operational	Financial Infrastructure Reputational Marketplace	Political Economic Sociological Technological Legal Environmental

Table with Risk classification systems

There are similarities in the way that risks are classified by the different risk classification systems. However, there are also differences, including the fact that operational risk is referred to as infrastructure risk in the FIRM risk scorecard. COSO takes a narrow view of financial risk, with particular emphasis on reporting. The different systems have been devised in different circumstances and by different organizations; therefore, the categories will be similar but not identical.

British Standard BS 31100 sets out the advantages of having a risk classification system. These benefits include helping to define the scope of risk management in the organization, providing a structure and framework for risk identification, and giving the opportunity to aggregate similar kinds of risks across the whole organization.

The British Standard states that the number and type of risk categories employed should be selected to suit the size, purpose, nature, complexity and context of the organization. The categories should also reflect the maturity of risk management within the organization. Perhaps the most commonly used risk classification systems are those offered by the COSO ERM framework and by the IRM risk management standard.

However, the COSO risk classification system is not always helpful and it contains several weaknesses. For example, strategic risks may also be present in operations and in reporting and compliance. Despite these weaknesses, the COSO framework is in widespread use,

because it is the recognized and recommended approach for compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.

The reporting component of the COSO internal control framework is specifically concerned with the accuracy of the reporting of financial data and is designed to fulfill the requirements of section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. It is worth noting that the COSO ERM framework (2004) is the broader version of COSO, and it also includes the requirements of the COSO Internal Control framework (1992).

VI. IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL RISKS. CASE STUDY

VI.1. Identify and evaluate potential risks.

The first step in risk management is identifying and assessing potential risks. In this work we will consider pure risks that can cause a business loss. It can start with reason of these risks or the risks themselves reasons they can not be determined. Identification methods are different depending on geographic area, firm characteristics, culture, leadership style, etc.. A common practice in modern management is brainstorming run with teams of managers and specialists in information technology and analysis, taking as its starting point a list of standard risks. Generally result brainstorm answers to materialize in the following questions:

- What worries you most in the economic activity that conduct?
- Which are the Risks? (Hazards / incidents / threats)
- What conditions allow the emergence of risks? (Hazard / vulnerability)


Risk identification is followed by analysis, step by which risks are grouped, measured and evaluated by quantitative and / or qualitative, depending on the nature of the firm. Grouping allows quantification and measurement of the losses likely frequency of occurrence and severity of the risk consequences of its action on economic activity. A method often used for this purpose is two-dimensional drawing up a risk matrix which is based on the following formula:

Composite Index of Risk = Risk Impact x Likelihood

The results can be represented graphically by drawing up a risk with axes graduated dial. Scale can have more or fewer gradations of depth depending on needs analysis.

For example we use a simple version with a scale from 1-4 where "1 = low", "2 = medium-low", "3 = medium-high" and "4 = high"





Probability-impact relationship places the risk in the dial, causing; also, prioritize its risk management plan. To perform a proper risk placement will be used sub-indicators for each of the two axes: to determine the count probability of occurrence and severity of probable frequency that can occur and to determine the potential impact is analyzed influence all areas of business risk of the firm. In many cases, without considering the possible impact to consider secondary and tertiary order effects, which causes incorrect prioritization. A risk that may occur less frequently but with serious consequences for economic activity will have priority over a risk with a higher probability of occurrence but low impact.

VI.2. Managerial/Internal Control in MoND

Beginning with 2009, for implementation management of the risk and internal control, in MoND, was applied M113/2009 *Norme metodologice privind evaluarea si dezvoltarea sistemului de control managerial in Ministerul Apararii Nationale* to all the military structures and all the activities run within.

One of the most important standards included into the Code of the Internal Control refers to the risk management. One of the phases that is necessary to pass is development of the organization Risks Register, in which the identified risks are registered, evaluated (as a probability to happen and as an impact if materialized), and established actions to counter risks materialization or diminish their effects, in case they materialize.

The evaluator should assign values for the identified ‘likelihood’ of occurrence (A) and the severity of the ‘Impact’ (B). By multiplying ‘A’ and ‘B’ together you get the rating score, which gives an indication of how important the risk is. The thick black line is the “line of tolerance”. Those risks that are plotted above the line (score 10 – 25) are “out of tolerance” and should be referred for further consideration.

Likelihood of Occurrence (A)

Severity of Impact (B)

1 - Very unlikely (hasn't occurred before)	1 - Insignificant (have no effect)
2 - Slight (rarely occurs)	2 - Minor (little effect)
3 - Feasible (possible, but not common)	3 - Significant (may pose a problem)
4 - Likely (has before, will again)	4 - Major (Will pose a problem)
5 - Very Likely (occurs frequently)	5 - Critical (Immediate action required)

E - *Extremely High Risk* - Activities in this category contain unacceptable levels of risk, including catastrophic and critical injuries that are highly likely to occur. Organizations should consider whether they should eliminate or modify activities that still have an "E" rating after applying all reasonable risk management strategies.

H - *High Risk* - Activities in this category contain potentially serious risks that are likely to occur. Application of proactive risk management strategies to reduce the risk is advised. Organizations should consider ways to modify or eliminate unacceptable risks.

M - *Moderate Risk* - Activities in this category contain some level of risk that is unlikely to occur. Organizations should consider what can be done to manage the risk to prevent any negative outcomes.

L - *Low Risk* - Activities in this category contains minimal risks and is unlikely to occur. Organizations can proceed with these activities as planned.

The Romanian MoND's methodology establishes three areas in the Risk Assessment Matrix:

- Green for scores up to 4;
- Yellow for scores from 5 to 10;
- Red for scores higher than 11.

L I K E L I H O O D	Very Likely 5	5	10	15	20	25
	Likely 4	4	8	12	16	20
	Feasible 3	3	6	9	12	15
	Slight 2	2	4	6	8	10
	Very unlikely 1	1	2	3	4	5
		Insignificant 1	Minor 2	Significant 3	Major 4	Critical 5
(A)		IMPACT (B)				

Sample Risk Assessment Matrix:

Green = Low risk, Yellow = Moderate Risk, Red = Extremely High risk

When the risk likelihood of occurrence can be calculated, the methodology assigns the following values:

Likelihood of Occurrence (A)

- 1 - Very unlikely (hasn't occurred before) 0 – 9 %
- 2 - Slight (rarely occurs) 10 – 34 %
- 3 - Feasible (possible, but not common) 35 – 64 %
- 4 - Likely (has before, will again) 65 – 84 %
- 5 - Very Likely (occurs frequently) 85 – 100 %

VI.3. Case Study

Group "SUPREME" is specialized in providing logistics and feeding especially in difficult areas. The group originally founded in 1957 by forming a company specialized in providing services feeding the U.S. military stationed in Germany. Subsequently, the company has grown and expanded, providing services similar to international organizations. Currently, the division "SUPREME FOODSERVICE" feeding group provides restaurant chains in Europe and multinational military forces deployed in conflict areas. Risks they are

exposed to activities of the company are diverse, bringing together the specific risks of conflict areas and those specific catering services. Transposing these risks in using the composite risk quadrant, the company enabled to properly design and analyze these risks:

Process / Activity	Risk (description)	Occurrence probability (Y axis)	Impact (description)	Impact (X axis)
Transport and Supply	Reduction terrorist attacks on transport	4	Stocks decreased and even interruption of feeding	4
	Floods and earthquakes	1	Destruction of road and rail	4
	Infection products purchased on the local market	2	Changes in food preparation	1
Product storage	Massive thefts of products from storages	2	Stocks reduced and the need for changes in food preparation	3
	Altering a stored inventory stocks	1	Stocks reduced and the need for changes in food preparation	3
Services	Risk of illness to consumers	2	Interruption of feeding on indefinite time	4
	Risks of sabotage by deliberate contamination of food	1	Interruption of feeding on indefinite time	4

SUPREME FOOD SERVICE selective risk analysis

This method enabled the correct classification of risk likelihood and severity depending on the impact which resulted in making effective risk management measures. For example, the risks of a terrorist attack on transport have been addressed through the acquisition of GPS performance and implement a real-time tracking of transports which allows forces to

intervene to protect shipments efficiently. The company also has diversified by acquiring transport aircraft and helicopters, a solution that has a positive impact on reducing risks from disasters. To mitigate the risks affecting the stock, the company has entered into supply agreements with local and neighboring countries, also storage built in low-risk countries but are in a geographical area close to the company providing nourishment. The case of "SUPREME FOODSERVICE" is a good example of proper risk assessment. Were presented only a few significant risks taken into account, the reality is much more complex matrix and addressed much more risks. Analysis of incomplete and misleading risk classification matrix can lead to negative effects very expensive.

Conclusions

Following the implementation of the Managerial/Internal Control, based on the review of the risks attached to each activity, one can identify, from the beginning, the possible distortions, anomalies, dysfunctions. This allows corrective actions to be taken in due time, thus avoiding aggravation of the negative situations.

As well, the units command can permanently monitor the “negative elements” (risks) which could endanger the accomplishment of the unit’s goals/missions, and the effectiveness of the established counter-actions.

To another respect, the managers (commanders) concerns can be focused on identifying and dealing with the causes rather than with the effects.

At the same time, the favorable conditions that make prejudices, damages, and swindles to occur can be removed.

According to the specific newest regulations at national level, starting with 2011, after the submission of the budgetary execution documents attached to the finalized year, every unit commander will develop a report completed on his behalf, certifying the level of implementation of the Managerial/Internal Control System in his unit. This level will be set based on auto-evaluation questionnaires filled by every microstructure chief (office, section, etc.) within the unit.

As a final conclusion, it must be mentioned that the development, implementation, and especially the efficiency of the Managerial/Internal Control systems in the Ministry of National Defense are attached to a new concept brought into use in the military area, and that is why clarifications, redefinitions, updates will be necessary. The whole process is a dynamic one, and essentially depends on the capability to accommodate and the know-how of the commanders in charge during this period.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE - JOINT FORCE COMMAND

LTC Valentin IACOB

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of World War II, U.S. military organization was successfully carrying out joint operations setting the stage for a profound transformation in the conduct of future warfare. However, the technological revolution in military affairs that ended World War II - the atomic bomb - plunged joint operational art into a long hiatus.¹ The military did not manage for years to develop the efficient model used in economy by corporations in merger and acquisition strategies which was based upon “1+1=3” formula. This formula is not what mathematics teaches but, when dealing with organizations, it reflects their individual capabilities plus their joint capability as a third value added. This is the true essence of joint: a multiplier of individual capabilities which translates into synergy and increases the result proportionally with the level of integration and cooperation achieved. Failure to add this multiplier translates into losses and bankruptcy in the economic and financial domains, while in the military can result in mission failure and lost lives.

The U.S. military has always been the spearhead of joint operations and until mid ‘80s it had been consistently seeking to revitalize the joint concept and change the organizational culture as the services’ bias was becoming challenging and counterproductive. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 reinstated the joint concept and joint operational art. Since its appearance there were continuous efforts to improve and implement joint concepts and military organization increasingly aware at all levels of the benefits of joint warfare. However, some of the challenges related to joint concept have transcended through time as they have never had a time dimension attached to them. These “eternal” challenges joint force command is faced with are *organizational culture* and *leadership*. They have been present during World War II in the staffs of Eisenhower, Nimitz and MacArthur; they have also shown up for Clark, Ellis and Short during the war in Kosovo.

These challenges will not disappear soon but there are solutions that could reduce their

¹ George Feifer, Tennozan, “The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb” (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1970), p. 566-568.

effects to the level that they no longer have a big impact upon joint force command as they have had so far.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The first major challenge to jointness is *organizational culture*. It can be defined as a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes a particular service. Organizational culture is actually a very positive aspect in the military. I consider it to be the engine that drives the warrior spirit of the soldier joining that particular service and, thus, become part of that respective culture. In fact, service culture is a major consideration in an officer's decision to join a service and also an educational factor that embeds traditions and values. It gives officers, NCOs and soldiers a common bond and stimulates their will to fight, their pride and their morale. However, unless properly understood, service culture can act like a brake when dealing with joint issues.

I.1. Joint Organizations

A major contributor making organizational culture a challenge for the joint force command is joint organizations. Many great military commanders established joint staffs to carry out joint planning and operations but their respective service background diminished the benefits of such organizations. Admiral Nimitz and naval planners envisaged that all amphibious operation carried in Pacific should be under naval command. Moreover, Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley who was the commander of South Pacific exercised command “through a staff that was essentially naval in character. Of 103 officers assigned in September 1942 only three wore the Army uniform. In addition, all the major commands in the theater were under Navy officers and had predominantly Navy staffs.”² This situation led to many difficulties particularly in the areas of logistic and air support. Later in 1980 during operation Eagle Claw aimed at rescuing the American hostages from Iran, organizational culture and biases generated by this led to a major failure. “The failure is not simply attributable to inter-service rivalry, but to an inability to understand the mind-sets of the services.”³ In this case the joint planning team, although with the right attitude, failed to achieve “1+1=3” effect by not employing the right capabilities. Operation Eagle Claw also proves the fact that pushing

² A534 Joint Force Command Syllabus / Book of Readings (CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Dec 2004), p. L2-1-5.

³ Ibid. 2, p. L4-2-7.

too much for joint and “giving everybody a piece of the pie”⁴ is not necessarily a recipe for success unless the planners intimately understand how to best employ capabilities belonging to different services.

I.2. Joint Career Management

This leads to a second aspect of organizational culture being a challenge for joint force command: joint career management and career opportunities. To become an effective joint planner, an officer has to serve in a joint organization and have a significant degree of early exposure to other service cultures. Operation Allied Force conducted by NATO in the Balkans has many examples of how the lack of early joint appointments for officers negatively influences joint force command. General Wesley Clark and Lieutenant-General Michael Short could not agree upon the use of air power against Serbia. They both lacked joint service appointments until late in their career. Lieutenant-General Short spent about 26 years only in solely Air Force assignments and General Clark spent most of his career until 1994 only in Army positions. As a result, their mind was very much embedded in their respective service cultures due to lack of joint exposure at an early stage in their career and they became “service-centric” in terms of thinking by the time they reached top positions.

However, leaving the service early even temporarily could pose difficulties in career and this fact has always been place. I would venture to state that in the past officers serving early in career in a joint staff were not offered “equal opportunities”. This negative aspect was well unveiled in the 1985 report of the U.S. Defense Organization. This report concluded that, “military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty; are pressured for loyalty by their services while serving on joint assignments; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs.”⁵ Indeed, the best officers with bright futures would have had better chances of getting assignments that ensured promotions if they stayed in their respective services. Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols Act brought in a major change to this “status quo” in the career management by establishing procedures for selection, education, assignment and promotion of joint duty officers. Its provisions allowed for equal opportunities giving young staff officers a chance to choose joint assignments without having to overcome difficulties when considered for promotion in their respective services. The benefits showed up sooner than expected during the Gulf War when, as General Schwarzkopf declared, “the quality of

⁴ A534 Joint Force Command Syllabus / Book of Readings (CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Dec 2004), p. L4-2-7. Attributed to Lieutenant-General Pustay, former JCS Chairman Assistant.

the people that were assigned to Central Command at all levels changed dramatically as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.”⁶ Service culture domination upon the career management became less and less significant after 1990 having more good officers choosing an early joint career assignment. However, there were and still are military leaders having not served in a joint environment until becoming flag officers and the influence in thinking of their respective service cultures can still represent a barrier for joint. In Romania only after joining NATO we could speak about joint officers at the level of the defense staff which was consisted in early ‘90s in vast majority of land officers.

II. LEADERSHIP

While organizational culture drives the effects upon joint force command upwards, leadership represents a challenge from the top downwards influencing all levels.

II.1. Leader personality

The personalities of leaders have always played an important role in a joint organization. Joint leaders have to be “color blind” in terms of service and to forge a climate of integration within their organizations. A leader with a personality that is centered on his background service can pose a significant challenge to joint command. History is full of examples of personalities clashing to foster service parochialism. In WWII, the U.S. Navy promoted a strategy that was contrary to Marshall’s efforts to defeat Hitler first before Japan. In addition, admirals King and Nimitz “fought hard to command the entire Pacific theater, thus running up against the Army under General Douglas MacArthur in the South Pacific.”⁷ General Marshall possessed a true joint leader personality and he managed to keep things under control and focus the leaders involved upon jointly achieving their objectives. Years later, even with the changes brought in by Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the personality issue was still a problem during the first Gulf War.

As a proof of the non-temporal character of the challenge leaders’ personality represent for joint force command, we find the same problem alive in 2001 making general Tommy Franks describe that briefing Joint Chiefs would be “a bridge too far” due to the fact they were likely to “posture” and divert from the joint warfare view CENTCOM had.

⁵ A534 Joint Force Command Syllabus / Book of Readings (CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Dec 2004), p. L5-2-5.

⁶ Ibid. 5, p. L5-2-5.

⁷ General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, “American Soldier” (Harper-Collins Publishers Inc., New York, 2004), p. 278-279.

II.2. Joint Command and Control

Another facet of the leadership challenge to joint is command and control. This has always been a major Achilles' heel in joint warfare. Most failures occurred not as a result of services performance but as a direct consequence of inadequate command and control relationships at the joint level. Towards the end of WWII, Nimitz and MacArthur commanded their forces as integrated and cohesive teams. In 1950, during the planning of operation Chromite, "General MacArthur saw the need for a new form of joint authority to coordinate, control and deconflict air operations. This concept, which became known as coordination control, was the forerunner of the modern Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept".⁸ The experience of these "titans" of military leadership was not properly built upon after '50s. Failure to establish clear command and control in a joint operation led to a disastrous result in operation Eagle Claw. The Holloway report states that "training was planned and conducted on a highly decentralized basis within an informal component command structure that does not appear to have been clearly established..."⁹ Goldwater-Nichols Act managed to bring major improvements to operational command and control and, as general Norman Schwarzkopf said, "established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force".¹⁰ However, even with the structure and guidelines set by this act, there were still problems that appeared as a result of ineffective joint command and control during the Gulf War and in operations Allied Force in 1998. Moreover, the latter one also proved the difficulties of joint command and control are much increased in a multinational environment. A relevant example to illustrate this is the joint targeting process adopted which, due to unclear command relationships, proved to be very difficult and dissociated from the strategic intent. During the planning stage of operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, general Tommy Franks, in an attempt to prevent difficulties in command and control, told the Defense Secretary: "I have to know ... that unity of command prevails. I will follow every lawful order that you and the President give me. But I must have command authority to execute those orders".¹¹

⁸ John R. Ballard, "Operation Chromite - Counterattack at Inchon" (Joint Force Quarterly, 2001), p. 31-36.

⁹ A534 Joint Force Command Syllabus / Book of Readings (CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Dec 2004), p. L4-2-7.

¹⁰ Ibid. 9, p. L5-2-3.

CONCLUSIONS

General Tommy Franks faced in 2001 the same challenges many military leaders in the past were faced with during operations: *organizational culture* and *leadership*. They are eternal challenges because they are still with us and will not soon go away. As organizations and equipment evolves, so these challenges evolve developing new facets. Throughout the years, all the attempts to make these challenges fade away succeeded only to a limited extent and soldiers paid the ultimate price sacrificing their lives because of this. The only viable and long-lasting solution is the ability of all military leaders and staff officers to open their minds and accept that joint warfare is the only key to success in the complex contemporary operating environment of nowadays. As Eisenhower wrote in 1946: "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If we ever again should be involved in war, we will fight with all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."¹²

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¹¹ General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, "American Soldier" (Harper-Collins Publishers Inc., New York, 2004), p. 278.

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GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP: THE FUTURE OF MARITIME SECURITY MANAGEMENT

CDR Marian IOAN

INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War and subsequently the transformation/evolution of the security threats faced today by so many states shows that the choice to retreat into isolation in order to protect the country and the citizens is a lost cause for any political leader. Total security and total defense, although a myth, can be very much improved by mutual trust and cooperation.

Likewise, in this day and age, the economy of every state relies on globalization. It means that today's products are manufactured at low costs through efficiently cooperation which combines skills, specialization and costs of materiel from multiple markets across the globe. As this goes around as and continues to develop, one cannot help but make the mental leap and figure out that once the global cooperation works for the economy it should work for the overall security and stability also. It is obvious that nowadays our security is interconnected and that the fight against rogue entities should be a global endeavour. Not only the threats are coming from this international dependence but we should challenge them united.

In his remarks delivered at the Seventeenth Sea Power Symposium in September 2005, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations at that time, challenged his audience formed by a large part of world's maritime leaders with the concept of the *thousand-ship navy*, a tool for obtaining security and stability in the maritime domain¹. To have a fleet with an inventor of one thousand ships is unattainable even for the most powerful navy to date and, probably because the size was the first thing that impacted the general public, later this concept changed the name to Global Maritime Partnership (GMP). Nevertheless the rationales and the good will remained the same.

Traditionally, states govern their maritime security strategies on their own. But in this global struggle against transnational threats for the security of this almost unlimited maritime domain, only the state specific measures may not suffice. Policing the world's maritime

¹ Ronald E. Ratcliff - *Building Partner's Capacity*, in *Naval War College Review*, vol. 60, no. 4, Newport, 2007, pag. 45.

commons requires substantially more capacity than any navy will ever had. That is why, if accepted, initiatives as GMP will significantly affect the future development of countries' maritime strategy.

In a time with asymmetric threats emerged from some nations' weakness it is necessary to reassess the role of the navy. With all the intricate international implications, although not totally improbable, a naval engagement between some states' fleets it is not an appealing idea. Today's navies should focus their capabilities to protect the sea commerce rather than to be optimized for fleet to fleet combat.²

Good things are almost never come easy. While the overall conclusion of this paper is that the GMP initiative is an idea well worth pursuing there are obstacles to pass and things to change before it will transform in a fully operational concept. The purpose is to present and analyze from the author's perspective the challenges of the GMP venture, many of them inherited in its multinational nature.

To do so the body of the paper will address the topic in three parts. The first will make known the rationales of GMP initiative, its objectives and the outcomes expected as they were presented from its inception until now. The second part will present the challenges for this concept driven by its inheriting multinational quality. The last part of the analysis will come with some suggestions for a successful initiative execution.

I. OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS

Many nations are already finding themselves challenged by a series of common threats like: piracy, drug trading, illegal immigration, human smuggling, pollution, trade disruption, weapons proliferation including weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. While not of all these threats are present at regional level, cumulatively their presence on the seas around the globe produces serious political or economic concerns by significantly increasing lawlessness, thereby impacting peace and prosperity in a globally interconnected economy. It is not wrong to say that all nations are dealing with some or all of these issues now or will face them in the near future.³ That is why concurrently with identifying which of these elements threaten them, the nations should already been involved in partnerships which will help to eradicate them.

² http://www.sagecenter.net/files/GMP_TSNCConceptPaperFINALAPPROVEDBYN3N5.doc

³ John G. Morgan Jr, Charles W. Martoglio - *The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network*, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 2005, pag.14-17.

As envisioned the GMP is all about the capability to *see and sense* what and when moves on water at any moment. This is something that maritime nations can achieve by working together in order to improve marine safety and maritime security in order to safeguard their interests. And now it is technologically possible, even if technical difficulties remain.

To obtain this global picture it will be an almost impossible task if relayed only on navies. Maritime security is more than physical security and deterrence from patrolling ships and aircraft of a global fleet. Maritime security management is achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into a comprehensive, integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats. Common maritime security management demands a close partnership between governments and the private sector to put in place a rigorous maritime security regime for prevention⁴. The only way to deal with the facing threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities. Other law enforcement bodies like Coast Guards, border control authorities and civilian maritime organizations must be employed in this effort. This method will vastly increase the number of sensors in the maritime domain and would greatly complement the data gathering possibilities.

Working in concert and counting on interoperable technology that links all the players and enables the flow of information, intelligence and communications will favor a computed image of what is transiting on the maritime domain. It will allow to this utopian global maritime network to easily identify and track Critical Contacts-of-Interest (CCOIs) before any harm would be done or prior of their arrival at the destination.

This is GMP, a new approach for the international maritime security management, a cooperation tool meant to fight against piracy and smuggling of people and illegal drugs, as well as terrorists and other threats that cross national boundaries.

Perhaps the most tempting quality of this concept is that national sovereignty would always be respected therefore nations choose it voluntarily.⁵ Nations, navies and other law enforcement forces are invited to participate where and when they have common interests. It is expected that once they are driven by their own concerns at national and the best at regional level the outcome of their enterprise will be worthy if compared with the necessary resources

⁴ Bruce B Stubbs - *Making the 1,000-Ship Navy a reality*, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 2007, pag. 60-65.

⁵ ADM Michael Mullen, *Edited Remarks RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference London*, England, 13 December 2005, from:
<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051213.txt>

spending. And a good example for this is the involvement of neighboring navies: in the Mediterranean Sea security – Operation Active Endeavour, in the Black Sea – Black Sea Harmony and in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin - Operation Ocean Shield (NATO) and Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR).

On the other side the most challenging aspect comes from the necessity of sharing information.⁶ This key challenge means that countries will have to consider security information sharing as a mutual benefit. The GMP, based on information exchange and cooperation, will not simply be concerned with naval traffic movement per se, but will also need to seek after more data for a comprehensible picture. Usually some associations can be done analyzing the kind of information found in vessel's papers like ownership, charterer, cargo, crew manifests and even blueprints. Generally these kinds of data are considered sensitive and some will not feel comfortable sharing them.

Most of the navies are designed and dimensioned to meet the challenges in their area of responsibility. But there are admittedly some states incapable to maintain a naval force and therefore maritime security in their territorial waters, while other states have an exceedingly maritime power capability. If choose to willingly participate in this global partnership or *navy of navies* great things can be obtained by the first. Increasing the capability of all nations to provide security in their own waters and harbors is something that is for everybody's interest. This translates into the willingness of capable ones to export maritime security or at least security assistance. This is another important guiding principle of the GMP.

In the framework of this cooperation other dividends can also be obtained. Prepositioning all kind of naval assets in the world's oceans and seas will not only persuade the outlaws to refrain their activities but it will permit a head start in other circumstances like responding to crises, emergencies and disaster relief interventions.

To obtain Maritime Domain Awareness – MDA it is not an easy endeavor but it has not to be complicated either. The GMP does not start from a blank sheet of paper but in addition to already established procedures. Systems conceived for traffic management and also the improvement of maritime safety and security as Safe Sea Net⁷, ship borne Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) which are coming on-line, form a simple powerful suite of maritime tools that are ready-made

⁶ ADM Michael Mullen, *Edited Remarks RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference London*, England, 13 December 2005, from:

<http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051213.txt>

⁷ European electronic reporting - and information system for vessel traffic, from: <http://www.kystverket.no/Default.aspx?did=9269705>

and can be used in relation with other maritime information systems and sensors (at sea and ashore).

II. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

One of the biggest challenges for ensuring the success of the Global Maritime Partnership is the interoperability. The question raised is: How do the navies of disparate nations that desire to operate together at sea obtain the requisite C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – systems that will enable them to truly network and make the GMP a reality?

The emerging challenge is the access of the network containing inputs from all the partners, access which may be hampered by technical incompatibilities. This issue was raised by Professor Paul Mitchell who wrote about the struggle of other navies⁸.

Subordinate to the technical interoperability is classification and protection of sensitive information. Because of practical reasons many nations prefer to put everything into a classified domain to protect available information even though they are not always sensitive. Experience proves that it is usually hard to get the smallest bit of information out of a classified network at national level and the existence of international contributors complicate things.

The challenges of coalition interoperability have begun to surface at the operational level as the U.S. Navy's five numbered fleet commanders have consistently identified one C4ISR issue as their top priority: coalition communications. They recognize that the ability to communicate and exchange data with coalition partners is important to their success across a wide range of missions, but also that networking with the coalition partners in their areas of responsibility is all the time difficult.⁹

But the interoperability is more than technical competence. Since the key in a coalition is to function together in a challenging environment, as JP 3-16 – *Multinational Operations* points out, other important areas for interoperability may include doctrine, procedures,

⁸ Paul T Mitchell - *Small navies and network-centric warfare: Is there a role.*, in Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 2, Newport, 2003, pag. 83-99.

⁹ Dr. Darren Sutton, George Galdorisi - *Achieving the Global Maritime Partnership: Operational Needs and Technical Realities*, RUSI Defence Systems, London, June 2007, pag. 68 – 69.

communication (language) and training.¹⁰ While all of this may be easily overcome at regional/coalition level, they become a huge burden if considered the global scale of GMP.

Another challenge is legitimacy. Legitimacy is based on the overarching legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken in response to certain circumstances ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation. GMP should gain legitimacy through the broad-based participation of nations, in a response deemed appropriate to the maritime security threats, in compliance with international laws governing maritime access.

But admittedly legitimacy can be viewed from different perspective driven by the participants' perception. Since the benefits associated with the maritime commons exploitation are not equally shared so is the idea of policing this domain. Political agendas may affect coalitions and most of the time common goal and mutual interest are subjective to national concerns. And also there is mistrust involved. GMP, being an American idea, it is hard to disassociate it from the US' interests. If the GMP will fail to prove that its goals as common prosperity and security are nothing else but the United States affluence and global dominance, the initiative is *dead in the water*.

Legitimacy also includes the need to respect every country's national sovereignty in the territorial waters, vicinities where it is expected that much of the effort will take place. Even if, in the event of lack of capability, a coastal nation will agree with the initial intervention in its territorial waters of another nation more capable asset, legal dispositions of apprehended vessels and persons still presents a problem. The willingness to act and follow through legal procedures is not always forthcoming and tests the limits of existing international norms.¹¹ Therefore, old concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction need to be reassess to accommodate cooperative arrangements for an effective effort against maritime threats.

Another challenge is vastness of the ocean commons. GMP will have to deal with the reality of Earth covered by water in a large proportion, water on which 90% of the world's commerce travels and the existence of numerous of ports which facilitate this development. Simply put to have under control and understand what is happening or to obtain an operational picture in this huge environment, will be demanding.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that today's world fleet roaming in the oceans comprises 94,936 ships, with a total of 721.9 million GT; they are registered in over 150 nations and manned by over a million seafarers of virtually every

¹⁰ Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, 2007, pag. I-7.

¹¹ Alan Lee Boyer - *Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment: Maritime Security in the Mediterranean*, Naval War College Review, vol. 60, no. 3, Newport, 2007, pag. 83.

nationality.¹² All these figures are changing constantly and the trend is to grow bigger from year to year. The universal use of flags of convenience, lack of transparency into a vessel's ownership, crew, and cargo offer many opportunities for rogue actors to flourish the organized crime in the different aspects of it.

The MDA requires integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data from the public and private sectors to maintain visibility on these 94,936 ships. It is heavily dependent on information sharing and requires a well-synchronized collaboration among the various elements of the public and private sectors, both at national and international level.¹³

Unfortunately, this cooperation between navies and other maritime law enforcement authorities, although needed by both parts, is not taken for granted. In many countries, navies and coast guards – as any law enforcement actors in the territorial and interior waters – don't belong to the same department of the country's Government, so they are funded separately. The struggle for existing funds and resources available at Government level nourishes competition which leads to individual actions in the detriment of cooperation at the national level. In the same order of ideas on the international arena, if the need for cooperation is not perceived as mutual advantage, honesty and commitment may be missing.

Taken together, the difficulties mentioned above are already shaping the way this global partnership will function. A significant number of initiatives already in practice, added to new and constantly improving programs, will increase the efficiency of this endeavor and subsequently it will enhance the security of the maritime domain. In the following pages, I will present some suggestions for a successful execution of GMP.

III. POSSIBLE WAYS AHEAD

Unfortunately, there is no *silver bullet*, no single event or act would be capable of putting an end to the threats concerning maritime security. But, in the long run, a sum of actions well-intended and stimulated by the shared concerns are going to make the difference and most probably they will transform the ocean commons into a (more) secure domain.

The most important issue to address for a successful execution of the Global Maritime Partnership is its message, the way its objective/goals are presented to the global audience.

¹² International Maritime Organization - *International Shipping and World Trade; Facts and Figures*, IMO Library Service, 2007, pag. 6.

¹³ Lcdr Dan Uhls - *Realizing the 1000-Ship Navy*, Naval War College, Newport, 2006, pag. 7.

Since not all the nations benefit significantly from the world trade passing the maritime commons their lack of enthusiasm to spend their scarce resources for the benefit of the other already rich countries is understandable. In order to stir up the global interest GMP must be acknowledged as a solution to a wider set of problems. Although globalization has a strong economical connotation it does not refer only to the international economical dependence among countries but also to this existing special relationship which proves that anything happened at a large scale in one country has repercussions beyond the country's borders. Countries which are not so very much concerned about the maritime security must be warned of that sooner or later the proliferation of illegal activities, on sea or on land, will affect them also. GMP must be promoted not only like a global trade protector but also like a maritime security provider against threats like WMD, waterborne pandemics or misuse of sea resources.

As mentioned earlier maritime security common management can only be achieved through cooperation, an international integrated and allied one between military and non-military capabilities. But cooperation means more players and interests involved, therefore, presents more variables in obtaining consensus. For long time standing military alliances like NATO or economical like EU, of which country members are interacting on a regular base in respect of collaboration for mutual assistance, this is not an issue, but GMP does not resume to regional cooperation but to international one. Regional cooperation should be though one of the stepping stones in the GMP development. Because regional or bilateral arrangements are more restricted they are easier to manage and permit unproblematic implementation of the cooperation, beyond the realm of rhetoric. Thereafter it will be easier to network these regional efforts into formally or informally larger multilateral cooperation agreements in order to obtain a global exposure which is exactly the GMP's object.

Although the US does a great deal of things supporting naval international cooperation not every nation welcomes assistance from them for vary reasons. That's why for a thoroughly and unprejudiced understanding the GMP's goals should be advertised by other states too. These states can influence their special relationships which they may have with neighboring or other states, those intangible but nonetheless strong bonds developed over the time, based on cultural or historic ties. While a proposal may sound suspicious when coming from a long time adversary it may sound like a good idea when it is proposed by a friend.

The way Navies operate, doctrine if you want, is embedded in the ethos, traditions, heritage and their national roles. Because of this, a common doctrine for this *global fleet* is not achievable in the near future. Nevertheless, the development of common operating principles, or sets of rules of engagement, can reduce the potential for friction within this

partnership and very much improve its virtue. Also the navies may need to redefine their relationships with coast guard forces, or even produce forces that essentially act as coast guards since the maritime security threats are in the grey area between civilian and military aspects of sea use.¹⁴

Technological asymmetry still remains one of the GMP problems. Sharing the technology is not feasible for the GMP scale mostly because it is an ad hoc coalition and is hard to predict future friends and enemies. There will always be a risk that shared technology will be turned against its originators or transferred to a third party. Apparently the GMP members will have to deal with the available technology without expecting a massive change or a boost in their capabilities. It is obvious that technology will not change everything since it is just one part of a synergistic mechanism that includes among others support systems, training and doctrine¹⁵. Sharing the technology will not help unless the other components of the mechanism can also be shared and even if this is possible the time necessary to absorb new technology and develop the expertise will diminish its utility. Because of this considerations the focus should be on developing procedural solutions for information, rather than technology, sharing. Developing a liaison relationship or dividing the maritime domain in regions with one coalition responsible for the task could prove it is fruitful.

Confidence and trust in one another between nations is fundamental to cooperation. For this reason measures like: exchange of ship visits and personnel to ports and naval establishments, participation in conferences and seminars, presence on board as observers during exercises, promotion of interoperability and multinational patrols which can promote or enhance confidence must be welcomed and encouraged.

Another important element in cooperation at sea is acknowledgment of international agreements and conventions on good order at sea. For cooperation to be effective, the participating countries must be confident that others will not only adhere to international rules but also act in accordance with them and enact suitable legislation. In this respect, until the ongoing operations will be aggrandized by complementary regional treaties or law alignment, GMP members will have to respect the existing laws, multi-lateral treaties and customary rules. From all of the judiciary instruments regulating the maritime domain, UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is by far the largely accepted. GMP legitimacy is debatable because one of its big supporters is not covenanter of this law and

¹⁴ Geoffrey Till - *Navies and the New World Order*, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 2005, pag. 60-63.

¹⁵ Steven Metz - *The effect of technological asymmetry on coalition operations, in problems and solutions in future coalition operations*, Strategic Study Institute, Carlisle, 1997, pag. 59-67.

considering that, as Prof. Ronald Ratcliff mention, "...[it] *makes advocacy for GMP appear hypocritical*"¹⁶. As proven until this time, the U.S. respects the UNCLOS' provisions so the formal act of ratifying it would benefit to the international community by showing commitment in the respect of international law.

CONCLUSIONS

Admittedly today nations are conducting security operations in the maritime domain as part of routine, having peacetime duties to prevent and to respond to the threats posed by piracy, drug trading, illegal immigration, human smuggling, pollution, trade disruption, weapons proliferation including weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Generally referred to as *constabulary* tasks, these operations are either conducted independently by navies and/or law enforcement agencies in order to impose legal powers and safeguard state's sovereignty or as part of multi-national military operations, which aim to safeguard common defense and security interests.

In addition, there are other military and civilian initiatives at various stages of maturity which are seeking to enhance maritime domain security. Most of these initiatives overlap in terms of the effect they are wishing to achieve. It is axiomatic that by avoiding duplication, a more holistic approach would make better use of available resources. GMP was proposed as an overarching framework necessary to bring civilian and military elements and resources together at national and international level in order to address maritime threats efficiently, coherently and collectively.

It is true that a cooperation envisioned at such a large scale presents a series of challenges as mistrust, interoperability and legitimacy, but the nations have to deal with that today when they face a different kind of war, a war of which frontlines are everywhere and nowhere, making it impossible to be won by reduced scale cooperation. If the small steps performed until present times would be improved and augmented by new and proficient procedures sooner or later we will be able to establish maritime security and to prevent the occurrence of maritime illegal acts efficiently and with a lower cost, a goal well worth to be pursued.

¹⁶ Ronald E. Ratcliff - *Building Partner's Capacity*, in *Naval War College Review*, vol. 60, no. 4, Newport, 2007, pag. 56.

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MOTIVATION WITHIN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

LTC Antonela -Elena LÂSENKO

INTRODUCTION

Leadership and motivational qualities are excellent to have not only among management in military organization, but among military people as well. Motivation is an internal condition of a person which pushes himself (herself) to think or to act in a specific way to achieve a goal. Influencing people's motivation means getting them to want to do what you know must be done. It is a practical action which we meet frequently during our lives. Leading is the ability to influence others in a group.

A good leader understands what could motivate others. The leader's intention is to influence certain things to continue or change. Either way, only a person with certain skills may be up to the task.

Motivation is a psychic mechanism which converts the pressure generated by motives in behaviours, directed toward a goal. It is very important, as a leader, to understand what motivates the subordinates. To achieve this, the leader's need is to discover what subordinates needs are. Basic income and necessities are needs everyone shares. Also, there is the need for friends and social connections. People are always looking for a place the fit in and where they feel they belong. As other category of needs, people are seeking challenges and growth.

Few qualities seem to help people to obtain a leadership position at the head of structure. Many leaders have qualities like ambitions, stature and they are sympathized, task oriented and articulate. But these qualities are not always correct. In history, we have Napoleon or Steven the Great which happened to be short men, and we also have Abraham Lincoln which is reported as a very introverted person.

One of the problems of motivation is that it is not always properly used by using lies, manipulation or trickery. We can see in history that there are cases of motivation used in negative ways. In leadership, it is very important people are benefiting for their own actions and ethics and consideration of others should always be present.

I. MOTIVATION AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP

I.1. MOTIVATION is the willingness of people to work Motivation is a reason for doing something. Motivation is concerned with the factors that influence people to behave in certain ways. In his book *Work Psychology*, Arnold, J, Robertson, I T and Cooper, listed three components of motivation:

- Direction – what somebody is trying to do;
- Effort – how hard somebody is trying;
- Persistence – how long somebody keep on trying.

Motivating people is about getting them to move in the direction you want them to go in order to achieve a result. Motivating ourselves is about setting the directions independently and then taking courses of actions witch will ensure that we get there. Motivation can be described as goal-directed behavior. People are motivated when they expect that a course of action is likely to lead to the attainment of a goal and a valued reward – one that satisfied their needs.

Well – motivated people are those with clearly defined goals who take action they expect to achieve those goals. The best form of motivation is then the people who may be self- motivated, as long as this means they are going in the right direction to achieve what they are there to achieve. The organization as a whole can provide the context within witch high level of motivation can be achieved by providing incentives and rewards, satisfying work, and opportunities for learning and growth. Leaders have a major part to play in using their motivating skills to get people to achieve of their best, and make good use of the motivational process provided by the organization. To do this it is necessary to understand the process of motivation – how it works and the different types of motivation that exists (figure 1).





Figure 1. The process of motivation

I.2. LEADERSHIP

A **leader** is somebody who gives new ideas, enthusiasm and influences people to accomplish organizational goals, they motivate others to realize their objectives, focus thinking, and make decisions for the greater good of the organization.

Leadership is about building teams and communicating so that every military people work to accomplish missions. The importance of leadership is a key ingredient to achieve team objectives. Teams that have this synergy tend to be the ones on top.



The main *leader – subordinate* relationship issue is trust problem. Motivation of the subordinates for getting performance is based on trust. All get together organizations - as basis for long term performances – are not able to exist without trust. An axiomatic true of the organizations' theory say that trust is acquired by trust, and distrust is giving rise to distrust. Sometimes, the distrust leaders are getting from the subordinated derives from the misapprehension of the human behavior, conscious or not, declared or not, in the sense that subordinates are not capable to be responsible or they are less creative and have less initiative to accomplish their missions. In order to achieve the goals, leaders have to supervise the members of their teams and put restrains on them, because they have the tendency to try to evade their job.

The theory and practice of leadership demonstrates that this point of view is totally wrong. People can work without pushing, they are able to create or to have initiative, and they have satisfactions on their accomplished work with the condition of being motivated.

As a leader we have the power to influence motivation. For that it is necessary to know how to guide our decision making process. First we have to ensure that our team is trained, encouraged and has the opportunity to advance. Also, the way to ensure that leadership process is conducted in an honest manner basis on same value, moral and ethic principles that we seek in others.

Leadership style is the manner and approach of providing direction, implementing plans, and motivating people.

Theories about organizational leadership consider that the development and maintaining the ethic standards must be the key of how to conduct proper a team. Leading a group is not an easy job because military people have an ethic high – duty obligation. They tie oneself down to serve the country. The ethic of the military profession became from the purpose of the military institution that is to defense the country. That's why higher standards of moral behavior are necessary to maintain trust and public credibly.

Loyalty and dutifulness, true respect, keep one's promise, respect of the human rights, are central values of military profession. Without them rule of law, written or not written national value could became theoretical and simple precepts without practicability.

To be credible and respectable as military managers of character need to have mental, physical and emotional attributes and acquire abilities, they must have character and must develop character in those they lead.

Values of military leaders of character are elements that they appreciate. Some of this value could be:

- Personal courage – face danger, feeling fear or adversity
- Integrity – do the work right, legally and morally manner
- Honor - living up all the military value
- Selfless Service- put welfare of the nation, the Army, and their subordinates before their own
- Respect – treating the subordinates as they should be treated
- Duty-Fulfill the obligations
- Loyalty - Bear true faith and dutifulness to the Country Constitution, the Army, their unit, and other soldiers

II. LEADERSHIP STYLES AND MOTIVATION

II.1. LEADERSHIP STYLE influence level of motivation. However, throughout a lifetime, man's or woman's motivation is influenced by changing ambitions and/or leadership style subordinates works under or socializes with. Command-and-control leadership runs out ambition while worker responsibility increases ambition.

Depending on the team of the people they are guiding, there are infinite factors that can make a person a good leader... There is a common wrong conception that leaders are always free-spoken, flamboyant people, and this just isn't the case. Less articulate individuals with other combinations of skills are quite successful as well.

Leadership Style and Motivation				
Leadership Style	Motivation Type	Motivation is Based on:	Personality Type	Efficiency
Participative (democratic) Limited supervision Worker with decision making responsibility	Self motivated Team motivated	Creativity	Leader of ideas or people. Independent Achiever Thrives on change	High
Consultative Mixed styles	Goal motivated Reward motivated Recognition motivated	Opportunity Materialism Social status	Personality type and efficiency depends on leader's skill and/or the work environment he's created.	
Authoritarian (autocratic) High level of supervision Command-and-control	Peer motivated Authority motivated Threat, fear motivated	To be like others Follows policy Reacts to force	Status quo Dependency Resist change	Low

As military leader for the new subordinates who just learning the job, using an authoritarian style is a competent and a good approach of leading. The subordinates are motivated to learn new skills in a new environment for them.

When the subordinates know their jobs they want to become part of the team. In this situation, the leader could use a participative style because he knows the problem, but does not have all the information.

The commanders can delegate task when the subordinates know more about the job and they need to take ownership of their job.

An adaptive leader with mental flexibility and strong conceptual skills can use all three styles of leadership. They can tell the subordinates that a new procedure must be established because the old one is not working (authoritarian). In addition, they can ask for ideas and input on a new procedure (participative). Alternatively, leader can delegate task in order to implement a new procedure.

II.2 REACTION TO CHANGE

One of the accepted leaderships is the command-and-control leadership which teaches people to resist change and be more efficient. Once people learn one skill, they are less likely to want to learn another. On the opposite side, subordinate responsibility motivates them to seek new challenges and to find ways to achieve their goals. The first level of the leader is to find new ways to be more effective by changing technology.

II.3 REACTION TO EFFICIENCY

The advancement of technology is a forcing change in efficiency. There are two types of change, the leading edge or the trailing edge, and this is where the company or individual should decide on which type they should be using. The difference is that the leading edge is exciting while the trailing edge is generally time-wasting. Also, wasting time the motivation will be drained while leaders of change inspire it.

An individual should be ready to abandon old skills and learn new ones because of the continuous change in technology. Self-development programs help achieve this ability to adapt. Because level one leadership is all about change, people will use whatever method to be more efficient in getting things done with the least amount of effort. This is how work habits appear.

Military leaders and their level one subordinates work together to find ways to solve and prevent problems. The ability to prevent problems is a strong motivator. If the leader's management is in charge of decision making, as a result, they must always find a solution to all problems and search for alternative methods. Although subordinates may be aware of the problems, they cannot take any actions and have learned not to get concerned. The supervisors will be concerned with only what to management think is important.

Under command-and-control leadership, management considers the opinions or concerns of people on the front line to be trivial. Thus, the management will take actions only when the problems are too important to ignore. In the case of conflicts between subordinates and superiors, the first will eventually create a combative environment by increasing the magnitude of problems. By implementing more control, the management enters a downward spiral and subordinates will resist control. Under team members responsibility management and people should be unite to solve or prevent problems.

II.4 REACTION TO LEARNING HABITS

Young subordinates need to establish in work habits a balance between developing attitude and learning professional skills. The motivation level, on the job, depends on the style of leadership it is under. The ambitions of the command-and-control leadership are associated with the continuity of the status quo. Because of their continuous expand of their skills as needed or where an opportunity should arise; under subordinates responsibility the ambitions are associated with opportunity.

II.5 REACTION TO GOALS

An asset of the self motivated people is that there are motivated by certain goals and always conquering one challenge and moving on to the other. All the elements are required in the process of learning any goal. Organizations try to attract this type of people because they will be able to stay on the leading edge of technology. In this case, the goals of the employees will be payday and quitting time.

II.6 REACTION TO RECOGNITION

To build self esteem recognition plays an important role, although its benefits are short term by itself. If the employee thinks he was indispensable to the job then they will be achieved a long-term benefit. This is because they have faced a challenge and as a result they have had the authority to take action.

II.7 SELF MOTIVATED PROJECTS

A self motivated-project is an ability to finish what one has started, in opposition to most people who do not finish what they start if they were to would work alone. A winner's secret ability is that he will always finish challenging projects. Interest and asking the questions which inspire the learning process are among the first requirements. A challenge is presented with information and a goal will be set. Risk fear and failure become themselves challenges when action is taken.

Another barrier of the self motivated projects, which make them even more difficult, is that no one cares if they succeed. This is one of reasons why people quit before actually get a good start. Only the people who successfully overcome barriers can be named winners. By doing this they develop confidence and skills, which are needed in larger projects.

II.8 TEAM MOTIVATED PROJECTS

A team-motivated project inspires everyone to accomplish mission. When people have a common goal, they will support one another until the task is achieved. Team members are needed to achieve goals and others do care in this environment. This is why there is an extremely powerful team motivation. The motivating force is build up by the exchange of information, ideas and testing the results. This results to each member seeking to be a quality input leader.

III. HOW THE MILITARY PEOPLE ARE MOTIVATED?

Standing on tradition, education and culture all other, the world military people are motivated in different way:

USA

- Motivate by their good organization discipline and a good payment.
- They are good trained and equipped, powerful, hard workers and they love comfort. They transfer this comfort on the battlefield.
- They have strong personality and a sound free will
- They believe in order and are perfect organized
- The Japanese
- They were educated to strictly obey orders and are ready o die if the superiors ask and this is the interest of the nation (Kamikaze)

The French

- Motivate the soldiers that they have to believe in only one thing “they want to win”
- They have to accept the war like a matter of honor and they use this in Foreign Legion units

In Russia

- They build up the motivation that Russian soldiers are the best, brave, ready to sacrifice themselves for Russia and sometimes this is the main reason for going to fatal level

The Germans

- Motivate the soldiers to reach a high level of combat spirit
- The moral of troops is sustained by excellent weapons and equipments

- They are motivated to be able to autonomously take decisions during the combat
- General direction in how to motivate is the same in the past and nowadays

In Great Britain

- They used to motivate the soldiers that they are the best in the world
- They are very brave and depending the situation they can be motivated to hate

VI. MOTIVATIONS WITHIN LEADERSHIP IN HISTORY

Motivation is a process much more complex than many people believe. To assume that one approach to motivation fits all is wrong. In history there are examples of special motivation. We know that for leaders motivation is a powerful tool and like a lesson learned about how can be used this power from War World II were the members of the Einsatzgruppen (SS) (Operational Squads of the Security Service and the Security Police) who had developed a special motivation to kill. As described by Walter S. Zapotoczny in his book *Special Motivation - The Motivation and Actions of the Einsatzgruppen*, the members of this unit *were* from the start trained not as a regular military unit, for combat within the rules of conflict, but as murder squads.

According to Richard Rhodes in the book *Masters of Death*, starting with the early days of the war, from May 1941, the men chosen for the Einsatzgruppen were selected for the purpose of the Eastern Front, with background in the SS and preferably with knowledge of the Russian language. Perhaps surprisingly, the leaders of this unit were educated people, some of them even with doctoral degrees. Besides the former SS members, the candidates were also selected from the Hitler Youth, organization which put particular emphasis on obedience, sacrifice to the cause and discipline, as described by the author *Gisela McBride* describes in the book *Memoirs of a One Thousand-Year-Old Women*. "The BDM's purpose was to mold girls as closely as possible to conform to the Nazi ideal of womanhood. They were to learn to be obedient, dutiful, disciplined, and self-sacrificing. These virtues were to be emphasized and continually reinforced so the girls would become willing and faithful followers of Nazi doctrine."

In this respect, the Einsatzgruppen was intended to be the spearhead and enforcer of the Nazi doctrine regarding Arian superiority. Consequently, the background of the candidates was subject to a detailed examination, both regarding personal background and family background in terms of political and religious orientation to generations as far as the 18th century, but also regarding “genetic purity” – the lack of hereditary disease in the family and the concept of “pure blood”, uninterrupted Arian ancestry. This was determined by anthropologists, physicians and SS leaders, in a disturbing application of Lombroso’s theory.

As a result of this selection process, the accepted candidates had a sense of genetic superiority, as being pureblood Arians with outstanding physical qualities.

The emphasis on obedience meant that the accepted candidates were willing to relinquish the right to think on their own and become willing and unconditional executants of any kind of task assigned to them by their leaders, no matter how immoral or inhuman. They were indoctrinated to consider other nationalities and religions (Jews, Gipsies, Slavs etc) as inferior races and automatic enemies of the Third Reich.

In addition, they were also familiarized with the eugenics ideas, such as the T4 Euthanasia program designed to “purify” the Arian race of those considered to be inferior (people with mental disorders or mental or physical handicaps). The program was accompanied by a policy of encouraging the formation of Arian elite, by encouraging the birth of children from “pure” Arian parents and discouraging, through any means, the birth of children from “inferior races”.

Despite all the indoctrination, some of the tasks assigned to the members of the SS were proven to be too much even for some of them, driving them to self destructive behaviours such as heavy drinking and the use of drugs, up to suicide attempts.

Unfortunately, there were always new candidates to replace these “casualties”, as the system of indoctrination was promoted by the state in order to support the official policy. As a result, these people, with a particular type of motivation deriving both from their personalities and the motivation factors inculcated by their leaders, were willing to go to inhuman extremes to fulfil their assigned tasks.

CONCLUSION

The size of the personal vision determines the level of personal achievement. A bigger than life vision is possessed by the super achievers. Most people, instead of doing what they feel, limit their goals to socially acceptable standards. People are different in regard of interest, talent and learning methods. Their attributes should be in harmony with their goals. And finding this harmony is a barrier itself. When it is found the individual will develop a burning desire and will find success regardless of previous experience or social surroundings.

The foundation for productive motivation is a burning desire. There is no need for money or to hear a motivational speaker to begin. Everyone already has the starter tool and it is named creativity, all people have to do is use it. Creative thinking is stimulated by dreams. Transforming the dream into mini projects leads to produce a burning desire, and succeeding with many mini projects subordinates are preparing for a larger vision of life. Everyone, at some point in their life wanted to become an achiever. This ambition has been destroyed for most people. Only the right type of leadership will bring back to life this latent desire.

Motivating people to achieve performance is a hard, challenging, and interesting job. Leaders should be aware how their actions and decisions might affect the team they conduct. To accomplish their missions, leaders need to have in mind that in same situation each person may react differently. The following guidelines could form a basic view of motivation:

- Allow the needs of the team to coincide with the needs of the organization based on true value, moral and ethic principles, teaching and encouraging people how to do and how to be the best they could in their job.
- Recognize in an honest manner the importance of each member of the team. Feeling that everyone will be motivated to do better.
- Reward the good behavior. A letter, a certificate or a simple thank you may seem small and insignificant, but they can be powerful motivation. The reward should be specific and prompt in order to make them to believe that it was indeed a good job. When somebody did a mistake, show what was wrong and help them to achieve a particular goal.

- The leader must be the role model that he or she wants the other to grow into
- Develop morale and team spirit. Team spirit is the consciousness of the organization that allows the people within it to identify with and feel part of it.
- Allow the people to be a part of the planning and solving process. People who are of the decision making process become its owners, thus it gives them a personal interest in seeing the plan succeed. When communication is clearer, everyone has a better understanding of what role they must play as part of the team. When the subordinates feel that they are part of the team, recognition and appreciation from a respected leader are powerful motivators.
- Looking out for the team, keeping them informed, counseling people who behave in a way that is against the team's goal, and protecting the people when needed, allows leaders to be aware of the subordinates' lives and give the opportunity to show concern for them.

In groups that are exposed to extreme work-related hazards and stress, such as the military, the leaders are directly responsible for how stressful experience are made sense, of interpreted, and understood by the members of the team. They also need to know how to set realistic and challenging goals that are achievable - the end-state everyone wants. Setting performance goals is the first step toward accomplishing the objectives. A leader has the power to influence motivation and discover the key to improved subordinates' performance.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE – MODELS AND LESSONS LEARNED

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INTRODUCTION

Change is a part of our lives. The entire universe is changing and consequently the human society is in a continuous transformation. If we are thinking about the entire mankind's history, we discover that all organizational systems suffered a lot of transformations due to the internal or external factors. This concept, even if the ancient human beings didn't define it in words, was the main thrust engine of the humanity during the times. It was obviously that some civilizations were well developed when their leaders applied the main principles of this concept and they succeeded in making those societies more effective. After those leaders disappeared and their descendants tried to preserve the status quo of the societies, there was a severe decadence of them. Thus, it is useful to try to understand the laws which govern the organizational change.

I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

I.1 Change versus transition

The most organizations have rarely a balanced status. Their status are more or less dynamic; the current status is jumpy among some limits. Like any other environments with human interactions, there is a continuous and sensitive change inside them. Inside of the most organization there are a lot of changes on the large scale which are produced in a reactive way by the external pressures or like result of a planned action, mean proactive way.

The theoretical bases which establish the coordination for change phenomenon are not unitary and thus, the approaching ways for the same major problem are different.

Change is not the same thing with transition, change is dealing with the organization's status while transition refers to the psychological process performed by the employees in order to be accommodating with this new status.

The biggest difference between these two concepts is missed when we talk about transition like a gradual and uncompleted action. When we talk about change we have to

focus our attention on the action results. Transition is something different. The starting point of the transition's concept is not the picture of the results; it is the psychological process for the actual status' remission.

I.2 The challenge of organizational change

The need for organizational change becomes visible when managers sense that an organization's activities, objectives, goals or values are rather deficient. When there is a noticeable difference (gaps) between what the organization has to do and what it is actually accomplishing, effective managers move quickly to take positive steps to reduce this disparity.

But because all systems in the known universe tend to fulfill the lowest energy's level of the equilibrium status, sometimes there are needed an important amount of the change's forces. In this respect, the visionary managers have to know very well the force's system over the organization before to design the future status of it.

The forces necessitating organizational change can be found both inside and outside organizations. If manager has a comprehensive view of innovation and adaptation, they must be aware of both types of influence and be able to allow for both in their actions.

As I already mentioned, we can split the main forces which act over the organization, into two categories: external and internal.

There is a wide variety of external forces for organizational change that require managerial action. Thus, the external forces could be classified taking in account changes in four major domains:

- Economic and market, such a sudden decline in demand for a company's products
- Technological, such as the discovery of a less expensive manufacturing process by a competitor
- Legal political, such as a new consumer protection law that affects current products and practices
- Resources availability, such as an increase in cost or sudden unavailability of a major input, such as raw materials.

The internal forces for change are dealing with several factors within an organization which can also represent important forces for organizational change. These main factors are:

- employee goal changes, such as the hiring of newer or younger employees with a work ethic different from that of employees with more seniority

- job technology changes, such as the replacement of workers on craft-type jobs by automated equipment
- organizational structure changes, such a new entities necessitated by company growth
- organizational climate changes, such as the creation of a climate of riot, hostility and insecurity as a result of mass layoffs
- organizational goal changes, as when the goals change because management realized its initial expectation were too high, too low or misdirected for some reason.

Taking in account these forces we could think that the organizational change is easy to be handled, but during the time of it the managers has to face to a lot of troubles because of a normal phenomenon: resistance to change.

An important lesson learned by most managers who managed changes inside organizations is that resistance to such efforts can be found throughout an organization. The real reasons for resistance can be either personal or organizational. Some major sources of the resistance change can be emphasized.

A. Individual sources

Habit – to copy with life’s complexities, we rely on habits or programmed responses. But when confronted with change, this tendency to respond in our accustomed ways becomes a source of resistance.

Security – people with a high need of security are likely to resist change because it threatens their feelings of safety.

Economic factors – changes in job tasks or established work routines can arouse economic fears if people are concerned that they won’t be able to perform the new tasks or routines to their previous standards, especially when pay is closely tied with productivity.

Fear of the unknown – Change substitutes ambiguity and uncertainty for the unknown

Selective information processing – individuals are guilty of selectively processing information in order to keep their perceptions intact. They hear what they want to hear and they ignore information that challenges the world they’ve created.

B. Organizational sources

Structural inertia – organizations have built-in mechanisms – like their selection processes and formalized regulations – to produce stability. When an organization is confronted with change, this structural inertia acts as a counterbalance to sustain stability

Limited focus of change – organizations are made up of a number of interdependent subsystems. One can't be changed without affecting the others. So limited changes in subsystems tend to be nullified by the larger system.

Group inertia – even if individuals want to change their behaviors, group norms may act as a constraint.

Threat to expertise – changes in organizational patterns may threaten the expertise of specialized groups.

Threat to established power relationships – any distribution of decision-making authority can threaten long-established power relationships within the organization.

Threat to established resource allocations – groups in the organization that control sizable resources often see change as a threat. They tend to be content with the way things are.

Usually seven main tactics are used to overcome the resistance change.

Education and communication - resistance can be reduced through communicating with employees to help them see the logic of a change. Communication can reduce resistance on two stages. First, it diminishes or subside the undesirable effects of the employees' misinformation and poor communication. Second, communication can be helpful to convince employees about needed of change.

Participation – it is hard for individuals to resist a change decision if they participated in it. Prior to making a change, the opposed forces can be involved into the decision process but this action have to be perform carefully because of the knowledge's level.

Building support and commitment – change agents can offer a range of supportive efforts to reduce resistance. Research on the middle managers has shown that when managers or employees have low emotional commitment to change, they favor the status quo and resist it. So, firing up employees can also help them emotionally commit to change rather than embrace the status quo

Negotiation – another way to avoid some potential resistance points is to exchange something of value for a lessening of the resistance. For instance, if the resistance is centered in a few powerful individuals, a specific reward package can be negotiated that will meet their individual needs.

Manipulation and cooptation – manipulation refers to covert influence attempts. Twisting and distorting fact to make appear more attractive, withholding undesirable information, and creating false rumors to get employees to accept a change. Cooptation, on the other hand, is a form of both manipulation and participation.

Selecting people who accept change Research suggests that the ability to easily accept and adapt to change is related to personality. It appears that people who adjust best to change are those who are open to experience, take a positive attitude toward change, are willing to take risks and are flexible in their behavior.

Coercion – last on the list of tactics is coercion; this is the final argument in fighting to overcome resistance to change. This way can have some particular aspects regarding to the consequences: threats of transfer, loss of promotions, negative performance evaluations, and a poor letter of recommendation.

The managers have to have a strategy before to introduce a change inside the organization. The most applied strategy has three steps: unfreezing (making employees aware of needed change), changing (moving from old behavior to new ones) and refreezing (making new behaviors permanent).

For implementing this strategy, the managers design a basic change process in organization. This process has some usually and basically objectives which are linked among them. The chain of the objectives looks like:

1. Performance gap – initially emerge because of changes in the environment, structure, technology or membership of an organization
2. Recognition of need for change
3. Creating proper climate for change
4. Diagnosis of problem
5. Search for appropriate change strategies
6. Selection of change strategy
7. Implementation of change strategy
8. Evaluation of change effectiveness and modification of strategy where necessary.

All these steps are linked and must be performed by the managers in these sequences with a huge effort because of the resistance of change.

Once the resistance to change was overcome using one of the mentioned procedures in order to increasing the progressive forces or diminishing the opponent forces, there is compulsory to make a plan for organizational change. Kotter established a famous plan which has some specific steps in order to fulfill the desired organizational change. Kotter's plan has eight main steps, is called "Kotter's eight-step plan" and refers to the 7th objective of the basic change process – implementation of change strategy.

The main stages of "Kotter's eight-step plan" are shown below:

1. Establish a sense of urgency by creating a compelling reason for why change is needed
2. Form a coalition with enough power to lead the change
3. Create a new vision to direct the change and strategies for achieving the vision
4. Communicate the vision throughout the organization
5. Empower others to act on vision by removing barriers to change and encouraging risk taking and creative problem solving
6. Plan for, create and reward short-term “wins” that move the organization toward the new vision
7. Consolidate improvements, reassess change, and make necessary adjustments in the new programs.
8. Reinforce the changes by demonstrating the relationship between new behaviors and organizational success.

II. CASE STUDY ON THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM IN ROMANIAN LAND FORCES

For a better understanding of the theoretical concepts I think that it is useful to take into account a case study. One of the most complex domains is maintenance. Maintenance has a lot of layers, each of them with specific objectives, but generally, the entire maintenance system has capital consequences over the capabilities of the Land Forces. This is the main reason in order to choose this case study's domain.

The maintenance, like an activity, has followed the mankind during the times. The ancient human beings performed a lot of activities to find out and improve their means used for fishing and hunting, in order to assure the food needed and to avoid the mass extinction of the species. Also those means were adapted to be used for self-defense against animals and, later, for enforcement domination of some groups over the others.

Even if the ancient human being did not realize what maintenance was, this concept was used and developed through the ages. Perhaps the starting point of the maintenance's concept was the carving of the stones. This action was based on the thinking process and it assured a superior level of the effectiveness and, of course, a higher level of power, military speaking.

During the time, the military leaders were concerned about the improvement of their equipments and also about the possibility to spend less amount of money for replacement of the damaged or worn military means. I think that this point represented the turn point through the modern concept of maintenance.

Nowadays, the maintenance concept is strongly defined and it is a way for assuring military superiority.

For a realistic analysis of the interactions and connections between maintenance system and military environment and to study how the decision making process was or is performed in this domain, there is a helpful way to analyze the main features of the military environment during the development of the human society.

We can identify some basic maintenance activities in the early ages of the mankind. At that time, the main features of human social's organization was the family. For this reason, the maintenance activities had like the main purpose assuring and keeping in operation the common tools and ancient weapons. Those activities were performed by the family members. Also, they were farmers and warriors at the same time.

In the Middle Ages weapons continued to be developed and from that moment some kinds of workshops occurred. The maintenance activities started to be crystallized into a system split in some specific branches with theirs specific tasks like sharpening of swords, shoeing of the horses and so on. Also, it can be seen that the maintenance personnel was discharged by the fighting duties. The warriors performed the wars and the maintenance personnel had to assure the weapons needed. This division of labor was more obviously once the gun powder was used and the first gun was built up.

The first concepts about maintenance system could arise once the industrial revolution occurred. The oldest maintenance's definitions comprised only few domains of activities like maintenance, adjustments and repair of the machine tools which there were designed and made using a low level of technology. Accordingly, the reliability of those machines was the poorest possible and involved a large amount of manual labor and a lot of qualified personnel.

During the 1st World War, because of the stationary character of the war, the maintenance system wasn't changed so much; it was adapted at the new kinds of weapons that were more complex. For this reason related with the higher price of those equipments, a new element of the maintenance system occurred, the recovery mission. The damaged military equipments were recovered and sent to back of the battlefield where there were disposed some specific workshops. Of course, those workshops were also stationary.

The major changes in the maintenance system's concept occurred starting with the 2nd World War when the military environment was different; the military actions became more rapid and engaged a large quantity of complex equipment made by the newest technologies. So, it was compulsory to set up a new concept of maintenance system in order to assure the technical status imposed by the military actions.

The main idea was that each echelon should have a specialized unit for maintenance. These units had to have all capabilities to repair all kinds of equipments depends on the maintenance level for that specific echelon.

Obviously, because the war concept was usually set up on two lines, troops in contact for the 1st line and reserves for the 2nd line, the maintenance system was set up on four levels.

First level of the maintenance system was named ARTM (in Romanian) – workshop for repairing the military equipment - and it consisted in a workshop specialized in checking of the military equipment before and after missions. Those workshops performed the lowest level of the maintenance, the current repairs.

Second level of the maintenance system was named SRTM – section for repairing military equipment – which was assigned with some specific objectives, many and more complex than ARTM. The maintenance level of repairs usually was medium because of the higher technological level than ARTM.

The third level of the maintenance was covered by the other types of the maintenance unit, BRTM – repairing base of the military technique. This type was more complex than SRTM because of the maintenance level performed. BRTM had to fix all kinds of the military equipment with severe damages. This philosophy was used in order to renew the equipments' level needed in the war time. Also, this type of unit could provide the capabilities needed for improving the technical characteristics of the major equipments and in addition it had more developed means for recovery & evacuation facilities.

The last level was represented by the Central Base – BC in Romanian – which was one more specialized maintenance unit. They were focused only for some specific kinds of equipments but theirs main task was the highest maintenance level – remanufacturing. This type of unit did not have a less level of mobility.

In conclusion, the former type of the maintenance system was focused on the main characteristics of the military environment after the WW 2nd.

Some major changes occurred in the external force's system of the maintenance system between 2000 -2005, but with a transitory character as it'll be obviously seen few years later. This change was the “opportunity “for the military leaders of that time to outsource all of maintenance activities out of the military environment because some civilian workshops arouse over the night. This idea was starting to be applied without any realistic study over the entire picture view of the real implication in the former maintenance system. The decision making was based only taking in account some insufficient economical reasons. It was a lake of understanding by the military leaders of the entire roles of the maintenance system; they were taking in account just only one objective of the maintenance – “to fix the

cars”- and the dramatic result sudden occurred because a large amount of equipments were not be able to operate properly or not at all, but the worst thing was losing of the qualified personnel. The estimated time to full regeneration of the Maintenance System is about 5...7 years for a normal economical environment and perhaps 10 years in the crisis situation.

I want to emphasize that this concept was enforced inside the military environment because of its main character – hierarchy. The resistance of change of the maintenance system was strong but not enough because of the economical personal interest of the technical personnel with higher ranks in order to receive retired in advance and an important amount of money.

Starting with 2009 the Chief of the Major Staff realized the huge gaps inside the maintenance system and military environment taking in account the near economic crisis. He recognized of the need of change immediately and he created a proper climate and a strong opinion supporting this idea inside the military organization. Starting that point, all echelons were aware about the change inside the maintenance system. Only if the necessity of change was obviously, a lot of opposite opinion occurred because of some misunderstanding regarding to the main advantages taking for the fighter units. The main objectives of the new maintenance system were to discharge fighter units from a large amount of specific duties regarding to logistics and to save money in order to spend them by the logisticians in an optimal and proper manner.

The J4 structure from the General Staff supported by the experts from the former maintenance units identified the main problems of the maintenance system and they designed the configuration of the new maintenance system. They also established a common strategy for implementation of this concept. The main feature of the new system is the network character in order to cover entire national territory on one hand and to have enough power and mobility in order to assure the capability to be deployed abroad on the other hand. The strategy for transformation of the maintenance system was endorsed by the minister of defense at the proposal of the J4’s head. After this moment, the strategy was starting to be implemented. For this, there was formed a strong and well trained coalition from the experts of the maintenance centers derived from the former maintenance battalions in order to developed theirs main subunits named SMEM - section of the maintenance of the military equipment. J4 created and communicated the official vision about the strategy of the new maintenance system through the military organization. Because this participative character, all personnel were empowered to act on vision by removing barriers to change and encouraging risk taking and creative problem solving. Also I want to emphasize that the effectiveness of

this manner of implementation was very high recording best results in a very short period of time. The direct relationship between new behaviors and organizational success was done.

The actual stage of implementation is the evaluation of change effectiveness and modification of strategy where necessary.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Organizational change is an episodic activity. That is, it starts at some point, proceeds through a series of steps, and culminates in some outcome that those involved hope is an improvement over the starting point. It has a beginning, middle and an end.

Lewin's three-step model represents a classic illustration of this perspective. Change is seen as a break in the organization's equilibrium. The status-quo has been disturbed, and change is necessary to establish a new equilibrium state. The objective of refreezing is to stabilize the new situation by balancing the driving and restraining forces.

Also, organizational change should be thought of as balancing a system made up of five interacting variables within the organization – people, tasks, technology, structure and strategy. A change in any one variable has repercussions on one more of the others. This perspective is episodic in that it treats organizational change as essentially an effort to sustain equilibrium. A change in one variable begins a chain of events that, if properly managed, requires adjustments in the other variables to achieve a new state of equilibrium.

Even if the military organization has a rigid character derived from the hierarchical feature the change phenomenon is quite present because of the necessity to adjust it taking in account the military and economically environments features.

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POWER AND AUTHORITY IN THE MILITARY

LTC Radu MOSCU

INTRODUCTION

Through the history of humanity, when people felt the need to associate in order to collect food, they had to have a leader. That leader was decided by the leadership skills needed in that specific period of time, given the environmental challenges.

What we know nowadays regarding the succession styles of leadership is based on archaeology and studies made upon present hunting-gathering bands in Africa and Aborigine population in Australia.

The study of leadership in prehistoric and contemporary bands is of value for both the indigenous leadership discourse and the general leadership discourse; bands represent what can be called a “pure” horizontal leadership-followership paradigm¹. This paradigm was assessed and illustrated as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. A generic horizontal paradigm framework

A group consisted of several families and up to 100 individuals, united in the endeavor of gathering food. Later on, security became a problem, when other groups with less access to

¹ Sveiby, Karl-Erik, *The First Leadership? Shared Leadership in Indigenous Hunter-Gatherer Bands*, Dept. of Management and Organisation, Hanken Business School, Helsinki, 2009, page 3

resources tried to take over the ones of the luckier group; they needed a form of leadership. In those groups, respect was based on skills and experience. Of course, age had an important place, as elders have done lots of things in their past. But leadership in this kind of group was based on tasks and leaders were appointed temporarily by the whole group. The leader had to be the one more skilled to lead the group for a specific task. Equality within the group was highly valued. Therefore, each member had to follow a code of conduct, regardless of his position: leader or follower. At that time, as in present days in the African hunter-gatherer groups, the rules had much greater weight as the laws in our society: an offender faced the punishment imposed by the group and the group always endorsed the punishment with the respective attitude toward the perpetrator.

Leadership Code of Conduct for temporary leaders²:

1. Do not take the leadership role for ego reasons – you are there on behalf of the followers.
2. Do not use fear to influence (fear of competition, job losses, etc).
3. Do not keep information to yourself – share.
4. Do not exploit ignorance (of customers, of followers, etc).
5. Do not say one thing and do another – walk the talk.
6. Do not ignore risks for others (in the operation, when launching new products, etc).
7. Do not blame others when things go wrong.
8. Do not conceal problems occurring – take responsibility.
9. Do not leave the followers alone to save themselves (in times of downsizing, etc).
10. Do not inflict damage on the innocent bystanders (such as society).
11. Do not repeat mistakes – acknowledge and learn from them.
12. Do not avoid the issues – change direction before it is too late.
13. Do not impose your own view on other people.

Followership Code of Conduct for temporary followers:

1. Do not follow a leader who shows disrespect toward followers.
2. Defer to more knowledgeable people.
3. Do not usurp the role of another person.

We do not know when the horizontal paradigm lost its effectiveness. As the first documents of antiquity state, this horizontal paradigm was replaced by the vertical paradigm, which implies hierarchy. Horizontal paradigm did not work on power basis, but on common outcome of the individuals within the group. Modern society uses hierarchy to complete its

² Idem, page 16

goals, giving much more weight to people in charge, from kings to presidents, committees and officers. And with responsibilities come power and authority over the lead people. This is called the vertical paradigm, as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. A generic vertical paradigm framework

I. DEFINING THE TERMS

I.1. Power

As any of the terms used in social sciences, power has not a certain accepted definition. The meanings of this notion are often tied of the general context it is used in and the purpose it is analyzed. For instance, generally speaking, power is defined as the ability or the possibility of an individual or a group of individuals to act or to use the force to do something. J.K. Galbraith said that power is the ability of an individual or group to impose his objectives to others. Hyman’s opinion is that power means the ability of an individual to control the physical and social environment.

Generally speaking, power means “the ability to influence people“. The influence can be imposed to the people being in decision making positions and the result wanted is the final decisions to be in accordance with what the power holders want. Power meaning can be divided into:

- a) the ability of controlling or imposing a situation or a person, in spite of any other desire or attempt to influence another individual or group;
- b) the ability to influence a decision or an action in terms of modifying the original objectives, most of the time partially³ .

Power can be a set of resources that can be used by the power holder: not only the formal position but also money, information, control over the jobs.

In other cases, power is in the mind of the influenced one. It is the image of the individual reflected into the perception of the influenced person. Once the influenced perceive the influencer having the means to inflict some consequences, the first one will be convinced in some degree he faces a power holder. This kind of power is used by people having connections or working with people having power. Maybe they have not enough power to show to the influenced person, but they use the perception of the power coming along with the person they can call.

In most of the researches done, power is analyzed as having the following means: authority, influence (or control) and affinity. The sources of power are in coercion, remuneration and rules.

Coercive power results from the expectation of a negative reward if your wishes are not obeyed. For instance, suppose a commanding officer (CO) counseled a subordinate twice for minor infractions of regulations. At the third counseling session, CO threatens the subordinate with non-judicial punishment (NJP). At the next occurrence of the un-desirable behavior, CO places the subordinate on report. Coercive power works, but is not the best method of leading subordinates. It works best if used when all else fails and you feel sure you can influence the behavior with a threat. Before threatening, CO should have some insight how he will handle the case. To recommend maximum punishment needs a very thorough assessment of the case and a certain prevision that the behavior will not change in the desired way.

Legitimate power comes from the authority of the rate and position in the chain of command. In the military, as in any other organization using the vertical paradigm of leadership, legitimate power is used on daily basis. Even legitimate power increases with more responsibilities added, the power holder can decrease that power if fails to meet all the responsibilities. To increase the legitimate power, an officer can assume some of his commanding officer's responsibilities. At first, the CO will be glad to have that help. After a while, CO will see those responsibilities as being of the officer who offered the help and will formally delegate additional authority to the last one. That will increase the officer's legitimate power, in the same time lowering the power of the CO. In this way, the subordinate officer becomes accountable in front of the CO for what he assumed.

Informational power depends on giving or holding information or possessing information that others do not have. That is the reason why "information means power". When issuing orders to

subordinates, a commander uses the informational power in such a way that the subordinates will automatically presume he originated the order. Sometimes the one giving an order may not agree with the orders he has to comply. Placing the responsibility to somebody else up in the chain of command diminishes the power of the one giving the order (“The chief of staff said ...”).

Referent power comes from the subordinates’ identification or association with the one issuing the order. The order issuer has this power by simply being “the chief”. People often identify the ideals that officer stands for. This image can be enhanced by exhibiting charisma, courage and charm. A negative image in the eyes of the others will decrease the power and will create an image of ineffective officer.

Expert power derives from the knowledge and expertise in a specific area through somebody can influence others. An officer has expert power when his subordinates regard him as an expert in his rating. Subordinates may have also this kind of power. If this power is combined with other types of power, it becomes an effective tool in influencing others. If used as itself, it is ineffective.

I.2. Authority

The word Authority is derived mainly from the Latin word *autoritas*, meaning invention, advice, opinion, influence, or command⁴. In English, the word “authority” can be used meaning power given by the state (in the form of Members of Parliament, Judges, Police Officers, etc.) or by academic knowledge of an area (someone can be an authority on a subject)⁵.

Either in politics, military or economy there is recognized authority, therefore legitimate. Normally, authority is a legitimate use of power, or the inherent right of a person or institution to use the organization to fulfill the objectives and obtain the outcome expected. Therefore, authority relies on the legitimate power based on a social infrastructure, accompanied by the perspective of coercive power.

Even if the three domains (politics, economy and military) have legal basis, the difference between political, military and economic authority is given by the objectives, domain and the area included. For instance, in the economy there is the authority of an individual or a company over his/its properties. In the politics there is the government’s authority over different aspects of the

³ <http://www.stiucum.com/economie/economie-politica/339/conceptul-de-putere-si-notiuni>

⁴ <http://wealthandauthority.blogspot.com>

⁵ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authority>

political activity. In the military there is the authority of the commander over all manning, operational, administrative and logistical aspects of the unit under his command.

The term “authority” means also:

- legitimate power, a power combined with the right to issue orders, to lead something or somebody;
- a relationship created between a person or a group and an outside entity (person, group or organism) which states the acceptance as legitimate the guidance of its actions provided by that entity;
- a governmental institution having the competence to issue orders mandatory to comply with;
- a government representative.

I.3. Authority – Power relationship

There are situations when individuals, groups and institutions have authority; they have the right to use power in a legitimate way. Military organization is part of this situation, especially in war times. There are also situations when some persons may force you to do something, even if they do not have the right to do it. It is the case of your classmates, who can (morally) force you to pay for a party you cannot be part of (due to various reasons).

Authority generates hierarchy, for the following reasons:

- hierarchy means the acceptance of guidance coming from some persons and offices in command, their responsibility being to organize and coordinate the activities of the execution level.
- authority is an essential part of the decision making process at the leadership level.

Social hierarchy involves a stratification of individuals from the perspective of:

- authority;
- prestige;
- power;
- influence.

The image of a hierarchic organization is the one of a pyramid: at the top level, the number of individuals is smaller and smaller; downwards the number increases. Military organizations look exactly like that.

This pyramidal system is based on:

- separation in the decision making process;

- general decisions are made at the top level and they are transmitted downwards as orders;
 - all the other levels make specific decisions which are parts of the general decisions.
- relationships of authority, to include all levels in a subordinate or supraordinate position.
- The functioning of the military, like any hierarchic organization, has some attributes:
- it has to coordinate complex activities;
 - it has to solve complex problems, successively decomposed in subproblems; this way, each member can use his specific expertise to solve relatively simple problems;
 - it motivates the performance of the subordinate levels.

These were the benefic parts of the military; but there are some inconvenient also:

- there is bureaucracy, especially if the dimensions of the pyramid are big; the level of control and coordination is difficult to maintain and personal involvement is very low;
- the pyramidal structure is rigid, having difficulties in changing;
- it affects the individual in a negative way regarding: responsibility, work satisfaction, motivation (high level to the top, drastically decreasing to the base).

II. PRINCIPLES OF POWER AND AUTHORITY USE

Use of authority includes at some level the use of power (or the image of power). But this use has to have a balance in order to achieve the right objectives, or the group within the authority is used will face negative consequences.

The principles of using authority should be known and followed by all persons in charge of something, regardless the position or the domain. In the military these principles have greater weight, especially in crisis or war times, when authority has to deal with people carrying lethal weapons.

Humanism. The philosopher Immanuel Kant said that “rational human beings should be treated as an end in themselves and not as a means to something else”⁶. The relationship based on authority inflicts a lack of balance between people. A person gives orders, as his profession gives him the right to do so, provides guidance, and others follow the orders and carry them out. One person obtain the power, the others lose some freedom. In this situation, in a system based on hierarchy there are temptations. The power holder will be tempted to

⁶ Kant Immanuel, *The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*

consider himself almighty and to use his position however he wants. In this case we face abuse of authority in two directions: over people and over domains.

This principle proposes a great value: to provide freedom to subordinates as much as possible, in order to carry out the orders given. This way, the subordinate can feel he is valued by the commander and he has an important role in the organization.

As an extension of this principle, the person having authority must use it in the right way, for the purpose it was given and not as a tool to have everything. The commander has to do what he must do and not what he wants to do.

Altruism. This principle refers to the subject of authority in order to bear in mind the feelings of the subordinates. When giving an order, the issuer has to give to the subordinate the reason he has to carry on that order in order to understand the importance of what he is going to do and his place into the organization. The highest level of altruism is when the one having authority is asked to make the ultimate sacrifice for his organization. This is the level of heroism which is rarely encountered. It is the attitude of the captain who is the last to leave his sinking ship or he decides to go down along with the ship.

Reciprocity. This principle has a special connotation, involving what in psychology is named *empathy* – put yourself in the shoes of the subordinate. That means when issue an order, think what consequences has that order upon the subordinate and the others. This principle should have a benefic effect upon the level and nature of the authority holder, urging him to be moderate, balanced and to have expertise and common sense.

Sufficient authority. This principle derives from the way authority holder is dealing with his job, given the obligations, interdictions and permissions he faces. How much he uses from each of them when he uses his authority? This principle is considered to be the one to discourage the excess of authority. Sometimes, some authority holders do not want to assume responsibility of the orders they have to issue and they try to transfer it to a higher authority. More than that, they use the name of that authority as a reason and justification: “the commander can do that ...” but we seldom hear “the commander must do that...”.

Adequate authority. This principle deals with the nature of the regulations, especially the punitive ones. The ability of the authority holder to apply this principle is determined by the level he assumes the moral criteria, which should stop him to claim an illegitimate authority. Overuse of authority means to show yourself an expert in domains you have not competencies, to issue orders in fields you have not expertise or responsibilities, to punish unbalanced in relation with the nature of the offence or for imaginary facts.

Delegation of authority. The authority has to be delegated to the lowest level needed for a task to be effectively performed. This principle should be widely used, especially if the

task to be done is out of the area of expertise of the authority holder. Delegating the authority in that domain do not lower the authority, but ensures that the subordinates will know the orders based on the expertise of somebody having knowledge in that domain. In this case, the subordinates will accept much easier the authority.

Many authority holders fail to delegate authority or they do it improperly. It may be due to they feel more powerful if they are the originators of all decisions. Other supervisors do not agree to delegate because they think their subordinates will make poor decisions. So they do not want to be responsible for the decisions made by somebody else in the domains they will be accounted.

All the principles described above should be considered from the first step in a soldier's career: the first appointment.

From the human resources perspective, the problem is to fill a position with a person in such way that the specified and implied tasks derived from the mission can be carried out properly, in accordance with the commander's intent, so that all the members of the organization will be satisfied as much as possible.

III. THE REAL PRACTICE IN THE MILITARY

Everything above is at the theoretical level. When in practice, there are many situations and cases. Charisma and the leadership style of the commander will determine the way of using power and authority. Next, I will present some cases picked up from reality.

An autocratic style will spread the abusive way of using power and authority in relation with subordinate levels. Coercion is the main tool of this kind of command. All subordinate levels have to ask for approval for every decision necessary in the daily activity. If somebody dares to make a decision, he will be sanctioned or punished, because he had not any authority to do that. The success of the unit will be assumed by the commander, but failure will be upon the subordinates (in most of the cases for not understanding the way of thinking of the commander or they were incompetent). This way the commander strips off all his subordinates from authority, and relationships within the unit will be severely affected.

The positions inside the unit are decided by this commander, regardless the recommendations or the skills of the candidates. All the commander wants is his orders to be followed. The chief of personnel will be only a clerk, putting in practice the orders of the commander. A good example for this style is as follows.

In a reconnaissance battalion, S3 Operations had a clerk working as a computer operator. She had to take a pre-birth extended holiday. Meanwhile, the commander went into his holidays, leaving his chief of staff (COS) in command.

Feeling the need of a computer operator, S3 and COS decided to replace temporarily the clerk, hiring a civilian one, on a contest basis. The contest was published on time, candidates presented their credentials and CVs to be taken in account.

Two days before the contest, the commander phones the chief of staff in order to be informed on how things are going in the unit. COS reported about the contest for hiring the clerk. The commander became extremely angry and ordered that the contest be cancelled, as this activity had not his approval.

After a brief investigation made by COS, he discovered that the commander's daughter was hired the very next day the clerk was gone. This was known only by the commander, the chief of personnel and the finance officer. The chief of personnel and the finance officer were instructed by the commander to keep this secret. The fact remained at this level, because everybody in the unit knew the commander had connections at very high level in the General Staff and could inflict a lot of negative consequences on those he considered responsible in front of him for personal offense.

This is an example of misuse of authority and power by the commanding officer, in order to act like a despotic king. Moreover, this style of leadership may be subject of prosecution.

Another case for study is a completely different one. A new commander was appointed to lead an EOD unit. The problem was he was not an EOD specialist, but he worked extensively in engineering. After a while he made an idea regarding the activities the unit was supposed to perform. Receiving continuously tasks and missions from the higher command and realizing that he alone cannot deal with them properly, he decides to use brainstorming with the staff officers. In those meetings he stated the task to be done and he listened to all the opinions. When two or three options were identified, he asked which one is most suitable and sustainable for the unit. Then he decided to act according to what they identified as the optimum solution to carry out the task.

After several meetings of this kind, the staff officers began to like working with the commander, even if he was keen of the legality of all the actions. Every paper had to be in accordance with the regulations. It was well known that if a paper passes the commander having his approval, that paper was of value. Soon enough, all his subordinates became more and more responsible in carrying out the tasks and they said they were happy to come at work.

This case was real, too. Even if the commander had the authority to give orders, he preferred to ask for the opinion of his subordinates, delegating the authority in making decisions. His authority did not diminish. On the contrary, it increased day by day and along with it came the respect of all his subordinates. It is the real practice of the consultative style of leadership, respecting every single principle of authority stated above.

Nowadays there are still officers that use different styles of leadership. Some of them delegate authority, some of them do not. Especially at echelons above brigade they have to delegate authority, as the tasks and information are too many to be handled effectively by a single person. A commander overwhelmed by information has no time to decide. The restrictive style is still used at the level of battalion and below, where the tasks are more specific and the troops are less in number, easier to manage then.

CONCLUSIONS

Power and authority are the tools of domination within an organization. The only issue is to use these tools for the benefit either of the organization and the members of it. Looking only to accomplish the mission the people will be forgotten, unhappy, demotivated. Looking for people first and leaving the mission second, the organization will lack performance and the objectives will not be achieved. The solution is to have a balance between orientation on mission and the welfare of the people. This balance is hard to be achieved, as power corrupts.

There will always be people wanting to show themselves to the others. Problems occur when they are appointed to high positions. The bigger they are, the harder they hit⁷. Furthermore, a fool in a high station is like a man on the top of a small mountain: everything appears small to him and he appears small to everybody.⁸

The responsibility to place somebody in a powerful position is very high, as the consequences will come later. They can be in a good way, but sometimes they show it was not the best solution.

Balance is everything in use of authority and power. And there is another factor easily forgotten: common sense. The leadership code of conduct described in page 5 of this paper remains valid regardless of the position of the leader in a hierarchy. And the leaders should be checked from time to time if they follow this code. At least, all of us have to try to comply with every single statement in that code.

⁷ *Murphy's Laws*, Perkin's postulate

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⁸ *Idem*, Matsch's maxim

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION TASK FORCE IN PURSUING NATIONAL INTERESTS

LTC Florinel-Constantin NEGULESCU

I. DIVISION OF RESPONSABILITIES DURING THE ESTABILISHMENT AND USE OF COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION TASK FORCE IN PURSUING OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of warfare, different countries have used special operations in their effort to achieve key strategic objectives. These special operations have largely relied on surprise, speed, and manoeuvre in order to defeat an often numerically superior enemy.

The objectives of these special operations ranged from hostage rescue to foreign government overthrow, but all of these objectives were of strategic importance for the high-level decision makers who conceived and ordered the missions. Thus, because of their high potential payoff, these particular special operations ordered to achieve strategic objectives could be defined as Strategic Special Operations.

Some of these risky missions, carried out by highly trained commandos or by specially trained ad-hoc task forces composed of elements of regular forces, succeeded while others failed.

The international interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are two good examples of the necessity and reality of military cooperation in solving strategic security issues using combined military joint operations. Therefore, in the future, the use of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations is plausible and may become an efficient method for solving potential international crises.

NATO continues its expansion as part of the effort in efficiently responding to new global threats, and close cooperation in military operations is required among the allied countries in order to preserve the peace, or to effectively solve the security issues. Close cooperation is also required between civil and military decision makers.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The scope of this paper is to analyse the process of planning and preparation, of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations and to explore the peculiarities of this process in order to identify the key factors leading to success of these operations.

An analysis of responsibilities in the process of planning and preparation of Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations (SCJSPECOPS), with the intention of emphasising the principles to be followed in order to achieve success, can offer a valuable advantage for military and political decision makers. This analysis may help the military and political decision makers by improving their ability to achieve strategic objectives using this efficient tool.

INTRODUCTION

JP 3-05 (2003) defines Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) as:

A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

That is, in order to create such a military structure, a political agreement between two or more states must exist. Moreover, in accordance with FM 3-05, special operations' objectives "are as much political, economic, and informational as they are military in nature" (DoD, 2006, pp. 1-6). This highlights the fact that the political decision makers are not only involved in the creation of this type of political-military coalition, but in the supervision of the coalition's operations as well. Furthermore, the joint aspect of a CJSOTF involves cooperation among different types of special operations units, or between special operation units and conventional units. Finally, in terms of economy of force, special operations forces are "an essential economy of force when military objectives are subordinate to political, economic, and informational objectives" (DoD, 2006, pp. 1-6). All these characteristics qualify special operations as the proper method to achieve highly political outcomes at lower material and human costs.

An appropriate division of responsibilities at the political-military and military levels is essential for a political-military coalition, when Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations are used for fulfilling coalition common objectives. Roman and Tarr observed, political leaders, civilian bureaucrats, and national security professionals each lay claim to certain functional prerogatives by virtue of their specific offices. However, national security policy formulation is a shared domain that links the top political leaders

I. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE POLITICAL-MILITARY LEVEL

Samuel Huntington (1957) noted, “War is always subordinate to the external political ends which determine the extent and nature of the violence to be employed” (p. 57). Moreover, Roman and Tarr considered that “civilian and military professionals are drawn into policymaking arena by appointees who need all the help they can get” (Feaver & Kohn, 2001, p. 404). Furthermore, referring to the “civil-military interface,” AJP-3 states that, “Joint forces will usually conduct joint operations in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental agencies” (NATO, 2007, pp. 1-3).

The purpose of Strategic Combined Special Operations is to discreetly deal with sensitive matters while backing up national interest. If this type of matter arises, civilian and military professionals, under the supervision of political leaders, are the first to decide upon the necessity of employing Strategic Combined Special Operations and assessing the chance of success in solving the problem by launching them (Johnson & Metz, 1995, pp. 2-3).

When focusing on Strategic Combined Special Operations at the militarypolitical level, three main categories of decision makers are identifiable: political leaders, high-ranking national security professionals, and high-ranking military professionals (Johnson & Metz, 1995, pp. 8-13). The challenge here is to identify what kind of expertise is needed in order to help the decision making process in the field of Strategic Combined Special Operations.

First, we need to be aware of the “social myth” of professional expertise. Usually, at this political-military level, high-ranking professionals are mostly involved. That does not mean the professional expertise is directly proportional to professional rank. This situation appears because, in time, the high-ranking professionals lose a part of their special abilities in their field of expertise as a consequence of their high position in which they mostly deal with administrative matters instead of training, practicing, and maintaining their professional skills

(Feaver & Kohn, 2001, p. 405). Therefore, the way political leaders need the expertise of high-ranking professionals, the latter need the support and expertise of national security professionals and military field experts as well.

As far as the Strategic Combined Special Operations is concerned, at the military-political level the decision should involve two separate steps. The first step involves a detailed evaluation of a given situation and whether a special operation is the best available course of action (Dalton, 2008, pp. 61-62). Once the use of special operations forces is identified as the best suitable course of action for solving the problem, the second step is the creation of an interface between military-political decision makers and operational forces (Goodpaster, 1996).

I 1. Evaluating the Situation and Identifying the Best Available Course of Action

For this step, the “decision making table” at the national political-military level is represented below in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The National Decision Making Table at the Military-political

Using Douglas and Metz's (1995) analysis on the military-political level, the following responsibilities for the political leaders, national security professionals, and the military professionals may be identified.

a. Political Leaders' Responsibilities

- Evaluate how the matter under discussion affects national interest at the national and international level;
- Evaluate the internal and international risks of taking or not taking any action to solve the problem;
- Evaluate the possibilities of an international coalition to solve the problem through combined special operations versus unilateral special operations;
- Initiate the process of identifying the best available course of action to solve the problem;
- Take responsibility for the finally agreed upon course of action;
- Initiate the procedures for establishing an international coalition.

b. High-ranking Military Professionals' Responsibilities

- Analyze the military capabilities of the potential adversary/target;
- Estimate the probability of success in engaging the adversary/target by different available methods;
- Estimate the collateral damages of military actions;
- Estimate the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of a combined military operation versus a unilateral military operation;
- Recommend a military course of action for solving the problem;
- Initiate the procedures for setting a combined military operation.

c. High-ranking National Security Professionals' Responsibilities

- Analyze the possibility of engaging the adversary/target by specific means and methods and the likelihood of success;
- Analyze the risks involved by using such methods;
- Analyze the possibility of supporting the military course of action recommended by the military professionals;
- Estimate the possibilities, advantages and disadvantages of cooperation with other foreign security services.

d. Common Responsibilities for all Political Leaders, High-ranking National Security Professionals, and the High-ranking Military Professionals

- Analyze all proposed courses of action from their perspective;
- Participate in selecting the most advantageous course of action;

- Support the selected course of action by offering the necessary resources, personnel and expertise from their field of responsibility (pp. 4-14).

I.2. Creating a Combined Military-political Interface between the National Military-political Decision Makers and CJSOTF

AJP-3 states, “Military activity at the strategic and operational level will clearly be influenced, and ultimately directed by political considerations” (NATO, 2007, pp. 1-3).

If the use of special operation forces (by launching a Strategic Combined Joint Special Operation) is considered the most advantageous course of action, the next step is to establish an interface between the combined operational task force (CJSOTF) and the decision makers at the military-political level.

Similar to the national level, this interface should be composed of three categories of decision makers: political leaders, national security professionals, and military professionals (Neagoe, 2009, p. 33). At the national military-political level, a balance between their political skills, administrative skills, and specific professional skills should characterize the decision makers. Nonetheless, at the combined military-political interface, highly qualified professionals who understand the nature of the relationship between the military and political actions are needed. Moreover, besides their political affairs experience, the politicians involved at this level should also have strong knowledge of military affairs (Deist, Boog, Maier, and Rahn, 2001, pp. 106-109).

In analyzing *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo* (Odom, 1988, pp. 25-28; 42-43; 45-59; 61-81) and *Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo* (Wagoner, 1980, pp. 130-136; 137-140; 143-148), a few conclusions about how national security professionals and military professionals should divide their responsibilities within the structure can be drawn as described in the following paragraphs.

a. Politicians’ Responsibilities

- Deal with the political aspects of setting up a Combined Joint Special Operations Force;
- Negotiate the quantitative and functional participation within the Combined Joint Special Operations Forces according to national caveats;
- Ensure that the operations’ end state supports political aims;
- Cooperate to establish the rules of engagement to protect military personnel in according with international treaties and national caveats;
- Keep national political authorities informed of the status of operations.

b. Security Professionals’ Responsibilities

- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy of supporting the military course of action recommended by the military professionals;
- Facilitate the cooperation between their services and the CJSOTF's elements;
- Provide intelligence acquired by the CJSOTF elements' services regarding the situation in the area of operations.

c. Military Professionals' Responsibilities

- Advise the politicians on negotiating the quantitative and functional participation within the Combined Joint Special Operations Forces in accordance with national military caveats;
- Deal with the military aspects of setting up a Combined Joint Special Operations Force;
- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy for engaging the target in order to support political aims;
- Advise politicians on establishing the rules of engagement.

d. Common Responsibilities for all Political Leaders, National Security Professionals, and Military Professionals

- Cooperate in establishing a common strategy for engaging the target/enemy in order to fulfill the common political purpose;
- Support the common strategy by engaging the necessary resources personnel and expertise from their field of responsibility (pp. 32-44.).

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II. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE MILITARY (CJSOTF) LEVEL

ABCA (2001) states that the coalition force commander will have to look at which nations can offer special capabilities. These capabilities—airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics—can offset other countries' shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence. (pp. 1-14)

This statement is an important one for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force's commander as well. He must be aware that the division of responsibilities at the CJSOTF level may be influenced by two factors: national caveats and military proficiency. Depending on these two factors, the CJSOTF commander must clearly establish what type of task each CJSOTF element is of performing and shape each element's mission.

CONCLUSIONS

By analyzing the Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations not only as a military operation but also as a complex political-military operation, we can distinguish three levels of responsibilities: the national political-military level, the combined joint political-military level, and the combined joint military level. These levels are shown in Figure 2

1. The National Political-military Level

The decision of whether or not to participate in a coalition is made by each state at the national level. This political decision is taken after the military and national security professionals, under the supervision of high-ranking political leaders, carry out a detailed analysis of the situation. At this level, the situation analysis consists of an evaluation of the state's available methods to solve the problem and of an assessment of the compatibility degree between the national interest and a coalition's common interest. If the final decision favors participation in coalition operations and execution of combined special operations, the interested states can begin negotiations. The main purpose of negotiations is to conceive the coalition's common strategic objectives and form a combined political-military element aimed at turning those objectives into reality.

2. The Combined Joint Political-military Level

At this level, political-military teams or political and military representatives from each coalition member state work together. Their common goal is to design the structure of CJSOTF and to build up the diplomatic channels and legal framework necessary for its materialization. Moreover, at this level the strategy of employing CJSOTF in order to accomplish the coalition's common objectives is conceived.

3. The Combined Joint Military Level

This area should be exclusively reserved for military and national security professionals. At this level, the necessary decisions to achieve CJSOTF military objectives are taken in accordance with the strategy established by the high-level political-military decision makers. At the combined joint military level, the responsibilities for fulfilling the CJSOTF objectives are divided among its constituent elements. As long as the decisions taken at the CJSOTF level are in accordance with the rules of engagement, any alteration of those decisions based on political criteria can be counterproductive.

As far as the Strategic Combined Joint Special Operations is concerned, there must be a division of responsibilities between those three layers and between the components of each layer as well. In this way, undesirable interferences will be avoided, and thus all the politicians, military professionals and security professionals involved will be given the opportunity to effectively use their skills and expertise in fulfilling the desired common goals.




Figure 2 The Levels of the Division's Responsibilities

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TENDENCIES AND GUIDELINES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CAPT CDR Aurelian NIȚĂ

INTRODUCTION

The concept of "European Security", according to dictionaries and many specialized works, expresses the same idea on creation of mechanisms regarding the relations between the European states that have to preserve the fundamental values of the states and civilization of this continent.

Mainly, the aspect that differentiates this concept from the one of global security is related to the factor space, which is reduced to the limits of Europe. Other features of continental security are determined of how objective or subjective is the evolution of the European states and their relationships.

So, when people speak of achieving a European security it is not unimportant the place where such claims are heard because the continental limits and the spiritual and material objectification of the "security" value are perceived differently. The "normal" of this situation, which we hope that with the passing of time and the changing of generations will equalize with that of geographical boundaries, is given by the difference that led to the development of areas and the evolution of relations between the European states. A common view of security across the continent, is possible only in specific conditions of a homogeneous internal area, which is based on related policies, strategies and national and multinational programs.

The relaxation and international cooperation period, initiated after the 90s, is deeply and beneficially influenced by positive transformations in the political, economic, military, financial, social etc. field, that took place in the NATO and EU organizations, as well as that of the countries invited to join the great Euro-Atlantic and European families, development of democracy and market economy, human rights and universal values. These two organizations are representative because they are the ones that not only generated a high level of economic development on the continent, but also a new approach to security, based on a peaceful solution to disputes and on international cooperation through some common institutions.

Of course, a crucial role in ensuring the European security was played by the U.S. both by security commitments to Europe taken within NATO and through the given support for European integration.

On the other hand, the new relations between the United States of America and Russia, on one hand, and between NATO and the European Union, on the other hand, mark the international security environment of the present - a new partnership, but also new tensions. Under these circumstances, lack of money, time, vision and political will could affect not only the national security, but also the international one.

I. ORGANIZATIONS UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK

In Europe, the number of security organizations, institutionalized or not, is increasing, and the area of their action is global, European or Euro-Atlantic. In this respect, the institutionalized organizations include:

- the United Nations organization, with a global mission,
- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a common security system based on cooperation between European countries plus USA and Canada, which includes 28 states,
- the European Union (EU), an independent community of European states, today in a number of 27, reunited, after five waves of accession, made around common political, economic, cultural and social values,
- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the main warning and conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation instrument in the European region,
- the Council of Europe, the continent's oldest political organization, founded in 1949, bringing together 47 states, received the application of one more state (Belarus) and granted the observer status to other five states (the Vatican, United States of America, Canada, Japan and Mexico).

Also, among the regional cooperation structures which are not institutionalized we may mention the following:

- the Cooperation Process in Southeastern Europe (SEECP) involving small and medium countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia with an observer status,

- the Central European Initiative (CEI), which is a flexible and pragmatic regional cooperation which brings together a number of small and medium countries such as: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Ukraine, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro,
- the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was signed between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in 1992, and then the agreement was expanded to include Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. It proved to be an excellent preparation for obtaining access to EU for the economy of candidate countries,
- the Danube Cooperation Process, which involves 13 countries in the Danube basin take part (the 10 countries Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, and the three states, with most of the territory located in the river basin: the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- the European Commission and the Stability Pact, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) which includes a series of objectives relating to local democracy and cooperation; media, infrastructure, investments and trade, management and stabilization of population movements, organized crime.
- the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), a sub-structure that encourages cooperation between the participating countries and facilitates their integration into European structures. The participating countries are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary.
- the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is the result of a comprehensive restructuring of the regional cooperation , for their adaptation to the needs and challenges of the region.

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW CHALLENGES

Based on projected new types of conflicts, we easily notice that the traditional means of obtaining security are no longer effective, except through applying national resources and transnational cooperation in international forums, of inclusiveness and multilateralism. On this premise, the states of Europe have largely joined the regional military security organizations.

We believe that the best option to achieve a framework for European security, would be if preventive diplomacy and collective security of the States would occur in a comprehensive, indivisible and cooperative way. The reality, however, doesn't allow their actual manifestation to occur in another way than fragmentary and institutionalized at regional level.

Nowadays, building regional agreements as security partnerships is perhaps the most important innovation of security practices of the states. In Europe, a large number of regional organizations operate. Generally, each of them contributes to the development of progressive social, structural elements, corresponding to long-term preventive diplomacy. Capability and complexity are significant in its objectives: The United Nations (UN), The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The European Union (EU).

II.1. UN

The United Nations Organization has been and still remains the most important security organization with a global character that has a special role in world's history and will continue to play this role. The purposes for which this organization was established refer to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations based on the principle of equal rights of people, achieving international cooperation and harmonization efforts of nations to achieve these purposes. In this respect, the United Nations Charter sets the principles, structures and mechanisms that can lead to achieving these goals.

The most effective UN mechanisms include: analyzing the most important aspects of existence and development of human society in various forums - General Assembly, Security Council etc. - and adopting appropriate resolutions and decisions, implementation of international agreements in various fields, important for global stability, setting up missions and sending peacekeeping forces in different parts of the world, coordination and supervision of their activities, supporting areas and nations which were left behind in terms of social and economic issues or of certain categories of people (children, sick persons, refugees, etc.). We must emphasize the important role of special UN missions for maintaining or enforcing peace, and of the UN Security Council to solve the most pressing issues of global, regional or national interest of humanity, with implications for international and regional stability.

II.2. OSCE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a pan-European security organization whose 55 member states are situated, geographically speaking, from Vancouver in western Canada and Vladivostok in the Far East of Russia, falling from a functional viewpoint, in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the one referring to the regional security arrangements.

OSCE is the first instrument in its area of responsibility: early warning, prevention of conflicts, crisis management and post conflict recovery situation. Addressing security in the OSCE vision is extensive and based on cooperation. It includes a wide range of issues such as arms control, preventive diplomacy, mutual confidence building measures between states, human rights, election monitoring, security, environmental and economic security. All OSCE participating States have equal status, regardless of their size, and decisions are taken by consensus.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a regional security institution with a very well defined role in the European security architecture - the creation and performance of collective security mechanisms, bilateral and multilateral, to help maintain real relationships and trust among the European cooperation, for stability and equilibrium on the continent. Its mechanisms and levers are mostly theoretical, based on the provisions of treaties and conventions and bilateral or multilateral arrangements, without the use of force or coercion procedures and also on the analysis of important issues in different forums or institutions of the OSCE.

Among the special mechanisms, with significant effects on European security plan, one of the most important ones are CFE Treaty and Open Sky Treaty, and some peace support missions that are effective tools to control the activities of military forces and conventional armaments of the major European countries, which contributed to reducing the danger of a significant local or regional conflict and increase trust between the classic nations. It is equally significant to emphasize the role of the security body that lacks elements of force and coercion mechanisms which affect the credibility of this organization in the panoply of international security structures and the efficiency in conflicts and ethnic problems or religious crises.

II.3. NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a collective political-military organization, mainly with a role in security, makes a delimitation of the security concept in several articles of the Treaty. The challenges of the beginning of 21st century led NATO to reassess the definition of security. Collective defense remains the main mission of the Alliance, however, risks, dangers and threats facing the North Atlantic Organization substantially changed.

NATO has its source efficiency, among others, in the fact that it covers all components of stability, has organizational tools and mechanisms - collective political and military institutions which take and manage decisions, processing systems of information, special forces etc.. - Conceptual - doctrines, standards, concepts, manuals, etc.. – acted by infrastructure in all confrontation environments, from outer space to underground or under water.

It is also relevant in this moment of our analysis, that NATO has constantly upgraded these institutions and mechanisms due to the requirements of the security environment and to the threats that have emerged in different periods, compared to the UN and OSCE mechanisms which have tried to adapt the old mechanism to modern threats, losing efficiency.

Trends show the new orientation of the NATO alliance to assume new responsibilities outside the security arrangement of geographical regions of the Member States and new responsibilities to the classic ones. The terrorist events in U.S., 11th September 2001, and terrorist actions that followed, demonstrated the NATO strength, solidarity of its members, effective mechanisms, even some cracks, including partial coherence or consistency caused by uneven technological development of member countries. The NATO development, taking place in the first years of 21st century, make this organization to be a global security actor, who has assumed the appropriate capacities of all responsibilities in almost any region of the globe.

The issue of NATO modernization, its adaptation to the requirements of new dimensions of global and European security environment is always in the attention of the alliance's leaders, being a highly actual and continuity theme. Currently, there is talk about: security cooperation with other organizations, extension, strengthening of transatlantic relations, crisis management, non-article missions 5, the fight against terrorism, etc. role specialization. In this context, NATO underlines the indivisibility of international security: the evolution of a region affects the development of others, and the

old concept of security (ability to defend the territory) is insufficient to illustrate the complexity of the world.

At the same time, NATO development to Eastern European area, places for the first time, the six Black Sea countries in a numerical parity: there are three NATO members (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria) and three non-member states (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine). Thus, the Black Sea ceases to be under a great influence of ex-Soviet countries exclusively. NATO military transformation and the modernization initiated by the EU involves firm directions of action of the states that are part in the two organizations and as well as the implementation of safety management systems that comply with the requirements of both standards in all aspects of national security organizations.

II.4. EU

The European Union, organization primarily responsible for economy, has become an important element for the European stability and security. The impact of existence and action of the European Union in the security matter has an economic component - the basic original purpose of this organization and a political-military component, more and more consistent in the last years of the twentieth century and later, when the EU enlarged its concerns, and therefore extended its tools, concepts and mechanisms of action, in terms of security. Of course, it is obvious that the political-military plan, the EU evolves in competition with NATO, especially that now, the Union is based on some capacities and facilities of NATO, but the EU projects and the predictable progress in medium and long term indicates its desire to increase its role in the European security field, perhaps on an own lane, or on other security organizations' lanes.

For the purposes of the foregoing, a new intensification of EU efforts took place in the early 2001, through the foundation of the concept regarding European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which became one of the most delicate topics at that time, both in the EU and the NATO-EU relations.

This is based on economic and trade interests of the union and pursues a common security plan. The declared reason of CFSP is to create a full range of military and non-military capacity, to help the European Union, to enable it to intervene, if necessary, in humanitarian missions, search and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, management crisis, including peace enforcement. In addressing this delicate issue, EU decision makers start, probably, from the fact that it provides over half of the international funds for

development and humanitarian aid, about a third of the world help for Middle East and 40% of the reconstruction efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union wanting the political efforts to raise the economic level. This goal could be reached by achieving the ability to defend its members' common values, fundamental interests, independence and security, and capacity to prevent and, if necessary, resolve by themselves in the case that local conflicts occur, countering multiple threats and danger to the continent and every member's security . Real steps made by the European Union in this regard are already significant, but the pace is relatively slow, and hiring some of the EU members or partners do not materialize to the appropriate extent. The fact is that, some of the projects launched several years ago, began to come alive, such as the Rapid Reaction Force or collective structures of political and military leadership.

III. THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Quite often, contemporary debates address issues of how actors (state and non-state) appear and act in the international relations, what their status is, how coherent and how connected to the reality of international politics their action is, which is the consequence and the role of the major centres of power, where the European Union wants to be a real actor of international relations, the way economy and trade bases determines the measures taken by it.

The role and the importance of the European Union are becoming more and more evident in the international diplomatic circles, given its involvement in managing the world's great contemporary problem that directly affects the creation of a climate of security and stability, fight against international terrorism, "stabilization of near surroundings ", North South relations, - relations between the Mediterranean countries and Central and Eastern European countries (which have already started to be part of the Union) and, finally, sometimes the controversial relationship to the common foreign and security policy, and also the European policy of general defense. Threats and vulnerabilities at all European countries, whether big, medium or small, only identified, but not detailed by EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy are considered to derive from the political, economic, demographic, ecological, scientific, technological evolutions and are not necessarily exploited against a particular state or non-state actor.

Thus, in the Strategy are identified as weaknesses: global warming and energy dependence of Europe, but elements that can rather be classified as risks and dangers, such as poverty, starvation or economic growth failure. The more clear threats are: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and hostile attitude towards European expatriates, aggression against the main communication lines, attacks against the European forces for maintaining or restoring peace, etc.

The European Security Strategy clearly defines the main objectives: the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, violent conflict and instability in the vicinity of the Union, combating extreme poverty, hunger and endemic diseases, creating a "circle of good governance" in the Mediterranean area and Eastern borders. Also, in terms of international cooperation of the organization, there are important points on the partnerships' agenda: strengthening transatlantic relations, strengthening relations with strategic partnerships with Russia and Japan, China, Canada and India. Under the EU Treaty, the European Council defines the principles and general directions of action in the foreign and security policy, including issues related to the size of defense, and the EU Council takes the necessary decisions to their implementation. The legal instruments available to the Council are common strategies, common actions and common positions. The EU Council recommends to the State presidents and Government chiefs setting common strategies, then implement them, particularly by adopting common actions and positions (TEU, Article 13). The states included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are those that are at the eastern and southern border of the EU and for which there is no near prospect of accession. Such partnerships are developed in the ENP especially with the following countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and The Palestinian Authority. In the Mediterranean area, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.

ENP involves a privileged relationship between the Union and its neighbours, which is based on respect for the EU's values, namely respect for human rights, respect of minorities, rule of law, good governance, promoting good relations with neighbours, the principles of market economy and of sustainable development.

The main objective of the ENP is to ensure security in the EU neighbourhood, creating an "arc of friends" around it.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is an instrument of EU foreign policy that sets rules for the cooperation between it and its neighbours. ENP is one of the main objectives of the European Security Strategy.

Another evolution of the European Union refers to the creation of the Eastern Partnership, which will be a multinational forum, composed of the 27 EU member states and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (potentially Belarus). The objectives of this forum will focus on migration, the facilitation and further liberalization of visa regime, free trade areas for services and agricultural products and establishing strategic partnerships between the European bloc and the five Eastern European countries.

There will be focus on developing projects on student exchange or environmental protection, too. However, the partnership excludes the possibility of a subsequent EU access. The Eastern Partnership will establish a new multilateral framework for cooperation between EU and Eastern ENP.

In the European Commission's view, the new multilateral framework would support the development of EU's bilateral relations to its eastern neighbours, which will continue to be governed by the principle of differentiation, which means that the pace and depth of their development will depend on the ambitions and capacities of each state.

However, the new multilateral framework will be more than a forum dialogue, it will have to facilitate the development and implementation of positions and concerted actions to meet common challenges. In fact, the new multilateral instrument will print substance to the political association which will be established between the countries of Eastern Europe and the EU Association Agreements.

The latest press on the spring European Council of the European Union refers to the economic problem affecting the whole world, and therefore the Member States of the organization. That is why, in this document there are guidelines for "leading the recovery of Europe": rebuilding trust and loan ; financial markets and confidence in the future will be provided by five key measures set out in a new and ambitious program of reform – EU will have to provide a framework so that potential risks are monitored and earlier detected, filling the gaps of existing legislation in the Member States, based on the approach of "safety comes first", providing investors and consumers the certainty that they can trust in the manner of financial keeping and managing of their resources by banks, improving risk management in financial firms and tightening sanctions regarding the violation of legal provisions in the banking sector.

The European Union is not threatened, now, by classical conflicts. Instead, it is more frequently faced to a number of asymmetric threats, which are very difficult to

predict and more difficult to combat. Three of these types of threats must be emphasized in particular:

- International terrorism, which is a strategic threat. This new type of terrorism is related to fundamentalist religious movements with particularly complex causes. Beyond the immediate risks, terrorism threatens the opening and specific tolerance of democratic societies. The new type of terrorism is different from that of previous decades because it seems to be interested in the use of unlimited violence and massive loss of production. For this type of terrorism, exemplified by the Al-Qaeda, Europe is both a target and a base to launch attacks.

- The proliferation of mass destruction weapons is another major threat to the peace and safety in EU countries. Currently, there is a danger of dissemination of mass destruction weapons, especially in the Middle East. Through these weapons a small terrorist group can cause loss which previously could have been caused only by armed national states.

- The existence of weak state structures (failed states) and increasing crime. In some states or regions such as Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, etc., institutional disorganization, high-level corruption, civil conflict and access to weapons led to the consolidation of organized crime. These situations are security threats by supporting drug or human beings trafficking and terrorism.

These types of security threats to Europe are located in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

In this context, it becomes increasingly obvious that the security interests and objectives of states can be achieved only through effective and efficient international cooperation. Europe can bring, both directly and indirectly, additional stability, because risks of traditional military confrontation on the European continent have declined significantly. Security interests and objectives of today's European countries promote cooperation and solidarity. International security environment is positively influenced by European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

Given these issues, the European Union aims to counter new types of security threats by three strategic objectives:

- Ensuring stability and good governance in the immediate vicinity. The quality of international society depends on the quality of the constituent governments. The best defense for European security is given by the existence of a world composed of well-

managed democratic states. This requires good governance, fighting corruption and abuse of power, and protection of human rights.

- Creation of an international order based on effective multilateralism, through international development of a strong international society, characterized by effective international institutions existence and by the existence of an international order based on respecting the laws;

- Preparing a response to a new type of threats. This response includes the anti-terrorism measures package adopted after 11th September 2001, and also supporting measures to non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and assisting states with weak or unstable structures. The European Security and Defense Policy is not a process of militarization of the European construction. Its main objective, from the very beginning, was to promote the Union as a global political actor, being able to mobilize all available resources - economic, commercial, political, diplomatic and military - to act coherently and effectively in the international arena.

For the security and defense policy of the European Union to become more effective it is necessary for the EU to become more active in pursuing its objectives by civil or military means, more consistent with the efforts and ensuring unity of command in case of crisis, able to allocate greater resources, avoiding duplication decision-making, better coordination of existing resources.

IV.ROMANIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Romania, as a member of NATO and the EU, has a linking role between the two structures. The political and military experience recommended it in the first phase as a strategic element in the Balkan and Black Sea.

Then, as a country located in the "frontier" of both the EU and NATO, its role in border security became a determinant one to both organizations and common experience will be needed to meet current and future challenges. Regarding Romania, as a middle European state, its national security in the era of globalization should be seen through the view of its national interests. This should be done but in such a way to fit into regional policies and regional security organisms to which they are part and become a part of the global security.

According to the concept of national security, military collaboration with other countries is both an indirect security guarantee, and a way to improve the military structure.

The new status of Romania as a donor of development assistance in 2007, resulted in a new form of cooperation with the UN, through financial support from our country to a large number of programs and funding of UN development activities. UN presence in Romania is a source of support for our country's efforts in a period of defining social and economic transformations. Through the documents adopted at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, Romania has undertaken specific obligations to contribute to the implementation of REACT system, which provides the ability to carry out operations, civilian and police expertise for effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Through active participation in managing and resolving crises situations, Romania proved to be a real factor of stability and security. In the new configuration of areas of major concern for international security organizations, Romania's geostrategic value was recognized and, therefore, it will be assigned a special role in the area located in the eastern part of the Black Sea.

Our country's participation in operations and missions of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) provides support for the specific political commitments made by Romania as a member of the Alliance, amplifying its credibility as an ally.

In the current security environment, characterized by changes in the nature and complexity of threats, EU member states, including Romania, have decided to create a specific tool for intergovernmental action in the field - European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), subsumed to the European Security Policy (CFSP). At the basis of EU actions in this plan stands the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 and which is currently subject to an update process, to ensure compatibility with current challenges and the new status, a significant player in the security field, which EU lately assumes. To support this vision several crisis management missions were launched.

Meanwhile the Union has built a reputation as a capable actor of a comprehensive approach in crisis management, focusing both on the military side of involvement in various crisis management missions, as well as on the civilian side, especially in the state of law.

Romania's military contribution, along with the one of the other Member States, covers both the civil and the military fields. So, Romania is present in many missions carried out under the ESDP, conducted on several continents (Europe, Asia, Africa): EUPM (civilian mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina), EUFOR ALTHEA (military mission

in Bosnia and Herzegovina), EUPOL RD Congo (civilian mission in DR Congo), EUJUST LEX (integrated mission in the rule of law for Iraq), EULEX Kosovo (mission in the rule of law field in Kosovo), EUBAM Rafah (civilian mission on the border between Gaza and Egypt), EUPOL Afghanistan (civilian mission in Afghanistan), EUFOR Chad / RCA (transitional military mission 'bridging operation'), EUMM Georgia.

In addition to regional military or military-political organizations devoted to regional cooperation there are also un-institutionalized structures such as:

a) *The South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)* involving small and medium countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia with an observer status. In the SEECP meetings many representative participates: EU Presidency and European Commission, OSCE Presidency, BSEC and CEI, Stability Pact, the Council of Europe, UN, WTO, UN / ECE, etc..

b) *The Central European Initiative (CEI)* is a flexible and pragmatic regional form of cooperation that brings together a number of small and medium countries including: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Ukraine, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro. Romania's main initiative was to strengthen cooperation between member and non-member states of the EU, to facilitate the "know-how" transfer and to offer assistance in relevant areas for the relationship with the EU. In this regard, it supports the opportunities offered by ICE, transposed in real projects.

c) *The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)* was signed between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1992. Subsequently, the agreement was expanded to include Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. It proved to be an excellent preparation for EU accession for the economies of the candidate countries.

d) *The Danubian Cooperation Process*. In this process, the 13 countries in the Danube basin take part (the 10 bordering countries Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, and the three states with most of the territory located in the river basin: the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission and the Stability Pact.

e) *The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP)* which includes a number of objectives related to local democracy and cooperation between states: media, infrastructure, investment and trade, managing and stabilization of population movements, organized crime. SECI Center for Combating Crime in Bucharest was the most important initiative of the Stability Pact. The center is a regional cooperation structure, with

international participation, set up as a result of a formal proposal made by Romania, in 1999.

f) *The Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI)* is a sub-structure that encourages cooperation between the participating countries and facilitates their integration into European structures.

g) *The Regional Cooperation Council (Regional Cooperation Council - RCC)* is the result of a complex restructuring process of regional cooperation formats in order to adapt them to the needs and challenges of the region.

Romania held in 2001, the OSCE presidency, during which substantial efforts were made to use the potential of OSCE in settling tensions and conflicts, through involvement activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, RF Yugoslavia, FYROM, etc. A number of Romanian representatives have been or are members of OSCE missions and participated as supervisors in the elections.

The responsibility for ensuring the OSCE presidency in Romania offered a great opportunity to look like a credible partner, a chance to contribute to the formation and consolidation of a prosperous and peaceful community of states based on respect for common democratic values.

Romania, through its presence in various UN bodies, has the opportunity to participate in decision making within the world organization which can influence the international global and regional situation.

Romania's participation in UN peacekeeping operations highlighted the efficiency of the Romanian army and Romania's political willingness to engage in multinational military activities for international stability, crisis management and conflict prevention.

CONCLUSIONS

Security organizations acting on the European continent are subjected to a continuous transformation process due to the international security environment and the need to adapt to new threats and risks is visible.

The military dimension of European Security is represented mainly by NATO, but the EU through its new institutionalized tools, is getting a more and more important role.

Military or military-political organizations that act in the European continent undergo a continuous transformation process due to the international security environment and the need to adapt to new threats and risks is visible.

The European security environment is committed to continuous reconfiguration, especially caused by the global economic crisis. The main trends that can be noticed, especially in the recent years, refer to national attempts of states that are trying to protect their territory and population against possible threats.

Romania, as an active member of the European Union and North Atlantic Organization, and as an eastern border state of the two organizations has an important role for the European regional security, a fact which requires increased efforts to secure its borders.

Also, the geopolitical characteristics of the relationships in the Black Sea and its adjacent regions lead inevitably the transformation of the National Security Strategy and, consequently, Military Strategy, with major implications on the role, place and destination of the armed forces.

National security will be developed within NATO and the EU, depending on the specific policies of the two organizations.

The essence of Romania's security will be ensuring cohesion and internal logic of all transformations in ongoing or future required needs will be in a system that will allow continuity of macro policies and adjustment to the micro level of domestic and international requirements. In this respect we believe that it is important that all major international "actors" to act in a coordinated manner, applying a wide range of civilian and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account the mandates and strengths of each one.

Romania must continue participation in peace support operations under UN, OSCE and NATO and also in crisis management exercises under NATO/PfP.

This new status of Romania involves, besides guaranteeing the national stability and Security, responsibilities in the generation of stability - regional and European Security.

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DECISION MAKING AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN AIR FORCE

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INTRODUCTION

Satisfying the needs of citizens of any given political unit depend a lot on acts and actions, which in return depend on decision. Those who are responsible for decision-making make decisions and these in their turn, affect the people, who may or may not have the right to elect them. So "decision" is the outcome of an interaction between those who rule and those who are ruled. However, decision-making is a process in mind and results from the values and what the ruling elite considers as good for the people. Yet, their considerations are very much influenced by their authority and tasks given to them according to a legal -or perceived legal- way. In fact decision-makers act within the authority given to them to act on behalf of a given society.

Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is decision-making in a unique environment—aviation. It is a systematic approach to the mental process used by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances. It is what a pilot intends to do based on the latest information he or she has.

The importance of learning and understanding effective ADM skills cannot be overemphasized. While progress is continually being made in the advancement of pilot training methods, aircraft equipment and systems, and services for pilots, accidents still occur. Despite all the changes in technology to improve flight safety, one factor remains the same: the human factor which leads to errors. It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents are related to human factors.

ADM is a systematic approach to risk assessment and stress management. To understand ADM is to also understand how personal attitudes can influence decision-making and how those attitudes can be modified to enhance safety in the flight deck. It is important to understand the factors that cause humans to make decisions and how the decision-making process not only works, but can be improved.

Risk management is an important component of ADM. When a pilot follows good decision-making practices, the inherent risk in a flight is reduced or even eliminated. The ability to make good decisions is based upon direct or indirect experience and education. While poor decision-making in everyday life does not always lead to tragedy, the margin for error in aviation is thin. Since ADM enhances management of an aeronautical environment, all pilots should become familiar with and employ ADM.

I. RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF AERONAUTICAL DECISION

I.1. Definition and History

ADM: Is a systematic approach to the mental process used by all involved in aviation to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of circumstances.

Risk Management: The part of the decision making process which relies on situational awareness, problem recognition, and good judgment to reduce risks associated with each flight.

Situational Awareness: The accurate perception or knowledge a crew maintains to their operational environment in order to anticipate contingencies and apply appropriate action.

For over 25 years, the importance of good pilot judgment, or aeronautical decision-making (ADM), has been recognized as critical to the safe operation of aircraft, as well as accident avoidance. The airline industry, motivated by the need to reduce accidents caused by human factors, developed the first training programs based on improving ADM.

The goal of all flight crews is good ADM and the use of all available resources: human resources, hardware, and information are one way to make good decisions.

ADM research, development, and testing culminated in 1987 with the publication of six manuals oriented to the decision-making needs of variously rated pilots. The effectiveness of these materials was validated in independent studies where student pilots received such training in conjunction with the standard flying curriculum. When tested, the pilots who had received ADM training made fewer in-flight errors than those who had not received ADM training.

Contrary to popular opinion, good judgment can be taught. Tradition held that good judgment was a natural by-product of experience, but as pilots continued to log accident-free flight hours, a corresponding increase of good judgment was assumed. Building upon the

foundation of conventional decision-making, ADM enhances the process to decrease the probability of human error and increase the probability of a safe flight. ADM provides a structured, systematic approach to analyzing changes that occur during a flight and how these changes might affect a flight's safe outcome. The ADM process addresses all aspects of decision-making in the flight deck and identifies the steps involved in good decision-making.

Steps for good decision-making are:

1. Identifying personal attitudes hazardous to safe flight.
2. Learning behavior modification techniques.
3. Learning how to recognize and cope with stress.
4. Developing risk assessment skills.
5. Using all resources.
6. Evaluating the effectiveness of one's ADM skills.

Successful decision making is measured by a pilot's consistent ability to keep himself, and the aircraft in good condition regardless of the conditions of any given flight.

I.2. Risk management applicable to the Air Force

Need knowledge and understanding of risks derived not so much in need of control information and a more extensive area of risk factors as the severity of the consequences on human lives, on mission to accomplish, sometimes critical or even catastrophic.

The airspace is a complex environment with an increasing risk with a high degree of unpredictability. Thus, it is necessary to integrate risk management into planning, preparation and conduct of specific Air Force activities, and also assume responsibility for risk management by crews and staff officers.

Increasing use of information technology for risk management led to the development of integrated intelligent systems on aircraft, which have the capacity to make decisions in real time leading to minimizing the negative effects of risk and monitoring residual risks optimizing the positive effects. However, an important decision factor remains the human factor with an important role in identifying, analyzing, planning, monitoring, assessment and risk management.

If by danger we understand an event that can cause property damage, injury or death of persons, the risk is the probability that this kind of event to happen. In this context, risk assessment represents all decision-making about risk situations, those include identifying

sources of risk, estimating the consequences and develop measures that can prevent or limit the negative consequences [1].

Risk management (RM) is defined as uncertain events management for success. It is characteristic of all methods and means by which risk is managed to achieve the objectives described in the technical event, social, human and political analysis with basic uncertainty as major risk factors [2].

In the Air Force, risk management is a formal way to deal with the dangers, is a logical process which analyzes the potential costs of risk in relation to their likelihood to remain uncontrolled and cause adverse effect for specific activities.

Being a complex process, risk management is conducted hierarchically, each level having specific duties and responsibilities [3]:

- At the senior level (commander):
 - a. Is planned safety environment, establishing policies and goals of risk management process;
 - b. Safety standards are set;
 - c. Is lead forms of safety training shall be provided access for all the lower levels at necessary information shall disseminate lessons learned from conducting operational missions and shall monitor the effectiveness;
 - d. Ensures process resources;
 - e. Shall risk acceptance decisions when it can not be reduced and check efficiency means of protection.
- At operational leaders level (chief of branch, crew chief):
 - a. Is increasing adherence to safety standards and preventive procedures;
 - b. The risk is related to the context of the readiness and operational requirements;
 - c. The threats are identifying, removing or monitoring;
 - d. Identify constraints imposed by higher levels resulting from safety standards;
 - e. Assessing the effectiveness of preventive measures, introducing operative corrections, depending on the current development situation;
 - f. Making recommendations for risk management strategies and policy change.
- At individual level:
 - a. Understanding safety means responsibility;
 - b. to recognize actions and dangerous situations;
 - c. Shall act in accordance with existing safety standards. These are the most sensitive implementation of procedures to prevent accidents, as experience, level of maturity and individual characteristics are decisive for the efficiency. Sometimes absurd competition and

assuming unnecessary risks may lead to overestimation of the possibilities of action and disregarding the imposed safety standards.

Principles of an efficient risk control, risk management applicable to the Air Force:

- Integration of risk management in the planning, preparation and execution of missions.

It is the responsibility of specialized structure to continually identify and assess risks deriving from operational environment, from individual and group characteristics of the crew on board;

- Adoption of the decisions for each level of management and execution. They are based on standards and practices, but also on the initiation of flexible solutions, when the situation so requires;

Dismiss any unnecessary risk, avoiding those situations whose benefit is below the estimated loss involved in a particular risk factor.

I.3. Identify aviation specific risks

The key to preventing accidents is precisely identify hazards and associated risks. If a pilot disregards the existence of risks, it may not identify and did not realize the consequences. Unfortunately, pilots rarely have the opportunity to learn from their own mistakes, as even the smallest mistakes are sometimes fatal.

Standard operating procedures have an important role in identifying risks. A guide as a "checklist" that helps the pilot to examine areas of mission interest is a template called "PAVE" (Pilot, Aircraft, Environment, External Pressures).

Given that the main factor identified as a cause of aviation accidents is the poor decision making, research on human behavior try to determine individual predispositions to risk and the level of personal involvement in an accident.

External pressure is an influence that originates outside the flight itself, which creates a feeling of pressure in performing a mission - most times with a very high cost. Elements that can create pressure on the pilot can be mission requirements generally scales of time, conditions for the conduct of an exercise, etc.. Using the personal standard operating procedures is a way to manage, to control these external pressures. The key to controlling these influences is to be prepared and accept the changes that may occur during flight activity.

Commanders first analyze the mission received. They look kind of task to be performed and identify possible risk.

I.4. The evaluation and limit risks

Each flight implies the existence of hazards and associated risk level. Pilots should recognize the danger in order to understand the risk. Knowing the dynamic nature of risk must be taken into consideration the cumulative effect of multiple threats facing us.

Risk assessment is not an easy task, especially when it involves own ability to control. Pilots neglected very often the fatigue, being always oriented to the mission, denying its limits.

When pilots know the risk assessment of a situation that will confront, pilots can manage and reduce risk. The most basic tool is the risk matrix. (Figure 1) It assesses the likelihood and the consequence of an event occurring. Use of such a matrix helps pilots to differentiate flying with a high risk of those with minor risk.

LIKELIHOOD		SEVERITY			
		Catastrophic	Critical	Marginal	Negligible
Probable	High	High	Serious		
Occasional	High	Serious			
Remote	Serious	Medium		Low	
Improbable					

Figure 1

Therefore, risk management can be considered a decision-making process designed to systematically identify hazards, risk assessment, and determining the optimal course of action.

Risk management is the recognition that decisions are made under uncertainty. Decisions must remain in accordance with the commander's intentions and provide a chance for success. Skill to assume risks requires competence and assumptions.

After evaluation of each hazard, are set one or more measures to eliminate the danger or reduce the risk (probability and / or severity) of a dangerous incident. Action can take many forms, but are divided into three basic categories: educational measures, physical measures and avoid.

Educational Action. These measures are based on knowledge and skills of the unit or individuals. Effective actions are implemented through individual and collective training that ensures performance at required standards.

Physical action. These measures can take the form of barriers, guards or warning signs of individuals and units that are dangerous. In addition, This category includes specialized control or supervisory staff responsible for identifying hazards.

Avoidance. These measures are applied when leaders take direct measures to prevent contact with an identified hazard.

II. APTEC - Theory to increase likelihood of success

APTEC – Analyze, Plan, Train, Execute, and Critique – is a cyclical operational approach to planning and execution. Historically, successful leaders have demonstrated the ability to understand situations, problem solve, and develop strategies and plans. From these plans, they were able to direct and control the actions of others to accomplish their plans. Finally they used what they learned from experience to adapt or improve future missions.

APTEC is a tool for leaders to help organize people and things to accomplish a mission. It is a descriptive model of critical behavior performed by a leader. It's a tool used to help identify what to do and increase your likelihood of success. However, we can say that APTEC is a process or checklist instead of a model.

ANALYSIS

The purpose of the Analysis stage is to determine the problem and develop a solution using information about the situation, environment, circumstances, resources, people, and the mission. The actions taken in analysis revolve around generating and fine-tuning a solution. This solution serves as the core, or main portion of an executable plan. The steps in the Analyze stage are: identifying and understanding the mission or problem; gathering and using data; generating solutions, testing and evaluating these solutions, and selecting the best solution. When the leaders complete the Analyze stage they will have clearly identified a mission or problem to solve, organized body of information relating to that mission; and tested, viable, solution developed into a detailed core of a plan to implement that solution.

For some people, this ability comes naturally, almost second nature, and they are not really aware how they accomplish it. For the rest of us, we need to train ourselves to ask the right questions, and to systematically look at things to achieve results.

Analysis begins with gaining an understanding of the situation, the mission or the problem to be solved and the associated context or environment.

Most of us receive our tasks in the form of a commander's intent. Usually, higher headquarters or authority will communicate or task us with a mission through written communication, or verbal instructions. If you are lucky enough to receive it verbally, you have the chance to ask questions.

While successful communication is really the responsibility of all parties involved, ultimately, it is your responsibility to question, clarify, actively listen and use communicative feedback to ensure you understand your mission.

Sometimes, a mission or problem is clearly presented, but most times, the leader has to determine the problem by gathering and analyzing data and information. It may come from the recognition or identification of a problem that needs to be solved or from the recognition of an unmet need that should be met, or an opportunity for improvement or innovation.

Regardless of how you become aware of a mission or problem, you need to be able to state. This can take the form of a written statement, which will guide and focus the rest of your actions. A tentative mission or problem statement, your best first cut or guess at what has to be done, is a good place to start. Normally, a mission or problem statement takes the form of a question, "How can we do something?" or an infinitive phrase "We need to do something."

Now that we know what the problem is, you need to get an idea of what you have to work with by gathering data. This is the second step of the Analysis stage.

Gathering Data

The world is full of all kinds of information. The leader needs to quickly glean relevant information. This requires a systematic way to organize data.

Almost all data falls into one of four types: facts, assumptions, definitions, or criteria.

Facts are solid, known, concrete, observable, measurable, verifiable, truths.

Assumptions, on the other hand, are calculated guesses, conjectures, and conditional statements, like "if statements".

Although an assumption may or may not be correct, the leaders may need to make assumptions to narrow their options or make decisions. They will never have all the facts they want or need.

Definitions are agreed upon meanings and common language. Defining concepts or terms ensures everyone is singing off the same sheet of music. Depending on leader's background, even acronyms or casual phrases can mean different things to different people.

Finally, **Criteria** are those things that define what is acceptable and what is the measure of success. Criteria include the standards that determine what successful resolution of the problem means, or the limitations around which you need to operate. Time, budget, resources, and

personnel and risk are all examples of criteria. Most of these are self-explanatory. When the leader considers risk, they need to evaluate the likelihood of accomplishing the solution as well as the risk to personnel due to injury or death.

Specific areas to consider include Rules of engagement (ROE), Environment, Opponent, and resources. By identifying available data in each of these categories the leader can begin to paint a comprehensive systematic picture of the situation. While not all encompassing, these are some of the categories of information they want to start with.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the constraints, regulations, rules, limitations, requirements that define the boundaries within which we must operate. This information bounds our solution, and defines what we must do, can do, and sometimes, what we cannot do. We can find ROE in procedures, regulations, instructions, or other source documents.

We should also understand our environment. The environment includes the area where we will implement the mission, the time frame, and the conditions. To determine what is key, ask ourselves "what in the environment can you expect to impact or affect you?" or "what in the environment may help or limit you?"

Another area to consider is the opponent. The opponent is anything that prevents us from accomplishing the mission: an enemy, competitor, or even obstacles need to overcome to accomplish the mission.

Finally, we look at resources; both what we have as well as what we need. Some things to consider are people, talents things, peoples' skills as well as their attitudes.

Generating Solutions

Ultimately problem solving is a creative process. It is hard to identify how people actually solve problems, or how creativity works. Although, there are no sure-fire methods for generating solutions, there are some things we can do to spark creativity.

These methods include brainstorming, self-interrogation, and breaking down the mission into solvable tasks. These techniques work for both individual and group situations.

First, Brainstorming is the rapid generation of as many ideas as possible, followed by the evaluation of these ideas. The idea is to avoid evaluating the ideas during brainstorming.

Second, Self-Interrogation is the process of asking repeated sets of questions to arrive at the elements of a solution.

A third way to generate a solution is to break the problem into solvable, actionable components or objectives, then figure out how to tackle each component. This is especially helpful for complex problems.

However, good solutions include clear objectives, identification of critical tasks critical, points of failure, logical control points, and a means to measure progress.

No matter the task or time constraint, a solution should contain clear objectives. To do this, a leader needs to have a clear understanding of the mission, and the purpose of action. From this understanding, the objectives to be accomplished are broken out.

A solution should also identify the tasks, which must be accomplished to achieve the objectives. Within task identification, the leader needs to determine what skills, abilities, or capabilities the people need to have and what resources they'll need to accomplish the identified tasks or objectives. It may be necessary to create objectives and tasks, which involve generating skills or acquiring resources.

The leader should also "what if the solution to identify limiting factors or potential weaknesses or points of failure. Then the leader should consider how to fix or minimize them these weaknesses.

As the solution is developed, the leader needs to look for logical control or decision points. These decision points include places in the solution that require the leader to make decisions. Some decisions may include when to implement predetermined courses of action, or when to call it quits (knock it off criteria), regroup and try again.

Any of these decisions may rely on the ability to measure or determine progress. Hence, the leader needs a means to evaluate and measure progress. This includes a method to collect data for use in predicting success, making decisions, and taking later actions that are the purpose of controlling actions.

Throughout APTEC, the leader must use controlling actions; setting, monitoring and controlling standards. First, the leader sets a standard that serves as both a definition and criteria. As a definition it helps get people to perform the same actions the same way. Often the leader communicates the standard during training.

The next action the leader takes is to monitor, which includes gathering data to predict success or determine needed changes. The leader needs to have a way to determine if their standards are actually being met. This is done by observing the action being performed and applying the standard as criteria to evaluate the outcome, observe and evaluate.

During analysis, the leader identifies the standards and the process for using these measurements during the rest of the APTEC cycle.

Depending on the nature of the task the leader may not need a formal way to evaluate progress or collect data.

However, if a formal system is needed, the system should be designed around measuring and collecting data that will help leader to determine effectiveness. The data should provide performance feedback to those involved.

Subjective and objective methods are two basic approaches to evaluating progress.

Subjective systems rely on personal observations and conclusions, or opinions. However, this approach is subject to personal bias and drastic fluctuations because everyone sees things a little differently. Subjective evaluations have their place, but the leader wants to use objective systems whenever possible.

Objective systems rely on data. Although these conclusions are still affected by personal issues, there is a common, objective basis. Objective systems are easier to implement in a standardized fashion. Best of all, it is hard to argue with data.

A good measurement system will make it relatively easy to collect data and be comprehensive enough to provide the right amount of detail and data you need to make determinations or decisions.

In addition to these considerations, the leader should also consider a standard for collecting data and the form the data will take. First, we all have to be able to understand and recognize the standard for a given behavior such that any two people can collect the data and theoretically measure the same thing. That understanding is necessary if we are to perform it let alone evaluate it.

Given these considerations, leaders can bet that this process is somewhat iterative and may change over the life cycle of the project. The information needed to determine and control the beginning of the cycle may differ from the information needed later in the cycle.

Once a leader has developed possible solutions, those solutions need to be evaluated and tested to determine which is the best, most viable, to proceed with one. The next step is to test the solution for validity and feasibility.

Testing the Solution

The purpose of testing the solution is to determine if the solution meets leader's needs without violating their ROE. The leader starts by comparing the solution with the mission or problem statement and data. The next step is then to test the solution using the most thorough test time and resources will allow. Testing will reveal weaknesses and failure points not realized before, and narrow the choices. Testing can also reveal single points of failure related to personnel.

An evaluation and testing may identify a skill or resource deficiency. A leader needs to verify that the solution is based on available skills, talent, commitment and resources. If these

requirements are not available, the leader must identify ways to generate or obtain them. If this is not possible, consider another solution.

By comparing potential solutions against the criteria, the mission, resources and obstacles, the leader can eliminate alternatives, and perfect feasible solutions.

Based on testing and evaluation, the leader should pick the solution that accomplishes the mission, meets criteria, relies on available or generated resources and skills and has limited or acceptable risk.

PLAN

Whereas analysis is the process of gathering information, processing information, and problem solving; planning is the precise task of finalizing the executable steps, or instructions and assigning responsibilities and resources. In the planning stage, we put the meat on the skeleton solution.

Finalizing plan is a last time to “what if your solution and identifies any additional contingencies you need to address”. The plan can take the form of Operations Plans, checklists and procedures or verbal orders.

One again, communication is important. A leader may have a great idea, but until their followers have exactly the same idea or mental picture, it will be difficult for them to carry out the solution. Their plan should incorporate how he will communicate.

Once the leader has a clearly understand the problem, organized information, tested a viable solution, and developed a comprehensive plan its time to prepare everyone.

TRAINING

Regardless of the complexity of the task the purpose of training is to produce competent and committed followers who are ready to execute the plan. The steps involved are: making sure followers know what to do, how to do it and any other necessary specifics. There is always some amount of training required. The specific task determines the amount and type of training.

At a minimum the leader needs to communicate the plan as well as standards and expectations. Unless their people have been involved in the Analysis and Planning, the training may be the first time they will hear about the mission, and associated information.

As much as possible, bring everyone involved together and go over what is about to happen. Before periods of mission activity go through the plan, remind participants about important points, relay last minute information, and clear up any last minute confusion. This is the reason for the pre-departure type briefings.

Leaders need to make sure they know what skills are necessary to accomplish the mission, what their follower's abilities are in those areas. If there is a deficit, they need to make sure their training upgrades those skills.

Training also includes getting people motivated to accomplish the tasks.

EXECUTION

The overall purpose of execution is to achieve the mission. Hopefully this occurs through the successful execution of the plan. The length of execution depends on the mission and the nature of the tasks involved. During execution, progress needs to be monitored so changes can be made to ensure success and the leader needs to respond to actions of the followers and to circumstances.

To accomplish this, the leader needs to be aware of their surroundings and be able to recognize when they need to take action to adjust the plan or follower behavior to meet objectives.

No matter how good the plan, things never seem to go or work out exactly according to the plan. The reason for these deviations is due in large part to two forces; fog and friction. Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz coined these phrases to describe forces at work in war.

Friction is the countless unexplained incidents that lower performance. Human physical and emotional conditions like danger, fear, physical effort, mental strain, weather, new, unfamiliar, or poorly designed equipment, fatigue, the actions of the enemy or opponent can increase its effect or cause it also. Friction caused by all those things is what makes it harder to carry out tasks, to execute plans etc. Clausewitz compared the concept of friction to running in water. "When running in water; however strong, however athletic, the individual runner will not be able to perform as well as on land. Those involved in combat can rarely perform their tasks to the full extent of their abilities."

On battlefields many items are created to create friction, mines, tank traps, chemicals, or in the air flack or AAA.

While friction is a physical force, **fog** is a mental force, which also complicates and hinders the efficiency of operations. Fog is the atmosphere of uncertainty that makes it hard to know what is really going on during planning and execution. The effect of Fog is hesitancy, the difficulty to make decisions. Deception can magnify the effects of fog. Intelligence attempts to penetrate fog. Despite good technology and our ability to collect and process intelligence, there is always uncertainty. Chaos and disorder aggravate the effect of fog.

Both fog and friction hinder the ability to execute plans. A good plan anticipates fog and friction and minimizes their effects. Realistic training can also prepare followers to deal

with friction and allow leaders to modify their plans to mitigate the effects. During execution, good leadership and control can combat the effects. Regardless, the leader has to be ready to adapt and overcome.

The leader uses the controlling actions we identified during analysis and planning to control actions and make decisions. They use the methods established to measure the effectiveness of the plan. They observe and evaluate performance. Leaders must also be able to communicate the results of their measurements. The leader directs the outcome by accepting, correcting or rewarding their followers' behavior.

CRITIQUE

The purpose of the Critique stage is to use the collected data to identify lessons learned, a new mission, and requirements for change. During Critique, leaders identify problems, weaknesses, causes, and strengths and ways to improve.

The critique usually begins with a review of what was supposed to happen which is compared with what actually happened. From this, the leader determines areas for improvement, and to determine how the task should be done differently next time.

Units usually conduct "hot washes" or debriefs following exercises. Aircrews will watch HUD (head up display), films after Air Combat Maneuvering exercises. These are examples of critiques.

Using the data and conclusions from the Critique stage, the leader is then ready to start the Analyze stage for the next cycle of mission accomplishment.

Although, I have presented the APTEC (analyze, plan, train, execute and critique) model as a linear sequence, it is cyclical.

III. AIR FORCE SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

III.1. Conventional & Aeronautical Decision Making

The need for a decision is triggered by recognition that something has changed or an expected change did not occur.

This recognition is a vital step in any decision making process. Not noticing the change can lead directly to a mishap. (Figure 2)




Figure 2. Conventional Decision Making

The change indicates that an appropriate response or action is necessary in order to modify the situation and bring about a new situation. (Figure 3)

Therefore situational awareness is the key to successful and safe decision making.

At this point in the process, the pilot is faced with a need to evaluate the entire range of possible responses to the detected change and to determine the best course of action.




Figure 3. Aeronautical Decision Making

Understanding decision-making strategies used by the flight crew, in operational environment, we could improve decision-making and its consequences, both for experienced staff and personnel at the beginning of his career.

The general objective is to enhance aviation safety and reduce accidents and incidents caused by poor judgments and decision making.

III.2. Analytical decision-making processes

Analytical approaches are based on careful analysis, deliberate, of cues, the pilot generating a wide range of options, and the same time assessing and comparing the evidence and then choose the best course of action. Because the decision-maker generates a wide range of responses and counter-responses, these processes generally require periods of time, resources and considerable costs. Models and tasks are usually formulated single, well defined and straightforward, as formulated the alternatives [4].

Analysis strategies are deteriorating when used under time pressure. Under pressure of reduced time, analysis strategies become inflexible and require a higher workload. [5].

Hammond [6], also said that it is difficult as ambiguous clues, inaccuracies, dynamic environments, conflicting objectives, group and expert processes, to be taken into account in an analytical decision making process.

III.3. Intuitive decision-making processes

Intuitive strategies were simply defined as the opposite of analytical strategies.

Spontaneous decision and based on recognition are rather descriptive approach (rather than normative or prescriptive) of decision-making process, because they describe how people actually choose between several options, not how you should choose. [7].

Positive result or the correct choice indicates the use of correct reasoning, and a wrong choice or a negative result indicates the use of wrong reasoning.

Because the real environment is dynamic, decision makers must continuously evaluate the situation to adjust assumptions and situational models to reality. Therefore, evaluation and situational awareness are crucial processes for intuitive decision-making strategies. Situational awareness represents a prerequisite for correct decisions; it is positively correlated with its accuracy. Once the pilot understands the situation, an acceptable alternative action is often easily identified.

III.4. The theory of cognitive continuity

Cognitive continuity theory affirms that intuitive decision-making strategies the deals extreme cognitive continuity and analytical strategies opposite extreme, quasi-rational judgments and decisions being found between the two. Thus, there is a cognitive whole. Type of requirement determines the appropriate type of cognitive process used by decision makers. For example, requirements that require processing of large amounts of information in a short time require the use of intuitive methods [8]. The cognitive activity can fluctuate on the axis of continuity between intuitive and analytical as conditions requirements are changed.

Compared to errors due to perception and intuition, analytical processes produce fewer errors, but when they occur, have a higher severity. The accuracy of decisions is greater when the cognitive process location corresponds to the requirement location. So, those who use intuitive strategies to fulfill requirements in dynamic conditions, having ambiguous information will have better results than those using analytical strategies to decide in such circumstances.

III.4. The best decision in dynamic environments specific to aviation

Totally inappropriate for application in aviation, analytical methods can be used only when it is enough time and when it has sufficient information to implement a strategy - situation in which pilots are far too rarely. Conflicting and often incompatible goals that are specific to aviation often allow more choice and not a single decision and optimal. Therefore, the optimal decision is not necessary and is replaced by a satisfactory decision, leading to a similar scenario

Generally, pilots implement the first decision, rather than compare different decisions and to choose optimum. There is no evidence that changing a satisfactory in optimal decisions resulting greater safety or efficacy. Pilots decision which involves chooses the lowest consumption of resources for a satisfactory solution (and not an optimal) because in operational environments it is important to be consumed as few resources (knowledge economy) to cope with the stresses that are not limited to single task.

A general situation is usually composed of many smaller goals and decisions, and therefore, making a single decision does not mean an end but a step towards achieving the overall goal.

CONCLUSIONS

ADM is a systematic approach to risk assessment and stress management. To understand ADM is to also understand how personal attitudes can influence decision-making and how those attitudes can be modified to enhance safety in the flight deck. It is important to understand the factors that cause humans to make decisions and how the decision-making process not only works, but can be improved.

Decision-making in critical situations is a maximum actuality theme among experts in the field, several research and programs is developing to improve pilots' decision behavior to reduce accidents due to errors of judgment.

Leaders must understand the importance of the process in conserving combat power and resources. Risk management, like reconnaissance and security, is an ongoing process that continues from mission to mission. Within the mission, leaders must know when the process begins and who has responsibility. It must be integral to the military decision. The process is an important means to enhance situational awareness.

Risk decisions are commanders' business. Such decisions are normally based on the next higher commander's guidance on how much risk he is willing to accept and delegate for the mission. Risk decisions should be made at the lowest possible level, except in extreme circumstances. Training operations, including those at combat training centers (CTCs), may be of such intensity that risk decisions are retained at a higher level.

Good decisions result when pilots gather all available information, review it, analyze the options, rate the options, select a course of action, and evaluate that course of action for correctness.

People are known for the ways to make decisions. On board of the aircraft, although a whole team trying to create conditions of certainty, often the pilot is forced to take a decision under uncertainty, based on their reasoning. It is needed that everyone acknowledges and understands its own system to judge situations to assume with dignity responsibility for achieving or failure to fulfill of a mission entrusted.

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MILITARY CULTURE - AN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE THAT MATTERS

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INTRODUCTION

In order to analyze and understand the behavior of an organization or a state size player it is capital to identify what is the most powerful driver for the subject: the interests, the institutional role, or the culture. Defined in many ways, culture can be considered “an integrated pattern of human knowledge, and believes, that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning, or a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an organization, or group”¹.

The author of *Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View*, Edgar Schein², also considers that “the success or the failure of a leadership is based on the ability of the leader to understand the culture, being responsible to preserve the organizational characteristics that reward and encourage collective effort”, meantime considering the inability of the leadership to understand the „cultures” as the main root of the problems in an organization.

These days, one important challenge for the military and non-military leaders is to understand the culture of the organizations they have to lead to success, or they are competing with, in a certain domain. Being the main driver, or not, the culture determine and shape the future behaviors. In order to be prepared to act in a very fluid environment determined by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA concept), the 21st century leaders must use the cultural understanding as a valuable tool in predicting these future behaviors.

In this context, the paper will describe the organizational culture, will identify the military culture special characteristics, and nevertheless, will highlight the link between organizational behavior, military culture, and a specific military operation that have shaped the political behavior for decades. Finally, based on these aspects, we will draw some conclusions using the connection between the organizational/ military culture change and its future behavior.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

I.1. Definition

The concept of organizational culture refers to all things collective standards of thinking, attitudes, values, beliefs, norms and customs that exist in an organization. The cultural component can distinguish visible elements such as behaviors and common language, rituals and symbols but mostly have less visible components: perceptions and representations of what is "value" in the organization, myths, empirical standards about what is working well and behave correctly, about "how things are done around here", etc. Organizational culture is formed due to repeated interactions between members of the organization, bringing together of beliefs and values that make up although there are individual factors that customizes powerful model such as leadership style and decision-making default mode, the level of formality, organizational structure, policies and know-how and almost all systems that provide value and support a particular type of work and a certain type of behavior.

A strong organizational culture as one where there is a strong alignment to the values and principles. An organization with such a culture does not need bureaucratic systems and control systems. People that make a strong culture do not need additional exhortations already accepted unconditionally "game rules" and the organization manages to form a desirable type of employee. For this reason are few managers who understand the importance of organizational culture management but it is less tangible and difficult to measure becomes a touchstone that leave too little influenced by various cultural programs modeling. Management of organizational culture is considered by some theorists (Fombrun) as "an overwhelming if not impossible goal." A researcher said that "the organization has culture, it is culture" - that is why it is very hard to try to managers.

We believe that the intentions of managers to change the organizational culture within the organization cannot hit than illusion. We can imagine sitting on the chair and trying to raise our seat and all, pulling it up without putting feet on the ground. As we stronger force to pull up the chair so the body will resist pushing back seat. What we are interested in this analogy is the following aspect: organizational culture cannot "change itself". It may change only if we have a serious foothold outside that supports "opposite forces".

Organizational culture there any organization, is one that "binds the organization" in a chain of meanings implied that provides human specific meanings of all organizational

activities and processes. At the same time resistance is the most important factor in any approach to change, whatever its scale.

One of the most important factors in building organizational culture is due to usual interactions between members, leadership and quality of organizational communication.

I.2. Organizational Culture Typology

A relevant description of the organizational culture typology was developed by Robert A. Cooke³, PhD, defining culture as the behaviors that members believe are required to fit in and meet expectations within their organization. The Organizational Culture Inventory according to this author, measures twelve behavioral of norms that are grouped into three general types of cultures:

I.2.1. Constructive Cultures, in which members are encouraged to interact with people and approach tasks in ways that help them, meet their higher-order satisfaction needs.

I.2.2. Passive/Defensive Cultures, in which members believe they must interact with people in ways that will not threaten their own security.

I.2.3. Aggressive/Defensive Cultures, in which members are expected to approach tasks in forceful ways to protect their status and security.

I.2.1. Constructive Culture⁴

Constructive Cultures are where people are encouraged to be in communication with their co-workers, and work as teams, rather than only as individuals. In positions where people do a complex job, rather than something simple like a mechanic one, this sort of culture is an efficient one. The constructive cultures are achievement-oriented, self-actualizing, humanistic-encouraging, and affiliative by nature.

1. Achievement-oriented suppose to complete a task(s) successfully, typically by effort, courage, or skill (pursue a standard of excellence) (explore alternatives before acting) - Based on the need to attain high-quality results on challenging projects, the belief that outcomes are linked to one's effort rather than chance and the tendency to personally set challenging yet realistic goals. People high in this style think ahead and plan, explore alternatives before acting and learn from their mistakes.

2. Self-Actualizing: realization or fulfillment of one's talents and potentialities - considered as a drive or need present in everyone (think in unique and independent ways) (do even simple tasks well) - Based on needs for personal growth, self-fulfillment and the realization of one's potential. People with this style demonstrate a strong desire to learn and experience things, creative yet realistic thinking and a balanced concern for people and tasks.

3. Humanistic-Encouraging: help others to grow and develop (resolve conflicts constructively) -Reflects an interest in the growth and development of people, a high positive regard for them and sensitivity to their needs. People high in this style devote energy to coaching and counseling others, are thoughtful and considerate and provide people with support and encouragement.

4. Affiliative: treat people as more valuable than things (cooperate with others) - Reflects an interest in developing and sustaining pleasant relationships. People high in this style share their thoughts and feelings, are friendly and cooperative and make others feel a part of things.

Organizations with Constructive cultures encourage members to work to their full potential, resulting in high levels of motivation, satisfaction, teamwork, service quality, and sales growth. Constructive norms are evident in environments where quality is valued over quantity, creativity is valued over conformity, cooperation is believed to lead to better results than competition, and effectiveness is judged at the system level rather than the component level. These types of cultural norms are consistent with (and supportive of) the objectives behind empowerment, total quality management, transformational leadership, continuous improvement, and learning organizations.

I.2.2. The Passive/Defense Cluster⁵

The Passive/Defense cluster involves members of an organization to approach tasks in a more fearful and tentative way. Their goal is to protect their status and security. The four Passive/Defensive cultural norms are approval, conventional, dependent, and avoidance

1. Approval: This style reflects workers who try hard to be accepted. They view themselves as worthless if not approved by their peers. People who follow this norm try hard to make good impressions, be obedient, and please others.

2. Conventional: This style reflects workers who try not to draw attention to themselves. People want to blend in and not cause attention to them. If this norm is followed, workers stick to their status-quo and maintain their own routines and procedures. They do not like to veer off the beaten path.

3. Dependent: This style reflects workers who feel like they need protecting. They tend to seek others to make decisions for them and are willing to obey orders. Workers following this norm believe they have little control over events.

4. Avoidance: In this style workers tend to be very apprehensive. They draw from threatening situations fast and play it safe often. People in this style tend to be introverted and shy away from group interaction or conversation. Workers following this norm tend to be

indecisive. Security is the largest motivator for following this norm. Those who feel threaten or fearful tend to fit into this cluster.

In organizations with Passive/Defensive cultures, members feel pressured to think and behave in ways that are inconsistent with the way they believe they should in order to be effective. People are expected to please others (particularly superiors) and avoid interpersonal conflict. Rules, procedures, and orders are more important than personal beliefs, ideas, and judgment. Passive/Defensive cultures experience a lot of unresolved conflict and turnover, and organizational members report lower levels of motivation and satisfaction.

I.2.3. The Aggressive/Defensive Cluster⁶

This style is characterized with more emphasis on task than people. Due to the very nature of this style, people tend to focus on their own individual needs at the expense of the success of the group. The aggressive/defensive style is very stressful and people using this style tend to make decisions based on status as opposed to expertise, being characterized as oppositional, power use, competitive, and perfectionist.

1. Oppositional - This cultural norm is based on the idea that a need for security that takes the form of being very critical and cynical at times. People who use this style are more likely to question others work, however asking those tough questions often leads to a better product. However, those who use this style tend to be over critical and point out others' small flaws and use it as a mechanism to put others down.

2. Power - This cultural norm is based on the idea that there is a need for prestige and influence. Those who use this style often equate their own self-worth with controlling others. Those who use this style have a tendency to dictate others opposing to guiding others' actions.

3. Competitive - This cultural norm is based on the idea of a need to protect one's status. Those who use this style protect their own status by comparing themselves to other individuals and outperforming them. Those who use this style are seekers of appraisal and recognition from others.

4. Perfectionist - This cultural norm is based on the need to attain flawless results. Those who often use this style equate their self-worth with the attainment of extremely high standards. Those who often use this style are always focused on details and place excessive demands on themselves and others.

Organizations with Aggressive/Defensive cultures encourage or require members to appear competent, controlled, and superior. Members who seek assistance, admit shortcomings, or concede their position are viewed as incompetent or weak. These organizations emphasize finding errors, weeding out "mistakes" and encouraging members to

compete against each other rather than competitors. The short-term gains associated with these strategies are often at the expense of long-term growth.

3. Factors and Elements⁷

Gerry Johnson described a cultural web, identifying a number of elements that can be used to describe or influence Organizational Culture. First of these is the Paradigm which describes what the organization is about, what it does, what is its mission, and values. The second one is the Control System represented by the processes in place to monitor what is going on. Role cultures would have vast rulebooks. There would be more reliance on individualism in a power culture. Also the Organizational Structures is playing an important role by reporting lines, hierarchies, and the way that work flows through the specific business. The Power Structures element describes who makes the decisions, how widely spread is power, and on what is power based. The Symbols shows the importance of the organizational logos and designs, but also extend to symbols of power. The Rituals and Routines are represented by management meetings, board reports, and so on may become more habitual than necessary. Finally, the Stories and Myths are to build up about people and events, and convey a message about what is valued within the organization. These elements may overlap. Power structures may depend on control systems, which may exploit the very rituals that generate stories which may not be true.

According to Schein (1992), the two main reasons why cultures develop in organizations are due to external adaptation and internal integration. External adaptation reflects an evolutionary approach to organizational culture and suggests that cultures develop and persist because they help an organization to survive and flourish. If the culture is valuable, then it holds the potential for generating sustained competitive advantages. Additionally, internal integration is an important function since social structures are required for organizations to exist. Organizational practices are learned through socialization at the workplace. Work environments reinforce culture on a daily basis by encouraging employees to exercise cultural values. Organizational culture is shaped by multiple factors, including external environment, the industry, the size and nature of the organization's workforce, the technologies and organization uses, the organization's history and ownership.

The founding of an organization is a critical period in the life of the organization and the development of its culture. An organization's founder or chief executive has an influential impact on the development of the organization's culture since that person is likely to have control in hiring people with the same values and influence the choice of strategy. By

screening candidates for a cultural fit, organizations select those employees that will be able to uphold the organizational culture. Additionally, leaders embed culture in organizations by what they pay attention to, measure, and control; how they react to critical incidents and crises; the behaviors they model for others; and how they allocate rewards and other scarce resources.

Additionally, the legacy of an organizational founder may be reflected in the culture long after that person leaves through the processes of cultural transmission (e.g. rites, stories) where the culture perpetuates itself. The values of founders and key leaders shape organizational cultures, but the way these cultures affect individuals is through shared practices.

II. THE MILITARY CULTURE – A DISTINCT ONE⁸

The humankind history, with its unforgiving landscape of clashing armies and shattered nations, would certainly push us to study and understand the military culture. So far the, historians were focused on more immediate factors such as leadership, doctrine, or training to explain victory or defeat, having done little work on this topic. Most of these tend to discuss military culture as a tangential issue, even though the military culture may be one of the most important factors in military effectiveness, and military innovation, which is essential to preparing military organizations for the next war.

A scholar definition of the military culture would be the overall picture of the ethos and professional attributes, which contribute to a common core understanding of the nature of war within military organizations. As Michael Howard⁹ has suggested, no other profession is as demanding in physical or mental terms as the profession of arms. On the other hand the military organizations must estimate the impact of technological, tactical, operational, and societal changes as they apply to war, without fully testing those conceptions until war occurs. Military culture represents the intellectual and spiritual capacity of the armies, naval forces, and air forces to come to grips with the business of preparing for and executing war.

The military culture can be tackled like any other organizational culture depicted by a certain typology, described thru the Gerry Johnson's cultural web factors and elements, but keeping an eye on the particular aspects of the military organizations. The difficulty in addressing military culture in a scholarly fashion derives from the complexity of the subject, and from the fact that its influence is almost always the result of long-term factors rarely measurable and often obscure even to historians.

More than other organizational cultures, the military culture changes over time in response to changes in a society's culture, the advance of technology, the impact of leadership, and nevertheless, the doctrine and strategy adjustments to the real world demands that have a very high speed dynamics. While those changes in an institution's value system at times have a clear idea of the results they seek, in most cases they do not and in any case cannot be assured of achieving the desired results.

Anyway, when we are talking about the military culture, must be sure that the use of short-term analysis or a fast push in a certain direction would not be the right tools. Those interested in shaping military culture must accept that an effective change in military culture can only occur over a period of decades, and it is as likely that unintended effects of reforms on the cultural patterns of an organization may be more significant than intended effects.

III. THE CULTURE'S ROLE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR – CASE STUDY: OPERATION “ELDORADO CANYON”¹⁰

Operation “El Dorado Canyon” offers some excellent lessons learned on strategy, leadership, and the profound strategic effects determined by an air operation with a huge impact of the cultural factor of the players. From operational perspective, it was an air strike on Libya, conducted jointly by USAF and US Navy aviation on 14 and 15 April 1986, using roughly 100 aircraft. A big challenge for USAF strike flight formations that flew 5800 nm roundtrip in more than 30 hours for a strong attack on five target areas highly defended by 16 missile engagement zones in Tripoli. From organizational/ military culture perspective, projecting airpower on long distance in order to achieve desired significant effects is for USAF the common way to do things, in accord with the service' doctrine.

On the background of planning and conducting this operation, stands the rise of the terrorism during the 80s. Between 1979 and 1983 about 500 terrorist events occurred annually reaching on 1985 an undesired score of 3000 events with 2177 casualties, targeting especially the US citizens. In spite of the lack of a link to direct involvement on terrorist activities, there was some evidence of Libyan sponsorship by founding, training and supporting the Abu Nadal terrorist cell activities.

At that time, Reagan administration's answer to the terrorist behavior was given through the National Security Directive Decision 138 issued on April 1984: “State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats of such action are considered to be hostile acts and the

U.S. will hold sponsors accountable”, making clear the political will to use military force in order to counter terrorism. After a number of hijacked or midair exploded commercial aircraft with US citizens victims, on 4 April 1986 was intercepted a message from East Berlin Libya’s People Office to Tripoli that unveiled the plan to blow-up locations populated with US soldiers. Most popular night spots in Berlin were alerted but the message reached the „La Belle” Discotheque at 15 minutes after bombing. The terrorist attack injured 229 people, killing two US soldiers, and one Turkish civilian. That event was considered the „smoking gun” for the Libya’s terrorist activities. Based on these facts, on April, 7 the US strike decision was made. The UK Prime Minister Thatcher backed the decision based on Article 51 of UN Charter citing that US has inherent right of self defense, and has approved the use of UK bases for this operation. Meanwhile, the President Mitterrand expressed his fear, and declared that action may incite the chain of violence, giving no approval for France overflight for the US aircraft involved in that operation.

Under this auspice, the timeline for this operation proves how fast and effective could be such a mechanism: on April 9 the Warning Order was given, followed by an Alerting Order on April 11, with significant plan changes, that push for the Execution Order issued on April 13. The aircraft were launched on April 14, 1986, at 17.45 hours. The USAF aircraft executed a impressive low altitude/ high speed raid, reaching simultaneous the targets accomplishing the mission as planned – “Inflict maximum visible damage while assuring minimum collateral damage on the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that supported Gaddafi’s subversive activities”, as the mission was given.

In short run view, this very tactical operation demonstrate on the one hand that US can strike globally, anywhere in the world, proving that it will not allow terrorist organizations to hide behind of a state protection. On the other hand, it fully influenced and worked on shaping the political and military cultures and future behaviors. The visible and immediate effects were the dropping number of terrorist events, especially with American victims, and in the long term run a dramatic change in Libya’s policy. It abandoned weapons mass destruction programs, paid \$3B in compensation to 1988-1989 airline bombings, seeks to normalize relations with European Union and US. Over 25 years, from that operation, in spite of the visible strategic outcome, Gaddafi was removed from power after another military air operation. This move has a strong interest background, and a definitely a very well shaped institutional component (it was a NATO led operation), but no doubt, the political and military cultures of the both sides players influenced in a decisive way the behavior during the escalation and resolving the conflict, over decades.

CONCLUSIONS

The military culture is an organizational culture that can be defined through several attributes as a hierarchical structure following exact rules of conduct for all members of the organization defined by roles and ranks being consistent across all units of the organization, having a clearly defined career progress, sharing the same beliefs, traditions, and values.

On the one hand, the military culture is determined drastically by the cultural environment. As a part of the society, the military institution is supposed to be in all details a projection of the general cultural typology of that specific population, being shaped by the most representative collective standards of thinking, attitudes, values, beliefs, norms and customs that exist at that moment. On the other hand, the military culture is a result of the mix between several subcultures. In a joint military structure or operation, all sister services cultures will contribute with a specific and very diverse flavors to overall domain, or even more complicated, when we are looking on a combined environment where the commanders should deal with a different national military cultures all over the world put together to achieve the same goal(s), following the same rules.

One of the overall characteristics of the military culture is the high conservative behavior, comparing with other organizational cultures, keeping in the most cases a fair balance between changes within organization in order to adapt itself to the real world environment, and the heritage and cultural preservation.

A very difficult mission from this respect has been that of the military institutions from East European countries (the former Warsaw Pact countries). These faced two major changes, during the last 60 years inside these specific societies they are standing to protect. The first major transformation occurred after the WWII and imposed in all these countries the USSR armed forces ways to do things, and its military culture. The second change was triggered by the end of Cold War in 90s, and by the subsequently expansion to the East of NATO and EU. Never speaking in terms of good or bad, these profound changes of these societies in all perspectives – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – determined cultural changes in all areas, including the military field.

Talking from this respect, after the 1990 changes, the Romanian military institution has shifted from an “in place” armed forces able to defend itself on national territory to a deployable and expeditionary one, capable to project the force overseas in order to prosecute any potential threats addressed to itself or to the other Alliance’ members. Meanwhile, all these changes have a huge impact on the national security and defense strategies and doctrines and on the same time on the military culture. During this shifting process that last 20 years so far, was “mission impossible” to keep alive all “old” values and beliefs within a military

institution adapted from a full classic war doctrine, to CT (Counter Terrorism) and COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, specific to nowadays battlefield where the soldiers, airmen and sailors are sent to fight far from the homeland. Beside these aspects, a lot of foreign cultural characteristics from different military cultures are going to fill the gaps created by these changes. There are some examples looking at the Romanian Air Force culture change effects starting with 1990, influenced by the western AFs we came in contact with. During all this time and especially after the NATO accession in 2004, the common exercises, exchanges, combined and joint operations, and abroad military education, came up with borrowed/imported cultural behavior aspects (ex. patches on the flight suits, challenge coins, missing man flight formations, etc), but preserving the core and most relevant part of the heritage (Zorileanu's Eagle, ROAF blue uniform, first single flight baptizing ceremony, etc) very specific to the Romanian Air Force culture, one of the oldest in the World.

As a bottom line, it is also necessary to mention the obvious impact of the globalization over the all kind of organizational cultures, including the military one. It is more than obvious, whether you like it or not, that the globalization process is creating a melting pot of a lower number of diverse components, where the strongest flavors will last longer or forever. In this situation it is a duty for all the military to act as a filter, necessary to embrace only the right and desirable cultural aspects that are coming over and to find the proper ways and means to promote the most representative ones from our military culture.

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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION – A NEW APPROACH IN THE INDIVIDUAL CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD

LTC Marius Ioan POPENȚA

INTRODUCTION

Ethical leadership is the bedrock for success in the military. Courage and competence win battles, but character wins wars. The military can never lose sight of that¹

Christopher Barnes & Joseph Doty

The purpose of this essay is unpretentious. It does not pretend to be all-inclusive nor does it purport to be the last word on officer professional military education.

To a certain extent, this document try to find a solution, to serve as a reference, a starting off place, for specialists or organizations in partner institutions looking to extend or to estimate officer professional military education (PME) curriculum in the military academies.

The document is intended as a start of a dialogue within interested specialists, on one hand, and between organizations, on the other hand about the kind of education each institution want to have and wishes to share to its officers. It is not projected to be implemented starting this moment, and in the form is specified in this document, but somewhat to be tailored to get in shape with the particular needs and aspirations.

This study can serve to amplify not only the intellectual brainstorming and dialog between the members of the academic environment and their partners but to also promote greater professionalism in the Armed Forces.

This essay consist into an undersized but necessary contribution to the Romanian Military Leadership challenging transformation, assuming that the “officership” concept will be (hopefully) used by the Armed Forces to define the desired model of graduates and expand measures to achieve this end state.

To understand the way, we must first examine the past. The officership transformation can be adequately understood if we take a look into latest historical improvement of the topic. It makes sense to base this research by examining the developments regarding officership in the US Armed Forces, for instance, like an illustrative paradigm, and comparing it with the circumstances in our military organization.

By expanding this investigation and put side by side the developments, a solid foundation could be created for describing this continuous “in progress” status of officership and the feasible alternative to get better in our system.

I. Officership

From the early beginning is extremely important to identify what “*officership*” (the word, and more then this, the concept) means. During the typing exercise, I learned that the utterance is red underlined by the computer, indicating the system did not recognize this word. When I used the correction accessible in the Microsoft Word thesaurus, I found two available options: “*officer ship*” and “*officers hip*”. Obviously, no one fulfilled my real intent.

Finally, after a long trip through internet, I found a definition being feasible with this purpose: In the US military learning system (West Point US Military Academy) “officership” is defined as “*the professional practice of being a commissioned leader. An essential part of Officership is a shared professional identity or self-concept, shaped by what an officer must **KNOW** and **DO**, but most important, inspired by a deeply held personal understanding and internalization of what an officer must **BE**. This self-identity inspires and shapes the officer’s behavior on and off duty, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.*”²

I.1. Officership in the US Armed Forces

I could not “manage” my platoon up a hill. I had to lead them up there.

James R. McDonough

Romania considers, at the present time, the United States as the best possible political and military allies. We have worked together, in the military, from the highest politic decision makers top to the bottom of the system, in a variety of missions to encompass Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. This common background and mutual respect provide the basis to compare leadership development of army officers in these countries. The

organizational culture and the background of the US Armed Forces are feasible to consist in an example of dealing with the sensitive terms of officership.

One of the first intent to use the “*officership*” concept becomes visible in the United States of America, during the Vietnam War.

Before the deployment to Vietnam, the U.S. Army was convinced that its Commission Officers, NCOs and WOs have had the necessary qualities to guarantee the military victory. Based on success in the 2nd WW and Korea, the US Armed Forces had enormous trust in the own leadership. On the other hand, in 1969 a report sent by General William McCaffrey (at that time a Commanding Officer in Vietnam) stated that: “*discipline within the command as a whole has eroded and that within the chain of command communication has broken down.*”³ In 1970, the US Army War College carried out a study regarding the professionalism and leadership in the officer corps. The study was particularly focus on the “*state of discipline, integrity, morality, and ethics.*”⁴ The report emphasize a considerable discrepancy within the officer corps from “*the idealized climate*” of military professionalism (characterized by: individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information) to an “*existing climate*”, distinguished by the “*ambitious, transitory commander – marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties – engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.*”⁵

As a result, in 1971 the U.S. Army Continental Army Command Leadership Board stated that “*In our various personnel and organizational studies, we have been too concerned with management, money and machines, and not concerned enough with motivating men to perform with full effectiveness.*”⁶

In the book “*Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*” written by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, the writers argued that even previous to the ending fiasco in Vietnam, there were strong warnings that the officer corps was more worried with promoting in their individual careers than with increasing units cohesion. As a result, authors stated that: “*Honor, integrity, and personal responsibility had been abandoned to selfish ends.*”⁷ Gabriel and Savage identified the essential reason for this moral decline was the managerial ethos. By using universal civilian management policies and techniques, the Army “*turned into a bureaucracy where people were focused on technique, not goals; on self-advancement, not group loyalty; on the career, not tradition and on their own futures, not policy.*”⁸

The “*management ethos*” that was implemented by the US Armed Forces resulted in short-term limited personnel management policies that had a direct impact on the quality of officership. Regularly seen as representing these management guiding principles was: the system of officer rotation (creating the one year tour of duty with a six-month rotation between staff and command positions); the inexperience of officers in military operations (highly linked with the first policy); and the individual personnel system, which produced invariable turnovers in all ranks.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, declared: “*We need to discuss openly the fact that we have been lavish in our rewards to those who have demonstrated excellence in sophisticated business and management techniques. These talents are worthwhile to a leader, but, of themselves, they are not leadership.....today, we need sensitivity and backbone beyond that which the past several decades have demanded.*”⁹

In the 80s, the American military senior specialists started a bayoneted attack against the (2ndWW and Vietnam fancy developed) very “corporate” model of management in the U.S. Armed Forces. The “*officership*”, totally based on the valuable military leadership concept was the new (but in the same time the very old, classical) idea opposing the managerial way of conduct in the military system.

Anthony G White, in 1986 stated: “*Officers apply discretionary judgment and bear ultimate moral responsibility for their decisions. Their appointment/commission imposes total accountability and unlimited liability. Essential to officership is a unique, shared self-concept consisting of four identities: warrior, servant of the nation, member of a profession, and leader of character. Grounded in Army values, this shared self-concept inspires and shapes the officer.*”

When the Cold War finished, the US Armed Forces had witnessed a cultural transform of its officership. A rehabilitated emphasis on morals, the diminishing significance of civilian management techniques, demarcation in leadership levels and organizational leader development changed the conduct and performance of the officers.

The success of the US Armed Forces leadership in the buildup and execution of the Gulf War raised a general feeling that the U.S. Army managed to turn the corner concerning officership. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm showed that the Army had achieved an effective chain of command, good leadership, and operational success.¹⁰

Over the years, after the Gulf War, a survey sponsored by the US Army Command and US General Staff College (in 1995) found some concerns about leadership and the command climate noticeably comparable to those reported in the 1970 Army War College Study.¹¹ In August 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that there were

“*cracks*” in unit readiness.¹² In the same year a survey of several thousand soldiers reported that less than half the respondents replied positively to questions of confidence in their leaders.¹³ John Kotter clarified that the experience in the 1990s was similar to civilian companies, where most developed a change-resistant culture because management grew more arrogant about its own “*wonderfulness*.”¹⁴

Several editions of FM 22-100 (Army Leadership) stressed the growing importance of what a leader should BE (besides KNOW and DO). A 1999 revised edition of FM 22-100, emphasize and cover for the first time the three levels of leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic. This was based on the acknowledgment that leaders on the superior levels need supplementary tools: “*the skills and competencies needed at the direct level also apply for the other levels, but the other levels demand (above that) more competencies and skills.*”¹⁵ Besides setting up the three levels of leadership, the instruction manual tried to address the emerging problems concerning leadership by stressing the special role of leadership in the Army, the officer’s moral and ethical responsibilities, and the need to take and accept risks and promote moral courage.¹⁶

Each of the defined levels (direct - tactical, organizational - operational, and strategic) was associated with specific schooling, but the new security environment may change these assumptions. Based on the ongoing integration of the three levels of warfare, the officer today is much more likely to make decisions, even within the tactical environment, which could have operational and strategic consequences.

I.2. Officership in the Romanian Armed Forces

After the end of the 2nd WW, the Romanian Armed Forces were never involved into a major operation. It experienced a tough soviet control during the 50s. During the Cold War the Romanian Armed Forces were almost completely focused on its primary role within Warsaw Treaty. Based on its limited resources, the Armed Forces mainly consisted of conscripts. These conscripts provided not only the mass of the enlisted men, but, at the early beginning, after the 2nd WW, most of the officers, WOs and NCOs at the squad/platoon level as well.

Due to the shortage of time available for training, the lack of knowledge and practical expertise in combat operations, and the need to teach the recruits necessary basic skills, the training system was primarily based on teaching competencies. Little time was allocated for teaching other aspects of leadership, such as values and ethics, and all of these “under the light” of the very communist values. The military system, except a small number of

specialized units (mountaineers, paratroopers, etc), was assigned to build the entire socialist infrastructure, with no or a very low level of financial compensation.

The officers were educated in the different branch schools, where the curricula were dedicated mostly to develop the technical and pedagogical proficiency for the platoon level instructors, able to conduct and train the waves of recruits. Romania's defense organization, similar to additional institutions in the nation state, has been reduced to a situation of social and professional immobility, which cannot be expected to provide the basis for leadership, alternative to the Communist party elite.

In 1958 Romania moved into an opposing way by demanding the extraction from its territory of all Soviet troops, counselors, and the Soviet resident commissioner (Khrushchev, embarrassed, called this a unilateral troop decrease, contributing to better European security). Dropping its contribution in Warsaw Pact significantly, Romania also denied allowing Soviet forces, or Warsaw Pact quick reaction forces, to go across or to perform military exercises on the own country land. A new era of very national feeling started and the political advisors inside the military system were clever enough to conduct the education, building the individual and collective attitude based on this intensified patriotic sentiment.

However, not enough to isolate the military system from the nation, and that was demonstrated in the main Romanians cities in December 1989. The officers' good sense and their ability to understand the real mission of an army, was the keystone in the 1989 revolution, when the decision makers, in front of the own families and friends were the young platoon and company commanders.

It seems that *“the military’s professional status gives rise to a conception of professional integrity that would permit disobedience (at both an institutional and individual level) of political authority in those cases where the political authority ordered military actions that would severely endanger the wellbeing of the nation or that would require military personnel to perform illegal actions.”*¹⁷

One of the effects of the new political and social environment was a renewed discussion about the education of professional officers at the Military Academies.

In the context of the new exigencies imposed by the status of NATO member that Romania has and those generated by joining the European Union, the Armed Forces must accomplish ever more complex missions, their success depending on the quality of the human resources involved. Romania joined NATO in 2004. As a consequence, extensive preparations were made to abolish conscription by 2007 and create a professional army in place of a conscripted one.

The MoD specialized organizations (Human Resources Management Directorate) and the senior specialists in military education reviewed for few times in the last 20 years the ends, ways, the means of this education, the education plans and curricula, which resulted in refocusing the educational goals of the Military Academies towards increased academics. The main focus was on a core of managerial disciplines, on military science and basic military training. This caused an amplified importance to the military management that was mainly focused on what a leader must KNOW and DO, and less on what a leader must BE. The effort of the military specialists in education is to reinforce the idea of leadership, not against the managerial way of thinking but more focused on the professional military education based on the main core of values which make the military system to be and have the own crystal clear defined organizational culture.

I.3. Loyalty and truthfulness

Officers serve at all levels of the Armed Forces. Junior officers are assigned at the tactical level, whereas senior officers are assigned at higher levels such as Brigade and higher, and also to positions on the Armed Forces Staff. In addition, officers serve with Ministry of Defense, Joint Organizations, international posts, individual mission under UN, EU, OSCE flags and other military or non-military services.

Officers are educated in the armed forces that they have to speak to the superior officers with courage and sincerity (truthfulness) about the organizational problems. Officers who do not face their commanding officer when necessary are poor excuses for leaders. In the same time, the leaders who will not hear the frank and truthful input of their subordinates without any punishment are poor commanders.

The officer type of leader expects to be treated well by other leaders. He anticipates his input to be appreciated and genuinely considered and accepted. The officer type of leader want to fix the organization's larger problems and does not ordinarily is silent about them.

The sergeant type of leader will remain loyal to a fault. He adjusts to the problems and not necessarily ever speaks truthfully to the organization. There is nothing wrong with this type of person; in fact, they are greatly needed in all organizations. However, in unhealthy organizations, the sergeant type of leader is valued above the officer type of leader.

On the other hand loyalty and truthfulness are two covenant values that must be held in tension by the officer. Loyalty binds officers and organizations together. The truth sets them free. If one value is emphasized over the other, then serious problems develop and both values become distorted.

Unfortunately, officers who strongly value honesty and truthfulness are unappreciated, and often rejected as disloyal. Some people are particularly oriented to truthfulness and may be seen as not being team players by those who highly value loyalty. This may create a value conflict in the organization between the truth-tellers and those who highly prize loyalty. The loyalty value normally wins over truthfulness in these kinds of situations because those in authority will often value loyalty over truthfulness. When the loyalty value wins over truth, it often takes the form of a suppression of free expression, particularly dissent. Truthful officers are trained that they are not really welcome. Perceptions are created that success and promotion in the organization comes by telling the leadership what they want to hear rather than the truth. Loyal "yes men" can seem to become valued over those who have strong individual integrity and truthfulness.

II. Professional Military Education (PME)

*"The central task of education", according to Eric Hoffer, "is to implant a will and facility for learning; it should produce not learned but learning people."*¹⁸ Broadly interpreted, this conception of education implies that learning is contingent and continuous. Learning is contingent in the sense that it depends on a permissive institutional structure and environment, and on individual disposition and desire. Learning is continuous in the sense that even though one may graduate from an educational institution, it is a life-long activity.

However, unlike training which is inherently routine in nature and which, for the most part, focuses on *"what to think"*, education is about developing the intellectual curiosity of the individual through its focus and emphasis on *"why and how to think"*.

The necessity of education for armed forces personnel arises from their unique employment which includes, among other things, defence of the nation and provision and maintenance of peace and security abroad. Additionally the necessity of education inheres in the need as Williamson Murray put it: *"to prepare armed forces personnel for missions across the full spectrum of conflict, ranging from deterrence at the high end to peace keeping and enforcement at the low end."*¹⁹

Professional military education is therefore designed to prepare professional militaries to deal with the ever increasing ambiguities and multi-layered contemporary security environment and battle space. A professional military education curriculum should be broad enough to provide new academic horizons and deep enough to whet the intellectual curiosity of all officers. Professional military education is a critical gateway to endow a nation's armed force with the ability to live up to and to meet this awesome national security responsibility.

II.1. “*The Soldier and the State*”

“*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*” is a 1957 book written by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. In the book, Huntington moves ahead the assumption of the objective civilian control, according to which the most favorable means of claiming control above the armed forces is to **professionalize** them. This is in contrast to subjective control, which involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy. Huntington is maybe the first writer who provides a feasible definition of the military profession and an explanation for why the modern military officer corps represents a profession. He states that the “*specialized expertise of the military officer*” is “*the best possible option in ‘the management of violence.’*”

The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man. Professionalism, however, is characteristic of the modern officer in the same sense in which it is characteristic of the physician or lawyer. Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages.

The first step in analyzing the professional character of the modern officer corps is to define professionalism. The distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its *expertise, responsibility, and corporateness*.

The officer corps appears to contain many varieties of specialists, with a recognized professional *expertise*. Engineers, doctors, pilots, ordnance experts, personnel experts, intelligence experts, communications experts -- all these are found both with and without the modern officer corps. But individuals, such as doctors, who are not competent to manage violence but who are members of the officer corps are normally distinguished by special titles and insignia and are excluded from positions of military command. They belong to the officer corps in its capacity as an administrative organization of the state, but not in its capacity as a professional body.

The expertise of the officer imposes upon him a special social *responsibility*. The skill of the physician is diagnosis and treatment; his responsibility is the health of his clients. The skill of the officer is the management of violence.

To some extent the officer's behavior towards the state is guided by an explicit code expressed in law and comparable to the canons of professional ethics of the physician and lawyer. To a larger extent, the officer's code is expressed in custom, tradition, and the continuing spirit of the profession.

Regarding the *corporate* character of officership, this is a public bureaucratized profession. The legal right to practice the profession is limited to members of a carefully defined body. His commission is to the officer what his license is to a doctor. Organically,

however, the officer corps is much more than simply a creature of the state. The functional imperatives of security give rise to complex vocational institutions which mold the officer corps into an autonomous social unit. Entrance into this unit is restricted to those with the requisite education and training and is usually permitted only at the lowest level of professional competence. The corporate structure of the officer corps includes not just the official bureaucracy but also societies, associations, schools, journals, customs, and traditions.

III. Structure of the PME Reference Curriculum (RC)

A curriculum is a specific learning program, a range of courses that collectively describes the teaching, learning, and assessment materials available for a given course of study.²⁰ Creating a curriculum inheres in the need to provide learners with a road map of what they can expect to learn and a sense of how their learning is organized and structured.

With respect to this Generic Officer PME RC, it is organized and structured in the following manner: First, the curriculum is organized with respect to three officer developmental phases: *Pre-Commissioning*, *Junior Officer* and *Intermediate Officer*. Each phase in turn is organized around three broad themes/programs: *Profession of Arms*; *Command, Leadership and Ethics*; and *Defense and Security Studies*. The first theme is designed to teach the officer about his/her professional identity; basically what distinguishes the individual as an officer and a member of the profession of arms. The second theme, command, leadership and ethics, focuses on the key components of military leadership and most importantly the ethics that underpin the profession of arms and the conduct of war. The last theme—defence and security studies—focuses attention at the strategic level and in particular on the embeddings of the armed forces not only in society but in the terms of their service to the nation. Additionally, the defence and security studies theme aims to provide some understanding into the ingredients of national power and the implications of the changing geopolitical landscape for issues of war and peace.

Subsumed under each theme/program are several distinct courses. Courses under each theme/program constitute the blocks and include topics such as *Officership as a Profession*, under the theme of Profession of Arms in the Pre-Commissioning phase and *Crisis Management* under the theme of Defense and Security Studies in the Intermediate Officer phase. Blocks are what collectively give meaning and content to the themes. They contain learning objectives and outcomes which are in turn connected to the higher objectives of the theme/program. Recognising that courses (blocks) are taught over a period of time, they are

subdivided into lessons (modules). Modules constitute the lowest unit in a curriculum and have a similar relationship to blocks as blocks have to a theme/program. For example, lessons under the *Officership as a Profession* block include *What is a Profession* and *Officership in Action* and under the *Crisis Management* block include *Domestic Threats and Vulnerabilities* and *Consequence Management*.

CONCLUSIONS

What we can see at this moment in our system is a reinforced emphasis on the very theoretical and technical aspects of management and an almost complete disregard of the mental and ethical elements of leadership. However, this conclusion is not in complete agreement with the overall content of the Romanian military policy paper, where are very careful defined ethics and leader development as crucial for effective leadership. This difference between the content of the paper and the practice of leadership in the educational system finally led to a black deadlock. While a few projects were proposed to instill moral principles and ethics in the leader development, not a single one was put in practice.

Different official policy papers and the academies curricula define in a different manner the leader as a manager, commander and professional. What is important to understand is that: the manager organizes and allocates his assets in order to assure that the mission can be accomplished at the right place in the given time, but, when and if the manager needs to influence people to reach these objectives, the leader steps forward.

Nowadays Romania has its own specialists being part of a multinational team consisting on curriculum specialists from 16 military institutions in 12 countries (U.S., UK, Canada, Norway, Latvia, Albania, Romania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova). They met in the early November for their fourth workshop in order to finalize the NATO standard reference curriculum for professional military education (PME). The curriculum will cover pre-commissioning, captain-level, and staff college-level phases of officer professional development. The Allied Command Transformation Senior Enlisted Advisor also attended with a team of experts to explore the production of a reference curriculum for non-commissioned officers. NATO requested that PfPC develop this product after receiving numerous queries from Partner countries about the existence of such a reference.

What is very important at the end of the day is the way the system deal with the individuals in the Individual Career Management. It is an usual mistake in our system to take in consideration for graduation only the sum of transferable credits (based on Bologna agreement) and to deliberately forget about the professional education sum of vocational

credits, or worst than this about the individual annual report. Only a holistically attitude can solve the problem. To have in consideration the entire human capability is the answer for the future career managers.

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- [8] Ibid.
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- [12] Ibid
- [1313] Ibid
- [1414] John Kotter, “*Cultures and Coalitions,*”, ed. Rowan Gibson, London: Nicholas Breatley Publishing Ltd., 1997, p. 169.
- [15] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership, Field Manual 22-100*, Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army, 1999, p. 1-36.
- [16] Ibid, p. 54, 55.
- [17] Carl Cuelemans & Guy van Damme, “*The Soldier and the State: An Analysis of Samuel Huntington’s View on Military Obedience Towards Political Authority,*” Professional Ethics, 2002, p. 7-22. – There are other forms of conflict between the military and the political authority. Carl Ceulemans and Guy van Damme discuss four ways (based on Huntington’s views) in which the military and the political might conflict: conflicts between military obedience and political wisdom, between military obedience and military competence, between military obedience and legality, and between military obedience and basic morality.
- [18] Judith Lloyd Yero, “The Meaning of Education”, Web, 27 August 2011.
- [19] Williamson Murray, “*Testimony House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Professional Military Education,*” unpublished, 10 September 2009, p4.
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RISK MANAGEMENT BASED DECISION MAKING PROCESS FOR PLANNING MILITARY OPERATIONS

LTC Viorel ROȘ

INTRODUCTION

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of this millennium assist to some profound and dramatic changes within the international military-political environment that directly influence the system of international security. The great mutations produced on international arena in terms of their content and also the amplitude of the processes with relevance on security domain have been generating important actions for elaborating corresponding security strategies nowadays, in order to redefine the ways the international relations are developed. Also, they affect the perception of the emerging hazards and threats within the international security environment, and the range of the options to prevent and to counter them.

In this context, researches on phenomena such as crisis, conflict and the processes to manage them, including the concept of risk management are already on the agenda of most of the international security organizations, UN, NATO, EU or OSCE, but there is not a common understanding yet nor for these concepts or for their prevention and management mechanisms, due to the complexity and the large spectrum of these constructs.

These controversial subjects of the redefinition of the basic concepts operating within the international peace and security field are also fueled by the fact that the concept of international security get a new dimension, as long as the security threats become more and more diffuse and have no more an exclusive military character. The proliferation of terrorist, ecological, cultural threats, for example imply the involvement of various means – military and non-military, national and international – that lead to a tight interconnection between the national and the regional and global security components, for having the capacity to ensure the international stability and security through cooperation and coordination mechanisms, and by regionalizing/globalizing the security and military related relations.

The complexity of the decision making process, especially the one specific to the military field has exponentially increased according to the complicity of the conditions within it take place. The diversity of the threats within the security environment specific to the military operations, the increased number of the actors that act in the conflict areas also lead to the amplification of the uncertainty level.

Therefore, I consider that the insertion of the risk management in support of the decision making process is a self sustaining action, because it has the potential to direct the planners endeavor for reaching better decisions based on situational awareness and on logical arguments explaining the possible events/situations that could appear during the military operations.

The most important feature of a risk based decision making process is the fact that it implements the risk assessment and control components within the normal way thinking, by exploiting the information regarding the factors that could affect the operations, the possibility of occurrence of various threats and their potential consequences and impact, with the final aim to improve the quality of the decision.

First of all, approaching the subject of risk management it is important to be based on an as precise as possible definition and delimitation of its basic terms – hazard, threat, risk and vulnerability, concepts that still create numerous controversies.

Nevertheless, it should be understood that, risk management is not a method to foresee the future, but such an approach of the phenomena, based on risk management procedures supports the planners to avoid or at least to limit the surprise element, increases the probability that the events to take place according to own expectations and also translate the accent from crisis management to crisis

prevention. Thus, risk management becomes a decisional support process, based on keeping the risks under control according the proposed interests and objectives.

These are the most important reasons for what I have chosen „Risk management based decision making process for planning military operations” as the topic for my course final paper.

CHAPTER I DEFINITION OF BASIC CONCEPTS

The definition and delimitation of risk management basic terms – hazard, threat, risk and vulnerability are two of the most arguing subjects of nowadays studies on this very complex concept and they still create numerous controversies among the specialists. For example, many times terms as risk and hazard or risk and threat are confounded.

All our existence and evolution as human beings is strongly marked by the decisions the others or ourselves make as individuals and members of the society we live in. The decision is an essential expression of our complex act of leadership and it is perceived as the basic product of this activity and as the main instrument of building the future. The decision is the element that moves any kind of human activity or action.

There are a lot of definitions of the basic terms used in risk management– hazard, threat, risk and vulnerability, but there is not a common understanding and generally accepted delimitation of them within the international research environment.

I.1. Hazard versus risk

The first issue is the confusion between the terms hazard and risk, confusion that many times create controversies among specialists, even though both of them address the problem of uncertainty. Here are few definitions of these two terms just to better illustrate the statement before:

- Oxford dictionary defines hazard as a thing that can be dangerous or cause damage, and risk as the possibility of something bad happening at some time in the future; a situation that could be dangerous or have a bad result¹.
- Webster dictionary defines the same terms as follow: hazard – source of danger, a risk or an accident, and the risk as possibility of loss or injury, peril or someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard².

I consider that the hazard could be an important determinant of the risk, but these two terms should not be confounded. As Salvatore DiNardi, a specialist in occupational risk management stated, the hazard could be seen as the potential of a situation or event to create a damage³, and as bigger the hazard, the bigger is the potential of the damage. The hazard is intrinsically linked to the characteristics of the event/situation that could generate damage (a depot of chemical waste, unhealthy bacteria existing in food, smoking, for example, they are hazards independent of the context) But, in reality, usually, we can not say for sure if the existence of a hazard would lead or not to a negative event, and this is the uncertainty element associated with further actions. In addition, the consequences/impact and the frequency of the occurrence of a negative event could get various levels of severity and repeatability respectively.

The risk is associated to many human endeavors, even though is about building a nuclear reactor, developing informational systems, or conducting military operations. Probably one of the simplest definitions was given by Laurence Krantz, from one of the most important risk consulting companies, EURO LOG. He define risk as “a combination of uncertainty and constrains”⁴, uncertainty being the possibility of a failure to occur in certain conditions and implies an array of further consequences, and constrains are connected with vulnerabilities.

1 Oxford Advanced learner's Dictionary, ediția a VIa, 2000,

2 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 2003,

3 DiNardi, Salvatore, 2003. The occupational environment: Its evaluation and control. Ed. American Industrial Hygiene Association Press, Fairfax, VA. 2003

4 Tusler, Robert, "Project Risk Management Principles", 1996, [http:// www.netcomuk.co.uk/~rtusler/ project/ principl.html](http://www.netcomuk.co.uk/~rtusler/project/principl.html)

W Lowrence⁵ stated that risk is a measure of probability and severity of undesirable events. Also, Frank Knight, in 1921, defined risk as an incomplete form of awareness⁶ where the future could be predicted using the laws of hazard.

Many other definitions include probability that an undesirable event to occur and the possible consequences of that event⁷, the dimensions of these two components could be evaluated quantitative and qualitative in different conditions.

In other words, the risk is generated by the indetermination, by the impossibility to know with certainty the further events, and represent a potential status, which under certain conditions could become reality.

So, a definition of risk should combine all the elements mentioned before, as long as it is a measure of probability and severity of the occurrence of an undesirable event/hazard/threat⁸. Thus, the risk should be an expression of consequences, in terms of probability (P) that an event to occur, and of its severity (S) and of the exposure (E) of personnel and resources to a potential damage or destruction - $R = f(P, S, E)$. This approach gives the possibility to quantify the risk as an equation as follow:




Fig. 1.1. Quantification of risk

We can say that there is a probability of X% that an event to occur with a certain level of severity, but it could be reduced according the protective measures that can be taken. Talking about the chemical depot I mentioned before, the risk of an incident to occur differ very much according the storage and manipulation conditions, and the existing protective measure that could diminish the probability and potential consequences.

I would like to stress that risk and hazard are not synonym, and many specialists in risk management field, as S Kaplan and B.J. Garrik, made this difference⁹. A great hazard is not synonym with a high level of risk. For example, catastrophic events (such as Bhopal tragedy in India, in 1984 – huge drainage of toxic gases from a pesticide factory which caused more than 3.800 of deaths and other thousands of intoxicated persons) rarely take place and they could be extremely dangerous, but they have a low level of risk, because of their reduced frequency of occurrence. In the same time, an incident with a high frequency, but with lower consequences could be considered as having an event less dangerous but with a high level of risk.

Coming back to the security domain, the specialized American and British literature related to the defense and security matters make the same difference between these two concepts.

The US Army Risk management field manual (FM 100-14), “hazard” is defined as „any actual or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, damage to or loss of equipment, property or mission degradation; a condition or activity with potential to cause damage, loss or mission degradation”¹⁰, and risk as “chance of hazard or bad consequences; the probability of exposure to chance of injury or loss from a hazard; risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity”, expressed by the event probability and severity.¹¹

5 Lowrence W, The Nature of Risk, in Societal risk assessment: how safe is safe enough?, R Schwing & W Albers (eds), 5-14, New York: Plenum, 1980

6 Knight Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.

7 Barki H., Rivard S., Talbot J., “Toward an Assessment of Software Development Risk”, Journal of Management Information Systems (10:2), 1993, pp. 203-225.

8 DiNardi, Salvatore, 2003. The occupational environment: Its evaluation and control. Ed. American Industrial Hygiene Association Press, Fairfax, VA. 2003

9 Stan Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 Risk Analysis 11 (1981).

10 Risk Management Field Manual, no. FM 100- 14, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 23 April 1998 cap 2, pg. 2-2.

11 ibidem, Glosar, pg 2

In UK, the risk is defined as “the uncertainty of outcome, whether positive opportunity or negative threat, of actions and events. It is the combination of likelihood and impact, including perceived importance”¹².

Another distinction should be made between risk and the event/condition itself that generates undesirable consequences. The risk is the likelihood that anticipates that event/crisis and it characterizes the event that threatens the security of a person/company/process. I appreciate that is correct to say that there is a risk an event to occur and not that the event itself is a risk. For example, a technological incident at a nuclear plant is the event itself, and it has associated certain levels of risks for some incidents to appear, according the existing conditions – the characteristics of the reactor, the protective measures, other vulnerabilities etc.

I.2. Risk versus threat

Other issue of controversy is between hazard and threat. In comparison to the risk, the threat has more concrete indices, including at least the aspects of intentionality – there is a source of the threat, and direction – the subject of the threat is relatively well defined. The hazards and threats, with certain levels of risk permanently and virtually exist, they are not real, but have the potential to become real, and in that specific moment when they occur, as for example a terrorist attack, they are no more threats or hazards, but crisis/catastrophies/desasters.

According British approach, the threat is an „*expression of the intention to inflict injury or damage, to affect somebody by coercitive means*”¹³. A close definition we can find also in German dictionaries, where the threat is defined as „*an action that get a person into a dangerous situation or something that endanger a person*”¹⁴.

A clear distinction between these two concepts is made in the US Directive for Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)¹⁵, where:

- hazards are “non-hostile incidents, such as accidents, natural forces, technological failure, etc, that cause loss or damage”, and
- threat is “an adversary having the intent, capability and opportunity to cause loss or damage”.

So, the threat supposes the existence of an intention to conduct hostile actions against a target, the capability to perform the action, and needs specific opportunities to occur, usually perceived as vulnerabilities. We can say that the threat is:

$$T = C \times I \times V.$$

Where T is the threat, C – capability, I – intention, and V – vulnerability.

Within the defense and security field there are specific notions and language to define these concepts. So that, according the subject whom it address to, the threat is perceived as „*the political attitude of a state, a group of states or an alliance which supported by political, economic, or military power could inflict the sovereignty and integrity of other states*”¹⁶, if we refer to the states fundamental rights.

I.3. Vulnerability

Vulnerability is generally defined as the array of phenomena, situations, organizational and functional conditions specific to a system that exploited by an adversary or addressed by a hazard could bring prejudices to the normal functionality of that system. In other words, vulnerability is the weak point of an individual/organization/system that could be the subject of a hazard or threat. O good definition of vulnerability was given by the Romanian national security strategy from 2001, where it was defined as “internal situations, processes or phenomena that diminish the reaction capacity toward the existing or potential risks and could enable their appearance and development”. In this context, the evaluation of vulnerabilities, especially of critical ones is a systemic process for identification and assessment of its weak points (critical) that could affect the accomplishment of strategic objectives,

12 The Orange Book, Management of Risk - Principles and Concepts, October 2004, pg. 49, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk

13 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, vol. III, Editura Merriane- Webster, 1993, p. 2382.

14 Langenscheidts Grosswörterbuch, Deutch als Fremdsprache, Editura Varlag Enzyklopedie, Munchen, 1989, p. 125.

15 Directive for Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), DoDD 3020.40, august 2005, http://www.dod-map.msiac.dmsi.mil/dod_regulations/DoDD3020_40.pdf

16 1000 Stichworte zur Bundeswehr, Editura Verlag, E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Bonn, 1997, p. 34.

interests, mission or the functionality of the system and that could generate or support the apparition of hazards or threats.

Both threats/hazards and vulnerabilities are factors that impede or limit the organization's/national interests, strategies and objectives, and finally affect the performance level of a system.

In conclusion, given the above, I appreciate that the concept of risk must be viewed in terms of probability, as a potential threat to exploit vulnerability in the system and turn into a specific action against that system. Its risk level is determined by analysis and evaluation of interrelations between threats and vulnerabilities. In other words, the risk exists when there is a threat and a corresponding vulnerability that is addressed, so that even if there is a vulnerability, no matter how big it will have no consequences in the absence of threats.

CHAPTER II

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS APPLICABLE TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The risk is inherent in almost all human activities and implies probability that an undesired event to occur, and thus the ongoing activities are negatively affected generating damages, losses for an organization. So, we could state that the risk is a measure of the uncertainty of the results of an activity, depending on the quantity and quality of available information during the decision making process. As more and accurate information is available, the risk is lower.

A risk-based approach of decision-making process avoids or at least limits the surprise, increase the probability that events to occur according some expectances and move the accent on dealing with crises from reaction to prevention. Thus, the risk management becomes a decision-making support mechanism, based on keeping them under control in accordance to the organization's interests and objectives.

During the last 30 years, various approaches on risk management were developed, usually being perceived as an array of concurrent activities for identification, analysis, assessment, control, monitoring of risks.

The concept of risk management is nowadays used within various fields, statistics, economy, sociology, banking, research, and of course decision making theory, and in each of these domains there is at least a definition and a model of the process.

For the purpose of this paper, I exemplify here the Barry Boehm model, presented in his book: "Software Risk Management: Principles and Practices". Boehm proposes a process structured on two main phases, and each of them splitted in other three steps.¹⁷

But, in order to avoid the possible confusion between the terms of risk and hazard, and to better cover all the aspects of this process, I will alter the steps names and content as follow:

Risk assessment phase:

- Identification of hazards and threats;
- Risk analysis;
- Hierarchy and prioritization of risks.

Risk control phase:

- Planning the risk control measures;
- Implementation of risk control measures;
- Monitoring, evaluation and reviewing the risk management process.

II.1. RISK ASSESSMENT PHASE

Risk assessment requires quantitative and qualitative measurements for determining the level of risks associated with each type of hazard or threat, by taking into account the probability and severity of unwanted events specific to these hazards/threats. This can range from simple activity of staff involved

¹⁷ Boehm, B., (1991) "Software Risk Management: Principles and Practices", IEEE Software 8(1), pp. 32-41.

in the decision making process to complex studies performed by experts in the fields of interest, depending on the level at which the evaluation is performed and the available time.

Risk assessment includes identifying and categorizing hazards and threats according to certain criteria, followed by quantification of risks by employing a matrix that ranks them by likelihood of manifestation and severity of the consequences of incidents. Once appropriate risk levels are assigned to the identified threats, the staff can make decisions about which risks should be controlled or only monitored but not requiring immediate action for their control. Initial assessment should include an evaluation of existing control measures, these having an effect on the levels of risk and their prioritization. The issue is given by the fact that in practice, although there are already elements of risk control, they are applied only after certain incidents occur.

The risk assessment phase is performed during the stage of situation analysis in the operational planning process, when the staff state the goal, objective of the mission, and analyzes the existing conditions in the operational environment that interfere with accomplishment of the mission received.

II.1.1. Identify the hazards and threats

Identify the hazards/threats is virtually the base of the entire risk management process, because only those that are identified can be assessed and controlled. Identification is the process of transforming uncertainties and other problems related to the organization's proposed objectives in the formulations that can be described and measured. This involves two activities - the formulation of hazards/threats and the definition of the context of their development and manifestation, and the objective is to locate the threats before they emerge. This requires a team comprising representatives from all departments of the organization – managerial group, personnel, security, manufacturing, logistics, finance, information technology, legal, etc., to be able to identify all the critical points that may affect the successful conduct of business, to list as completely and understandable as possible all the potential threats and to analyze all the details related to the decision to be taken.

Do not forget that the hazards and threats in the environment should be related to the objective and subjective weaknesses existing in the system, especially as these are the elements that are likely to be primarily addressed. There are different ways to perform this work from the past experience and lessons learned, the use of questionnaires and ending with the so-called "checklist".

II.1.2. Risk analysis and determination

The second step of the risk assessment phase is performed based on probability and consequences of the identified hazards and threats, taking into account the possible existing vulnerabilities in the operational environment. After that, on this basis, exposure to those risks will be evaluated.

Once the hazards and threats are identified, it is necessary to evaluate their potential impact on the situation/organization, i.e. their risk level, in terms of likelihood and severity of their consequences. Risk analysis involves estimating and determining their characteristics - the probability of manifestation and impact of undesirable events over the system. A third factor to be considered is the degree of exposure of the system to these specific hazards/threats.

In practice of risk management there are several tools for risk analysis, the best known of them are:

- Pareto method,
- WHAT-IF method
- Event tree method
- Error-tree method
- Check list method
- Preliminary risk analysis method
- Graphical analysis method for causative factors.

The determination of probability is based on two components - how often a threat/hazard can manifest – i.e. frequency and possibility that the threat will occur during exposure of the personnel to that specific threat (this is in correlation with situations where the personnel performs a certain type of missions when a threat can occur).

The impact, treated in terms of the consequences of an event is measured as the magnitude of the effects of the incident/event and can be expressed for example as a number of people affected or the extent of area affected or delays in achieving the mission.

In practice, different scales are used for measuring the frequency and impact, with two, three, five or more levels of discrimination. In this paper we present a model that uses a 5-level scale.

Level	Probability		Impact	
	Levels of discrimination	Quantification	Levels of discrimination	Quantification
Binary	Yes	1	Yes	1
	No	0	No	0
3 levels	High	3	High	3
	Medium	2	Medium	2
	Low	1	Low	1
5 levels	Very high	5	Very high (catastrophic)	5
	High	4	High (critical)	4
	Medium	3	Medium (moderate)	3
	Low	2	Low (marginal)	2
	Very low	1	Very low (negligible)	1
<i>n</i> levels	<i>n</i> levels of probability	<i>n</i> , <i>n</i> -1 ...	<i>n</i> levels of severity	<i>n</i> , <i>n</i> -1

By assigning coefficients to each level of discrimination, both elements can be quantified, their values being employed in the step of ranking / prioritization of risks. It is important to keep a balance between the number of levels and discrimination degree of the risk, time available for the entire evaluation process, given the fact that the greater number of levels, the bigger the level of details, but also the complexity of analysis.

Exposure to risk is a derivative of the other two attributes of risk - likelihood and impact and it can be defined as:

$$ER = \text{probability} \times \text{impact}.$$

Exposure to risks materializes in determining the overall levels of risk through completing the risks matrix resulting from combining the two previous criteria - probability and impact. A hierarchical model with five levels of risk exposure is shown in the table below. As can be seen, in this way we can get a matrix with 25 possible variants of a risk estimate. By assigning values to the two components, we already obtain a first ranking of risks according to their degree of exposure.

Levels	Probabilities				
	Very high	High	Medium	Low	Negligible
Very high (catastrophic)	Very high (critic) (25)	Very high (critic) (20)	High (15)	Moderate (10)	Low (05)
High (critic)	Very high (critic) (20)	High (16)	High (12)	Moderate (08)	Low (04)
Medium (moderate)	High (15)	High (12)	Moderate (09)	Low (06)	Low (03)
Low (marginal)	Moderate (10)	Moderate (08)	Low (06)	Low (04)	Negligible (02)
Very low	Low	Low	Low	Negligible	Negligible

(negligible)	(05)	(04)	(03)	(02)	(01)
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This step must be completed with the development of a catalog describing the risks, which must contain:

- Description of threat (nature / chance / time of event)
- Description of vulnerability (%)
- Description of the consequences
- The level of risk (negligible/low/moderate/high/very high).

II.1.3. Ranking / prioritization of risks

The final step in the risk assessment is to make their hierarchy. The idea is to determine the risks ranking according their importance in terms of their effects over the organization's objectives, in order to decide further on the priorities for their control. The process involves cataloging the risks or risk groups according their importance and the degree of exposure in relation to strategic objectives and priorities of the organization.

As higher is the exposure to a risk, the higher is the priority for its control. Risks, which are assigned the highest level of exposure risk, are called key/critical risks, and they need to be given the utmost attention and priority.


There are several ways to elaborate this hierarchy, including:

- Analysis of scenarios - a number of possible outcomes and probabilities are investigated in different scenarios that lead to developing a decision matrix. From this matrix is chosen a number of different combinations, providing a range of possible solutions;
- Decision tree - risk models that can get certain percentages of success and failure for a number of solutions, from which we can calculate the final results (in particular by financial point of view);
- Risk matrix - which is the most used method. It provides a structured method for prioritizing risks. The threats are categorized by events' probabilities and the impact they can have.

Risk classification involves grouping them according to their characteristics and analysis of the relationships between groups. On one hand, the classification helps to identify duplicate or similar risks, thereby simplifying the risk matrix and on the other hand it helps in planning the control measures. There are several forms of classification - by source (which contribute to defining the major sources of risk), by impact (which helps to identify the main vulnerable areas), etc.

II.2. RISK CONTROL PHASE

Risk control is the transition phase of the risk management process from a descriptive to a prescriptive and actional one. Based on the risks matrix, their hierarchy according the strategic objectives and interests of the organization, the planning process moves to the elaboration of risk control measures, implementation of these measures followed by monitoring the effectiveness of



measures undertaken in parallel with the evaluation of effects and completion/correction/update control measures in accordance with situational developments.

Fig. 2.2. Risk control phase.

II.2.1. Planning of control measures

The goal of risk control is to transform uncertainties into opportunities for action by establishing measures leading to reduction of threats or vulnerabilities level as appropriate. This stage of risk management should be performed during the operational planning phase of elaborating the courses of action. Risk control measures can be classified according to types of possible options to address risks:

a. Acceptance

In reality not all risks require the application of control measures to limit or eliminate them, they can be categorized as acceptable risks, the level of acceptability being a prerogative of decision-making authority. Risk acceptance is characteristic for the low level of exposure. On the other hand, it is possible that for certain risks, even if exposure level is tolerable, to decide not to act for various reasons - eg. costs for treatment of that risk is more disproportionate to the benefits obtained by doing. However, this acceptance can have an active character in the sense of developing alternative plans for reducing or eliminating the impact if the risk materializes.

b. Treatment / Prevention

This is the main option that could be taken into account for most of the risks with the aim of reducing the level of risk to an acceptable level by implementing strategies to act on the factors that generate these risks, either by diffusion, reducing or eliminating them. Risk control measures can be divided into four categories:

- Measures of detection for the identification of the occurrence of unwanted incidents;
- Preventive Measures for prevention, to limit the possibility of manifestation of threats;
- Corrective Measures aimed at reducing vulnerabilities in the system;
- Reactive Measures, aimed at reducing the potential damages/looses that can appear if the threat occurs.

c. Transfer

In some cases, the lack or inadequacy of available resources, the organization could decide to delegate the responsibility for action on the risk to another structure / organization that has adequate resources to this end, and the option is more profitable than its own action - eg. security of humanitarian convoys can be transferred to private companies specialized in security services.

In addition to the control measures, there are other two options to be applied by the decision makers. The first one is to terminate the activity, if the associated risks' levels are so high that there is no possibility for a positive output or outcome to can be achieved. This option is particularly important in project management when it becomes clear that the projected ratio between costs and benefit is in jeopardy. The second option is to take the opportunity. This it is an option that could be considered whenever accepting, transferring or treating a risk. For example, at the same time as mitigating threats, there is possible that an opportunity to arise to exploit a positive impact.

All these options and risk control measures are reflected in the risk control plan. This is an integrated tool that should contain the description, evaluation and ranking of all hazards and threats according to risk levels associated with how to control. The plan also includes clear responsibilities for implementation and existing assumptions and limitations. It has to be an annex to the Concept of operations and to the Operational Plan. This plan should not be regarded as a rigid document, it is subject to constant change depending on the evolution of the project specific conditions.

II.2.2. Implementation of control measures

This is the active step of risk control phase. Once risk control strategies have been established and risk control measures are accepted and introduced in the operation plan they shall be implemented during the military operation they are designed for to be validated or not. Depending on the results that are obtained, the control measures are evaluated periodically and subject to update, amend or supplement if necessary to obtain maximum effect, both in terms of force protection and operation objectives.

II.2.3. Risk Monitoring and reassessment process

The risk management process should be seen as an ongoing and dynamic process. The last step of risk control phase, risk monitoring involves tracking and continuous assessment of the impact / effectiveness of the measures established to control the risks. The purpose of evaluation is to check that the decisions taken in support of achieving the proposed objectives and goals. Monitoring should be seen as a proactive process, which in addition to observing the results of the measures already established has to ensure the identification of new risks, which may arise during the operation, and to formulate proposals for their introduction in the analysis and evaluation.

Complexity of the operational planning has increased with increased complexity of the conditions under which it is carried out. Diversification of dangers and threats specific to a nowadays theatre of operations, a growing number of actors acting in the conflict zone have led to increasing uncertainty in decision making process and as such its complexity.

Risk based operational planning consist on the same stages as the normal process but includes the phases of the risk management. Here at the end I show just an example of the correlations between the stages of the two processes.

Stages of operational planning process/decision making process		Phases of risk management process					
		Hazard and threats identification	Risks analysis and determination	Risks prioritization	Development of control measures	Implementation of control measures	Monitoring and reassessment of the process
Initial operational planning	Orientation/Operational estimate	X					
	Situation analysis	X	X	X			
	Development of courses of action				X		
Development of Operation concept and plan					X		
Force deployment						X	
Conduct of operation/ Planning reassessment		X	X	X	X	X	X

Fig. 2. Correlation between the stages of operational planning and risk management processes.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The risk based approach to manage various phenomena specific to military decision making process, that includes risk management mechanisms and procedures, ensures avoiding or at least limiting surprise and increasing the likelihood that events will occur in accordance with some expectations and we can assist to a translation of management's focus to the prevention of a crisis. Thus, risk management becomes a decision-support process, which is based on maintaining control of environmental risks from the perspective of the interests and objectives of the organization.

Risk management should not be considered as a linear process ending with the formulation and implementation of control measures, but a continuous process, a balanced set of interconnected elements interacting each other. Furthermore, specific risks cannot be addressed in isolation, because acting on one risk, may cause effects on the evolution of other risks, so that an effective risk management must be able to address multiple risks simultaneously. Therefore, risk management must be a continuous and systematic process to identify and control risks throughout the course of a project / activities / actions, in accordance with a predetermined set of parameters, by applying the appropriate policies and procedures.

I agree that decision making under risk includes in itself the existence of uncertainty, and so that in any decision-making process there is a constant growing need for more and more precise information. The quality of a decision largely depends on the amount and quality of information available and uncertain information effectively represents a source of pressure on decision-making process. At the same time I appreciate that the perception of decision-making situations, risk assessment and alternatives of risk control measures are influenced by the attitude towards risk of decision makers.

However, what must be understood is that that no decision-making model is perfect, and risk management is not a way to predict the future, but just a process that identifies potential hazards and threats within the operational environment and proposes specific measures to prevent their manifestation or mitigate their effects.

Fundamental goals of risk management aim on one hand to increase the efficiency of the results of an operation, while maximizing the protection of personnel and equipment, and secondly to identify and exploit opportunities that could appear for the benefit of the organization.

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NATO MILITARY STRUCTURES - A CAPABILITY BASED APPROACH –

LTC Teodor-Valentin ROTH

INTRODUCTION

A lot of things have changed since the Cold War ended therefore NATO facing new challenges undertook important transformations. The challenge NATO had was developing a coherent vision for future warfare relevant to the new geo-political realities facing the Alliance. The diverse nature of the new security threat in an increasingly interlinked global environment, combined with a revolutionary increase in the development of information technology, make it difficult to predict the scale and types of military capability that will be relevant in the future. Within the Alliance, different nations have interpreted this threat differently. Thus, they faced a significant and growing divergence in the military capability of various member nations even as the Alliance contemplates new operational requirements that include also out of area operations.

I. NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

I.1 NCS overview

Let's have a quick snap shot of the Alliance civil and military structure. The principal policy and decision making institutions of the Alliance are Defense Planning Committee, North Atlantic Council and Nuclear Planning Group. Altogether they form the strategic political level. At the very top is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the principal decision making authority of NATO. Then, there is the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which is responsible for making decisions on matters relating to the integrated military structure of NATO. The third is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which deals with specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces. The last element of NATO strategic command and control structure is the strategic political-military level represented by the Military

Committee (MC). The NATO Military Command Structure remains under political control and guidance at the highest level.

Acing the new realities and feeling the needs the Alliance member states represented by the Defense Ministers at their meeting on 12 June 2003 agreed on the design of a new streamlined military command structure. It had to be leaner, more flexible, more efficient, and better able to conduct the full range of Alliance missions.

The new NATO Military Command structure implied the following key changes:

- at the strategic level, reduction from the previous two operational strategic commands to only one, but creation of a functional strategic command for transformation;
- at the operational command level, the existing five regional commands were reduced to two Joint Force Commands, and a Joint Headquarters;
- at the tactical level, their existing thirteen operational subordinate commands were reduced to only six;
- this means a total reduction from twenty to eleven command headquarters;
- in addition, the number of Combat Air Operation Centers or CAOCs was reduced from ten to six (4 static and 2 deployable).

The NATO Military Command Structure at the military strategic level of command was then framed around two Strategic Commands by using a functionality-based approach – Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation, one focused on planning and executing of NATO operations and one focused on transformation of NATO military capabilities over the full range of Alliance military missions. All of NATO's operational functionality is concentrated into just one Strategic Command – Allied Command Operations – responsible for all of the NATO area of responsibility. But, it is essential to look to the future. That is the role of Allied Command Transformation, which has the lead for transforming the Alliance. In practice, the division of functionality is not as clear-cut as this simple generalization suggests. Indeed, the capabilities of both Strategic Commands are integrated. For almost every issue or task, one Strategic Command is in the lead, while the other acts in support.

ACT is organized in a networked structure in both North America and Europe. These ACT centers/entities have dissimilar compositions and some support more than one process. The ACO is composed of permanently established integrated HQs widely geographically distributed and able to respond to the variety of emerging risks and threats.

The C2 structure has three levels of command with NCS HQs at the strategic and operational level, and NATO Force Structures NFS HQs of the Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF), of specific services, land (L), maritime (M) and air (A), at the component level.

The operational level consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs) one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy - which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited standing Joint Headquarters (JHQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-based CJTF HQ capability can be drawn. It also had an active role in training and conducting operations with the NATO Response Force, since the assumed NRF standby duty for in July 2005.

The component or tactical level command consist of six Joint Force Component Command (JFCCs), which provide service-specific (land, maritime, or air) expertise to the operational level. Although these component commands are available for use in any operation, they will be subordinated to one of the Joint Force Commanders. They exercise their responsibilities from static or deployed HQ. For the JFC in Brunssum, there were established an Air Component Command at Ramstein, Germany; a Maritime Component Command at Northwood in the United Kingdom; and a Land Component Command at Heidelberg, Germany. For the Joint Force Command in Naples, there were established an Air Component Command at Izmir, Turkey; a Maritime Component Command in Naples; and a Land Component Command at Madrid, Spain.

In addition to these component commands, there are four static Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) - in Uedem, Germany; Finderup, Denmark; Poggio Renatico, Italy; and Larissa, Greece; and two deployable CAOCs - in Uedem and Poggio Renatico. As the deployable CAOCs need exercise their capability to mobilize and deploy, the current facilities at Torrejon Air Base in Spain would be the primary site for training and exercising in that region. A small NATO air facility support staff would be stationed at Torrejon to support this capability.

I.2 Command and Control Arrangements

NFS can be divided into three types of forces reflecting their readiness levels, the High readiness forces (HRF), the forces at lower readiness (FLR) and the Long Time Built-up Forces (LTBF), altogether forming the NATO's "pool of forces" al GRF. The forces should be committed and, if necessary employed with their appropriate HQs and self-sustainable. Although the Technical Arrangements set out operational command (OPCOM) or other C2 modality between SACEUR and the nations sponsoring the GRF HQs, there is not assured availability of SACEUR for deployment/employment of the GRF HQs in operations and exercises. Employment of a GRF HQ requires national and NAC approval as stated at the

Technical Arrangements: *‘Upon NAC decision the GRF HQs shall be available for deployment under NATO Command for duration to be determined by the appropriate NATO authorities and agreed by the National Authorities’.*

The implementation of NCS HQ - NFS GRF HQ peacetime relationships has been performed on a case-by-case basis. SACEUR’s subordinate commands develop the peacetime relationship (affiliation and regular contacts) in different ways: dissemination of information, supporting the preparation of GRF HQs when they aren’t committed to the NRF rotation, evaluations, etc. Interoperability is crucial for mission success. This is to be achieved through joint and continuous training and exercises with the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure Graduated Readiness Forces and the NATO Response Force. Besides NATO Command Structure, NATO Force Structure provides additional C2 capabilities.

The NCS is composed of permanently established and multinational HQs at the strategic, operational and component levels of command widely geographically distributed and commonly funded. In addition, the NFS is composed of Allied national and multinational forces, as well as their associated operational HQs, placed under the Alliance’s disposal on a permanent or temporary basis. Whilst the NCS is primarily intended to command and control Alliance’s joint operations, NFS will provide additional C2 capabilities at the single service level. NFS HQs and forces are funded nationally or by participating/contributing nations.

I.3 Recent development in NCS

To fulfill the established C2 requirements for those multiple operations, NATO has developed the modular “Deployable Joint Staff Element” (DJSE) concept. For each individual Operation, NATO would step-up one of the NCS Joint Force Commands as operation-specific “Joint Headquarters” (JHQ). The JHQ would consist of a main element (MAIN), situated at the static location of the tasked Allied Joint Force Command, and a Forward Element (FE) part, deployed to the area of the respective Operation. Both parts will virtually form the aforementioned single “JHQ”, separable (in location), but not separate (in organization).

The functioning of DJSE is based on so-called reach-back concept, i.e. the process of obtaining mission essential C2, products, services and applications, in a timely manner, by using CIS technology between non-deployed and forward deployed elements to form a single HQ, in order to achieve operational efficiency. The major advantage would be the access to the full range of capabilities of the static permanent HQ and other supporting agencies where

some functions can be performed more efficiently from a non-deployed location while at the same time it will minimize in-theatre presence.

Because of the increased requirement for deployability, and taking into account the requirement to mount multiple smaller operations; six DJSEs at appropriate readiness are to be established. Besides, because of resource constraints and the guidance to place greater reliance on the NFS, for each JFC one DJSEs is planned to be provided by the NCS and one by the NFS.

Each DJSE is standardized and consist of three elements: The Joint Headquarters Forward Element (JHQ FE) which will contribute to the well-defined business workflow of the JHQ with the in-theatre perspectives, provide the lead for Liaison & Reconnaissance Teams and carry out any engagement with key stakeholders of the local government, the United Nations, governmental and non-governmental organizations; a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) Core Staff Element which will form the nucleus of a theatre-level logistics Component Command and a Forward Support Element (FSE) which is responsible for the planning, direction and provision of Life Support, Communications and Information Systems and Force Protection for itself and the other two elements. It will normally be collocated and led by a Chief of Staff as the senior staff officer deployed.

Once stood-up, the JLSG HQ is to be regarded a critical enabler for NATO expeditionary operations. For that, it will be augmented mission-specifically by subject matter experts in the fields of logistics, medical as well as movement and transportation plans, policies and procedures at theatre level in order to provide efficient logistics support to designated forces.

This DJSE concept aimed to enhance NATO's mobility and flexibility in achieving the requirements posed by the new Level of Ambition of NATO. It has brought a fundamental change to NCS leading to the transformation of NATO's LCC HQs in both Heidelberg and Madrid. On Mar 1, 2010, they were turned into Allied Force Commands with the task to provide each one two trained and ready-to-deploy "Deployable Joint Staff Elements" to the Allied Joint Force Commands (JFC) in Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon respectively.

II. NATO FORCE STRUCTURE

II.1 Political Guidance and Level of ambition

The term NATO forces can be misleading. NATO has no forces of its own and no standing armies. Instead, the individual member countries are earmarking and committing

forces to be made available for agreed tasks and operations. In fact, there are few permanent military forces, i.e. staffs integrated into HQS, the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, etc. But, NATO can and will mobilize the forces of member states and, more than those forces from willing partners, on a case by case situation.

The extension of the military structure's role was first highlighted by the deployment of NATO military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where NATO was given responsibility by the UN for implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement; further evidence of NATO's willingness to expand the role of its military forces in operations could be seen in Kosovo. And it is worth to remember about the Afghanistan Campaign where, for the first time, was implemented "Article 5" in response to the terrorist attack against a NATO member (USA). At the request of the Lead Nations, NATO has agreed to support the deployment of the GE/NL Corps as the framework for ISAF III on Afghanistan. This did not make this operation a NATO operation but NATO helped to coordinate the efforts of the nations involved. The last but not the least, is about the long debate and misunderstandings between the Allies in Iraqi Crisis, where, for the first time, France, Germany and Belgium did not agree with their counterparts regarding the defense of Turkey and the War against Saddam.

Within the existing NATO Force Structure there were a great number of forces on paper, but too many of them were old and static – lacking in contemporary military relevance, and too many of them were not interoperable. National force structures vastly exceeded in number, NATO's requirements; yet NATO's expeditionary capabilities were still limited. Nations were spending significant sums of money to maintain or obtain rapidly obsolete equipment programs, and duplication abounds. Since the end of Cold War the number of conventional forces has been significantly reduced (30 to 40 %). Most of the remaining forces are no longer kept at high level of readiness and has been transformed into more mobile and flexible structures. The reasons and direction to changes was from existing reactive, static, regional, platform-oriented assets towards future pro-active, expeditionary, global, network-oriented and integrated capabilities.

The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) which provides a framework and political direction for NATO's transformation, setting out for 10 to 15 years, was approved by NAC in 2005. Against the strategic context described in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, NATO should maintain the ability to conduct the full range of its missions, inside or outside Alliance border, from high to low intensity conflicts.

International conflicts between states that constitute the reason for NATO formation and built the basis behind the Alliance's "Collective Defense" has become less likely since

the end of the Cold War. Moreover such a conflict arousing to the high-intensity level is even more unlikely. Today conflicts take place rather within states than between states, with their main actors being non-state organizations or groups. In comparison to the Cold War period, the current type of conflict can be characterized as much lower in intensity, more likely to occur on shorter term notice and rapidly spreading and higher in overall number.

The security environment has changed and, at the beginning of the 21st century, that process has even increased in speed. It is more likely that NATO will need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations. In line with the increased number of smaller operations envisaged by the Comprehensive Political Guidance, Ministerial Guidance 2006 have been developed a new NATO Level of Ambition. The Level of Ambition is the basis for the organization of the NATO Command Structure:

- Ministerial Guidance 2006 (MG06) sets two Major Joint Operations (MJOs) plus six Smaller Joint Operations (SJOs) as a force driver limit.
- SJOs would consist of four land-heavy (two up to divisional size and two up to brigade size), one maritime-heavy and one air-heavy.
- Within the structures resulting from 2 MJOs and 6 SJOs, the Alliance will also have the flexibility to mount a joint operation larger than an MJO (up to the equivalent of three MJOs).
- MJOs and SJOs could exceed two years in length, while an operation larger than an MJO outside the area of responsibility is not expected to continue at that scale for more than six months.
- The minimum interval between the initiations of successive MJOs would be six months and the minimum interval between an MJO and an SJO, as well as between successive SJOs would be two months.

An MJO requires

- A land component capable of planning and executing operations up to corps-size,
- A maritime component capable of planning and executing operations up to NATO Task Force level
- An air component capable of planning and executing up to 1,000 combat and support sorties per day

The size of an SJO will vary from single service contributions to joint forces comprising

- a land component capable of planning and executing up to a division-size operation,
- a maritime component capable of planning and executing an operation up to NATO Task Group level reinforced with additional maritime capabilities

- an air force element capable of planning and executing up to 350 combat and support sorties per day

Within the GRF structure, High Readiness Forces (HRF) is designed to react quickly and deploy for operations within the Alliance's full range of missions. The readiness of these forces is graduated to take account of operational planning constraints. In addition, Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR) are required to rotate or reinforce forces to sustain Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 CRO. HRFs and FLRs can be placed under NATO command for Article 5 operations and non Article 5 CROs, within agreed TOA arrangements, following a decision by the NAC. Nations will need to develop an augmentation capability with Long Term Build-up Forces (LTBF) in the case of an emergence of a large scale threat to NATO.

The NFS is composed of Allied national and multinational forces, as well as their associated operational headquarters, put at the Alliance's disposal on a permanent or temporary basis under specified readiness criteria. National contributions are made available to the Alliance by agreed mechanisms for the Transfer of Authority (TOA), and by co-ordination and co-operation agreements, supplemented in some cases by common funded assets for specific capabilities and scenarios.

MC 400/2 is the Military Committee guidance for the military implementation of the Alliance's strategy which provides the guidance and principles that shape the NFS. The NFS is built on the basis of potential NATO missions following the principles ruling the Alliance's military structures (cohesion, jointness and multinational, affordability, forces of graduated readiness and interaction with the NCS) and includes Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF), the CJTF and the NATO Response Force (NRF).

II.2 CJTF concept and implementation

One example of the way in which the changes and challenges from the international security environment have led to transforming military forces was the introduction and implementation of CJTF concept.

Since its inception at the 1994 Brussels Summit, the CJTF Concept has been based upon a number of fundamental principles, the most significant were:

- The first of these principles, "*Available for all Alliance Missions*", dictates that the CJTF concept be applicable and responsive to NATO's emerging mission set. At the same time, the CJTF concept is to satisfy all operational requirements and assigned missions within the current NATO Command Structure, and will not be an independent or separate entity;

- In providing a functional capability to extend NATO's command and control mechanism beyond Alliance Territory, a key requirement is that the CJTF Headquarters and assigned forces be capable of rapid and efficient deployment to areas of limited or even no Host Nation Support.
- Recent experience has shown Alliance must be prepared for protracted operations. Therefore, NATO forces needs to be robust enough to remain sustainable for a significant period and over a considerable distance. Sustainable in this context means a period of up to, and possibly beyond, 2 years and include force rotation;
- Furthermore, it is assumed that the CJTF concept should enable the Alliance to support development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and to be capable of support EU-led operations.(again, separable but not separate from the NATO Command Structure);
- Last, but by no means least, the CJTF concept must be developed in a way that establishes a framework in which Partners and other non-NATO nations can contribute and participate;

There are a number of factors which govern the CJTF concept:

- Firstly, command and control in out-of-area peace support operations must preserve and follow the accepted arrangements within NATO's Military Structure;
- There must be only one command and control structure, which meets all mission requirements for either Article 5 or Non-Article 5 Missions. That structure must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate various permutations of force composition and national representation, including non-NATO nations;
- It must be capable of covering the full spectrum of possible peace support operations, i.e. humanitarian aid, peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations;
- The mission itself and the appreciation of it during the initial contingency planning, will determine the type of command and control element required, how it is composed, and how it will function;
- The concept must provide access to the Alliance C2 structure for non-NATO led operations on the basis of "separable but not separate."

The CJTF concept facilitates more efficient and flexible conduct of Alliance missions by:

- providing flexible and efficient means to enable the Alliance to generate forces at short notice, providing rapidly deployable, multi-national (combined) multi-service (joint) task forces with dedicated Command and Control capability;
- facilitating contingency operations in concert with nations outside the Alliance in situations not related to collective defense;

- including the provision of support to operations led by the EU, as part of the Alliance's contribution to build a stronger European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO.

The product is a mission tailored Task Force to meet the potential missions across the whole spectrum of PSO, but also for collective defense. The required forces would have to have a HQ that must consequently be deployable and capable of controlling a Combined Task Force composed of one corps-sized (or equivalent) component complemented by other components in a mission-tailored strength. Within that, the idea of tailored deployable HQ controlling the operations is new.

The CJTF HQ is not a standing structure and is only activated to the operational level of command when designated. The CJTF structure is essentially formed from the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure. In addition it is dependent on a comprehensive support structure both for the HQ itself and the force.

At operational level, one of the three “Parent Headquarters” will be directed to stand-up a CJTF Headquarters for command and control. This includes the provision of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and non-CIS support elements. The exact structure of the tactical level with component commands and forces will be tailored to the mission.

While the three HQs will have the same CJTF HQ capability, there obviously are some significant differences between the sea-based and land-based versions.

Development of the CJTF concept, its validation and implementation was mapped out in 3 phases:

- Phase one, named Initial Operational Capability (IOC), and was defined as the ability to conduct one CJTF operation commanded from a sea-based CJTF HQ.
- Phase Two is Foundation Capability (FC) which is the ability to conduct one CJTF operation commanded from a sea-based CJTF HQ or from a deployed land-based CJTF HQ.
- Phase Three is Tailored Capability (TC) which gave the Alliance the ability to conduct two CJTF operations at the same time. One would be commanded from a land-based CJTF HQ and the other from the sea-based CJTF HQ with the full set of Component Commands only deployed in one of the two operations.

II.3 The NATO Response Forces

The Alliance adopted in Prague a series of measures at ensuring that NATO is equipped for the full spectrum of modern military missions, recognizing that the traditional, more static forces of the cold war are no longer valid. This means NATO creating forces able to move faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively, and to sustain them in combat. To this end, NATO leaders approved a three-pronged approach to improving alliance defense capabilities: a new capabilities initiative, the Prague capabilities commitment; creating a NATO response force, and streamlining its military command structure.

The DCI was launched at the Washington Summit and was the first initiative aimed at improving the Alliance's capabilities. The DCI focused on improving interoperability among Alliance forces to ensure the effectiveness of multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. Fifty-eight decisions were endorsed, covering the areas of Deployability and Mobility (DM), Sustainability and Logistics (SL), effective engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, and NATO consultation, command and control (C3) systems.

The new capabilities initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), differs from its predecessor, the Defense Capabilities Initiative, in that individual allies have now made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas. This includes the following eight fields: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat service support units. The PCC will focus on those key capabilities critical for the prosecution of modern warfare in a high threat environment. It also considered the contribution of multinationalization, role specialization and reprioritization. And Nations committed themselves to the rapid implementation of the PCC as quickly as possible.

So what kind of capability does NATO want for its Forces?

NATO is no longer threatened by massive conventional and nuclear forces. It is now threatened by adversaries who have learned they can threaten and harm NATO nations in

ways that fall below NATO's traditional response threshold. They can destabilize neighbors and generate refugee flows. They engage in narco-terrorism, and low level attacks inside and outside NATO territory. They aim to proliferate WMD. They learn to employ suicide attackers, kidnap citizens, etc. In sum the threat of asymmetric warfare.

To deter and defeat these threats NATO felt the need of a new force. It needed forces able to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. NATO must be able to apply force—or threaten its application—rapidly, selectively, and decisively. It must be able to apply force in a manner that deters aggressors and reassures allies and partners. Doing so requires a force structure that demonstrates speed (strategic, operational, and tactical), power, endurance, and interoperability. To be as relevant—as decisive—in the 21st Century as were in the 20th, NATO had to transform and built a NATO Response Force.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) consists of a technologically advance, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed. It serves two distinct but mutually reinforcing purposes. First, it provides a High-Readiness Force able to move quickly to wherever it may be required to carry out the full range of Alliance missions. Second, the NRF is a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance's Military Capabilities and, more generally, for their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges.

The Alliance's military authorities were turning this concept into a detailed plan with the aim of making the NRF operational as soon as possible. The NRF reached an initial operational capability by October 2004 and became fully operational by end of 2006. The NRF and the European Union's headline goal of creating a deployable, corps-sized force should also be mutually reinforcing.

NATO envisages that the NRF will form the tip of the tiered readiness forces, drawn from the Graduated Readiness Forces, and in due course it envisages that the capabilities of the NRF, its expeditionary nature, its high readiness, and its technologically advanced assets, will permeate down throughout the graduated readiness forces. Therefore, Nations must focus on the whole structure, not just the early NRF rotations to achieve the necessary qualities that the specialists foresee.

By having a reactive and expeditious decision making ability, the NRF will be able to become more preventative or deterrent in nature, by employing a smaller show of force - and therefore demonstrating Alliance resolve - at an early stage, to shape and influence the result of any potential or developing crisis, it would likely mitigate against the need for a much larger scale deployment at a much later date, and with much increased risk.

NATO's vision was a golf-bag of capabilities from which the military can tailor a bespoke force to meet the developing crisis. This depicts the CJSOR for NRFs. This initial force was envisaged to be fully operational on 15 Oct.2003 and consists of almost 7,000 people. Its main characteristics were: having a single command and its own communication system; being self-sustained and SOF oriented and operating with integrated services and proactive capabilities.

NRF development was moving fast and progressing well. Significant hurdles had to be overcome, however. The deployable C2 requirements, including the essential CIS and strategic communications for the HQ elements, were for NATO the major concern. The Alliance doubled its efforts, initially through national contributions before the procurement of NATO owned equipment arrived in the longer term.

The work reflected in the development of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement culminated in the successful Force Generation Conference for NRF 1 and 2, and for the first time in the Alliance's history, Nations contributed forces without knowing what the Mission will be – a truly transformational moment. This augers well for the development and build up of the following NRF rotations. The NRF statement of requirement – what NATO needs in terms of forces and capabilities – is seen as the principal driver for the transformation that the Alliance is effecting. Its purpose is to provide nations with an indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required.

Under the SACEUR's permanent strategic command, the three joint force commanders based in Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon take one-year turns to command the NRF. They lead their respective forces throughout the whole process of their formation and stand-by periods. Joint Command Lisbon has responsibility for the training and the certification process of the successive NRFs.

Likewise, the subordinate commands of the land, maritime and air components of the NRF are held successively between the High Readiness Force headquarters of the NATO Command Structure. This system gives a reasonable balance between military efficiency and dissemination of experience throughout the Alliance.

Even though there is only one SOR for the NRF, which was approved by the MC however the CJSOR was implemented gradually in 3 stages to allow for the stand up of NRF to meet IOC requirements, and to sustain the evolved NRF post NRF. This approach allows NATO analysts to develop the CJSOR incrementally based on those lessons learnt from the early NRF rotations in conjunction with further analysis of planning scenarios. The post FOC CJSOR will then be updated as necessary, as the capabilities of the forces evolve, or are modified to meet any change in threat or risks.

Triggering the deployment of the NRF is also a key part of the concept. By having a proactive and expeditious decision-making ability, the NRF will be able to become more preventative or deterrent in nature:

- must generate NATO capability without over-reliance on the US;
- must retain focus on NRF as the driver to effect the transformation of NATO;
- nations must no longer spend significant sums of money to maintain or obtain rapidly obsolete equipment programs;
- specialists must get the mechanics that underpin the NRF right from the outset.

On 15 Oct 2003 SACEUR inaugurated a 'global strike force'- first NATO Response Force. The 9,000-man "response force" will be ready within five days to carry out missions by air, land and sea, ranging from deterrent shows of force to commando raids and beachhead missions for serious military offensive. NRF reached a full strength of 20,000 by 2006 but was not meant to be a standing army. It has to be drawn from member states.

The Land Component has the right structure for the deployment of an appropriately tailored brigade size formation, containing both a mix of combat forces and combat and service support such as aviation, artillery, electronic warfare and intelligence and air defense capabilities. When fully deployed, it can number around 9.500 troops.

The Maritime Component comprises a force up to a NATO Task Force size, which includes an aircraft carrier, surface and subsurface combatant units, amphibious forces, mine-hunters and auxiliary support vessels. When fully deployed, it can number around 6.300 troops.

The Air Component has the capability to conduct a full range of missions, from the defensive ones such as air-to-air re-fuelling; search and rescue; and air early warning, to the offensive ones like air interdiction, target acquisition, close air support and electronic warfare. When fully deployed, it can number around 5.500 troops and control up to 200 sorties per day.

The NRF has been provided with specialist functions like special operations forces and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense units. They can be integrated in the force within one of the three components - land, maritime or air - or as a separate one. When fully deployed, the special operations unit can number nearly 400 troops, and the defense units mentioned above -called the CBRN Battalion - around 1.000 troops.

Requirements for the follow-on forces will consist of: 3 Naval TGs, plus 3 Land Corps plus Air Reaction all mutually supporting

The current NATO doctrine sets up a new logistic concept in support of the NRF. This highlights the importance of the multinational and joint approach versus the national one. In

implementation of this new concept, a Joint Logistics Support Group headquarters has been incorporated into the NRF command structure. When fully implemented, the JLSG can number up to 1.900 troops.

NATO is revising its customary policy of “costs lie where they fall” to ensure expenses are shared more equitably and, in this way, to facilitate and encourage the participation in NRF rotations, particularly the contribution of those nations with key enablers such as strategic lift.

Forces are assigned in accordance with member nations’ offers and NRF needs at the Force Generation conferences conducted by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at least one year in advance of starting their training. The NRF will operate on a rotational basis to achieve military efficiency, equitable burden sharing, and dissemination of experience and capabilities throughout the Alliance, in order to achieve the transformational effect. SACEUR has developed a detailed schedule for rotation and, in conjunction with the NRF Generation Conferences, manages the flow of HQs and forces through the NRF. The rotation cycle comprises the NRF generation, the period of Component and Joint Force Training and certification that will be 6 months, and the stand-by phase that will be 6 or 12 months.

The training process has three phases. The first one is the unit level tactical training, a national responsibility, in which the assigned forces have to reach pre-determined NATO standards. Throughout the six months of the second phase, component level training is conducted already under NATO’s responsibility in order to ensure the required levels of proficiency and interoperability between all the component forces are met. The third phase is dedicated to the extensive training of the communications and command structure and it concludes with an exercise to certify that the NRF is a combat ready, deployable joint force. Once certified, the NRF starts its stand-by period during which it can be activated and deployed.

NATO military experts have developed a comprehensive and intensive training concept and programs in order to ensure that the involved headquarters and forces fulfill the standards of the NRF. It is a building block process comprised of exercises, academics, evaluations and tests, conducted both at NATO and the national level.

CONCLUSION

While the nature of the threats faced by member states changes so NATO is continually adapting the organization, the capabilities, the approaches and the procedures to tackle the challenges. What is and will remain the same is the fundamental underpinning of

the Alliance, as stated by The North-Atlantic Treaty within its core articles: a political and military Alliance of sovereign member states for common defense, a Trans-Atlantic link for commonly managing the security aspects, balancing national interests. Moreover, as the Alliance evolves from a defensive common shield into a security manager, in the wider perspective of the concept, it has become “a community of values” such as democracy and human rights, as much as a community of interests.

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LEADERSHIP - DEFINITION, STYLES, LATEST TRENDS. A CASE STUDY

LTC Ioan Vasile ŞANDRU

INTRODUCTION

Leaders have an impact on the mentality of those they lead so it is important to learn how to be a good and real leader not one which is leader only because his command function imposes it. As an officer everyone should be interested in how they could be a better leader for his subordinates who should be their friends in order to accomplish with success every kind of work or mission. We have to realize the importance of every decision that we take. Even if we consider that it is a common decision it can have an impact on the others. The success of the mission is another thing that depends on decisions that we take. Of course that experience is a crucial element for leadership. Even so young officers should not feel discouraged because leadership is like a chemical express and experience represents only one element. Another important element is special motivation. That is something that leaders should possess in order to be able to motivate other soldiers.

A leader should be able to help his subordinates not only by encouraging and motivate them but also by working altogether. That way he teaches soldiers to work and act like a whole. Another important thing that all leaders should know is that the officer in charge with something is the last one who finishes his work. Leaders should not leave work earlier than everybody they should stay and make sure everything was made right and all tasks have been accomplished. Leadership is the key to a successful army.

CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP

Being a very complex word, it is improper to enounce a definition of leadership. Leadership is based on various moral, mental and physical values and it depend of context. Leadership doesn't means only the authority it is also the capacity to lead other people. The word commander is very different from leader. A commander is not going to be a leader if practically it is not doing anything to influence and motivate subordinates. As a leader you have to gain your

respect and subordinates dedication. Leadership demand more than managing competences or legal authority.

Leadership is an art; the art of influencing the people around you due to your leader qualities or helped by your position or legal authority. This exemplification of leadership is available for every field where it is imposed. When talking about leadership in military context implications grow. Considering the fact that in civilian life people are usually getting motivated by the fact that they have to work for a payment in order to have the possibility to take care of their families, military leaders has to be capable to motivate and influence their subordinates in order to make them glorify their own country as to be capable to make all kind of sacrifices for their comrades and country they defend. More than that, the ability to arouse and raise subordinate's moral is very important when referring to leadership.

The fact that no one and nothing is superior law confers military leadership the possibility or better said the convenience to rely on legal authority. In my opinion this fact should not represent the real meaning of leadership concept. The amount of leader abilities developed over time or congenital abilities, legal authority and capability to use them to achieve tasks define a certain extend of leadership concept. When we speak about a leader which possess abilities, ingenuity and characteristics to lead a group properly, a key word in leadership is cohesion. We can draw the idea that in order to manage a strong leadership, unity together with similar goals have an exceptional contribution in carrying out military tasks. Nowadays the purpose of leadership is not to influence but to stimulate and motivate soldiers and also to increase soldier's ambition. Their ambitions should be increased not because system obliges them to achieve tasks but to make them want to compete on themselves because this way they will obtain professional satisfactions.

CHAPTER 2 CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY LEADER

Leadership is essential to a successful officer. The art of training, the preparation of effectiveness reports, the proper way to wear the uniform are important for a good officer but such proficiency is not essential to an officer. When we consider other qualities normally the attributes of successful officers, we can recall specific exceptions to all save leadership. It is not expected that someone will be a successful officer from the beginning. With application, normal individuals who meet the standards for commissioned officers can be that sort of good leader.

Leader is defined as one fitted by force of ideas, character, or by strength of will or administrative ability to arouse, incite and direct individuals in conduct and achievement.

We can consider leadership as being the art of imposing one's will upon others in such a manner as to command their respect, their confidence, and their whole-hearted cooperation. People must do what you direct them to do. Leading means influence.[1] Officers must learn to be a leader but no one tells them how. There are many facets of a person's outward bearing which influence his or her ability to lead. There are stuffs which help as a firm, resonant voice or a friendly smile but three fundamentals are very important when speaking about leadership: character, knowledge and power of decision.

By character is meant integrity, courage, morality and unswerving determination. Character is a spiritual force. It is a reflection of a person's grip upon himself, the degree to which he is able to dominate the baser instincts that beset us all. Because people know that the conquest of one's own weaknesses is a far more difficult task than any other which could be set before us, they tend to believe that a person who can conquer himself can also conquer whatever problem is at hand. Therefore, the masses look to a man of character to lead them. For young officer, the job is to find out his own weaknesses and conquer them because if officers manage to do this their subordinates won't have the opportunity to use weakness against them.

Also knowledge is very important because it means power. People will seek a leader who knows what to do. No one wants to be led by someone who knows as much as subordinates know or even less.[2] Nowadays officers are not well prepared and often it happens to be corrected by their subordinates. First, it is very embarrassing for an officer to stand in front of a group of people, being in charge of teaching them something and realize that it is not prepared and it has nothing to communicate to them. A real officer should be well trained and possess knowledge in order to improve the quality of work and manage to succeed his mission.

Another important thing for a leader is the power of decision which is actually an outgrowth of character. It is, however, of such importance as to warrant being cited separately. It is not essential to possess the honesty and wisdom to see the right course of action, and the knowledge of the means to accomplish the action. Beside this you must have the power to take the right decisions and to stand up for your own decisions. The scientific research I have made showed that leaders acquire power of decision after at least one month of having a command position. Many of our squad commanders made several mistakes before they achieve this fundamental and this happened because they were not informed, lack of experience and of course because they have never faced a real problem to solve. In our training to become a leader we should be prepared for such situations until we manage to solve different kind of problems alone, but our leaders are not prepared as well and no one is complaining.

It would be far better to make an occasional honest mistake and learn thereby than to fritter away the benefits of wisdom. The young officers should drill themselves in small, routine decisions to make an unqualified decision.

Mechanics and the human side of leadership are two things that a leader should learn to combine. Mechanics of leadership refers to the fact that a good officer must keep everyone informed and be close to his subordinates.[3] The door of his office must be literally and figuratively open to any person who may wish to talk. Another important thing is to observe their people at their work. The leader cannot be personally present at all times, but he should be present in critical moments. Also the leader sets the example.[4] This is something we should know and be careful because subordinates will copy a lot of things from their commanders. The military leader must set the standard in all things. If you want your people to look well then you must be meticulous in your dress, throw aside the non-standard articles of uniform, refrain from wearing soiled and rumpled clothing, and keep your clothing clean and neat. When you are in front of your subordinates you must be careful to do exactly the things which are expected of you. Your subordinates learn a lot of things from your behavior and without their will their vision of leader will be affected by their leader's mistakes. So as a leader we should be careful at our behavior and actions we do. Subordinates will mirror their leader strengths and weakness.

The human side of leadership refers to socialize with subordinates and do not forget that they are people not robots. A leader will at all times be in a position to enforce your will upon those under him and it will be well to reply only a little upon this law. Be human, with all of the interest, the sympathy, the pride and satisfaction in your men you take in your best friends. In order to obtain a human contact, good will is an important factor. Good will is defined as the sum of an infinite number of favorable impressions. The good will of the people who work under or with you is dependent on how they size you up after a period of observation.

A goal of leadership is to obtain the very highest standard of performance of duty by each individual and leader should use the technique of reward and punishment.[5] The attainment of this necessary end is most difficult. Some battle leaders of proven competence have concluded that in combat the really important work is performed by not more than twenty-five percent of the men. In order to increase to the maximum the efficiency of your group to the end that all men contribute their maximum to the success of the whole, as a leader you must utilize fully each of the tools placed in his hands. Some perform their duty in superb degree merely because they see their duty and are determined to do it. Others may be inspired by fine leadership and perform beyond their natural bent or inclination. Many can be encouraged to maximum effort through rewards, including small rewards such as favorable comments and recognition, or the granting of special individual or group privileges, or unusual provisions for comfort after arduous duty, or a well-earned leave of

absence, as well as the award of decorations and promotions. The judicious use of rewards is a powerful tool of leadership. But others do not respond strongly to inspiration or rewards.

The exercise of the art of leadership requires the leader to make wise and judicious use of the several tools with which he is equipped. The leader should inspire those who will respond to the higher appeals of duty, honor and achievement.[6] He must encourage people to do their best and reward them in an appropriate manner. The leader must prod when subordinates hold back or fail to give their best. The leader must drive when such demands are necessary, must not shrink from awarding proper punishment, even trials before military courts, when no better way remains to enforce his will. Reward and punishment in their varying degrees are the tools in the hand of the military leader with which he must be adept.

Fundamental qualities of military leader	Other attributes required	Indicators of performance
Integrity Courage Loyalty Altruism(selflessness) Self-discipline	Self-sacrifice Knowledge Cleverness Perseverance Spirit of decision Physical force	Manifest own example Impose discipline Acceptance of responsibilities Defending personal beliefs Analyze situations Take decisions Delegates and leads Supervises Responsible for his actions Ensure the welfare of his subordinates


CHAPTER 3 LEADERSHIP STYLES

Every commander will lead guiding by some outlines and by competence level of his subordinates. Leadership style refers to the way you handle a situation. There are probably as many leadership styles as there are personalities, yet there are four which stand out: directive, selling, participative and delegating.[7] The styles a leader adopts will depend on his analysis of the people, the mission, the environment, and his confidence and comfort using various styles.

3.1 Directive style

Directive style for many is simply an autocratic, power-based style of leadership in which leader controls and direct his subordinates' every action.

It is an appropriate style when you require immediate action or your subordinates are not able to do the job without close direction. The directive style is what you would find at basic training with new recruits. You might also use it when someone is learning a new task.



3.2 Selling style

Selling leadership is a style still directive in nature with emphasis on the “how” of doing the job. At this point, the subordinates have some knowledge of the job, and it is appropriate to explain why things are done. You should get feedback from your subordinates about the job and provide support and encouragement. In this case leaders should be capable to motivate their subordinates. Because subordinates know exactly what they have to do the leaders job is easy. They only have to motivate and supervise soldiers. After the task is accomplished they have to evaluate and ensure that the task was successfully solved.



leader

- *provide support*
- *explain the importance of task*
- *motivates*
- *impose certain restrictions*



subordinates

- *less qualified*
- *accomplish tasks after receiving directions*
- *discuss certain topics*
- *offer suggestions*
- *do not take decisions*

3.3 Participative style

Participative style is the most democratic as you allow your subordinates to assist in the organizing and planning of tasks. By doing so, you allow your followers to participate and control most of their work while you retain overall responsibility. As a leader, you provide support to these highly into the decision making process.



leader

- *assists in fulfilling tasks*
- *encourages*
- *supervises*
- *take the final decision*




subordinates

- *comes up with suggestions*
- *take decisions*
- *cooperate*
- *learn to lead*
- *assume responsibilities*

3.4 Delegating style

The last one, delegating style, is the laissez-faire style. It is appropriate to use with highly qualified subordinates. They need little direction or personal support. With their abilities, the subordinates are able to handle virtually all aspects of their jobs. While you may put the subordinates in charge, ultimate responsibility again lies with you.



3.5 Strategic and tactical leadership

In the army a classification of leadership can be made according to the purpose. Therefore we can refer to strategic leadership and tactical leadership.

The word strategy is a word of military origin, derives from the Greek “strategia” and it means “general”. It refers to a plan of action made to fulfill a particular mission. Unlike tactic, when speaking about military strategy we invoke an art; finding the best solution to accomplish the mission efficiently. Using strategic leadership we are interested to find a set of methods in order to reinforce and maintain the wellbeing and self-confidence of every soldier in our troop during the whole mission. So, strategic leadership refers to long term efficacy of the army.

We can define tactic as an entire set of actions performed in order to accomplish a task. This word “tactic” derives from French “tactique”. We can argue based on definition that tactical leadership is concerned on the result of the mission. When speaking about tactical leadership we suppose to do everything, no matter what, in order to accomplish our mission. It doesn’t matter how we fulfilled the task or how many subordinates have been hurt. It is much easier to lead this way because all you have to consider is a well-done plan and motivation. Despite of strategic leadership where the motivation should persist during the mission and soldiers should desire to

participate and be a part of every step of the mission, tactical leadership motivate soldiers in order to reach the final destination.

To figure out the difference between strategic leadership and tactical leadership we can take an easy example. Like a military commander we receive a mission, a situation like climbing a mountain. For an easier reference leader A is going to be the strategic leader and leader B the tactical leader. Mission: climb the mountain as faster as you can; both teams will be victorious but the better one will receive two hours of permission. Leader A will announce his subordinates the details about the mission and the first thing to be done is setting a plan of action. The same thing is doing leader B. The difference is the way this plan of action look like. Leader B takes all the provisions his team needs and starts climbing the mountain from the bottom to top straight ahead. He motivates his subordinates by giving them two hours of permission convinced that they will be the best team. Instead leader A takes few provisions in order to not overload the soldiers. He motivates soldiers telling them that together they will provide food and find water, giving them a good chance to apply what they have learnt and giving them the opportunity to learn what camaraderie means. They start climbing the mountain according to a map in order to ease their climb. At the end of the mission the leader's B team hasn't reached complete. One soldier was lost and other three were exhausted and needed medical care. Team A completed the mission four hours late than the first one but they all managed to accomplish the mission and they also used less provisions than the first team. As we can imagine team A where the winners and received the prize. In my opinion strategic leadership is better because it doesn't matter only to accomplish the mission; it is important that all staff reach safe home.

3.6 Transitional and transformational leadership

Another classification can be made according to relations between commander and subordinates. Based on this relation we can distinguish two types of leadership: transitional and transformational. Transitional leadership relies on a system based on rewards and punishments while transformational leadership appeal to soldier's inspiration, skills and understanding.

The leading style of a leader is usually a consequence of interaction between things he observes at other leaders and the skills he acquired. The leader must analyze each situation and choose the appropriate action to accomplish the mission. A leader must possess the ability to adapt his leadership behavior to different situations. There are two types of leaders: those which have power of lead and are named in leading position, and those who are missing the leading position but people follow them.[8]

To lead is the ability to win subordinates so a leader should have some competences in order to show that it worth follow him. A good leader has personals, socials and cognitive competences.[9] Personals competences are important for a military leader because these competences represent the motivation to succeed, self confidence, dynamism and personal efficiency. The importance of social competences, consist in the ability to influence people and make them follow you in any direction. Being a leader suppose to have an innovative way of thinking, a behavioral pattern and initiative. Koestenbaum highlights three important qualities required in order to succeed in being a good leader: vision, courage and ethics. A person who has vision see things different, he finds easy many ways to solve a problem because having vision means see things from many points of view. Courage is also important for a real leader because a brave leader will always assume the power to initiate, to act and to risk because having courage means to act through an initiative supported. And of course ethics is a very important quality because a real leader is a commander and a friend at the same time. So, a person with ethics will always be sensitive to others problems, listen them and try to solve together all problems.

Leadership style	Effects on organizational style
Instrumental leadership	This type of leadership does not correspond if subordinates are qualified and are able to accomplish their task successfully. They have to know exactly what they are supposed to do. Tasks have to be structured. Soldiers are constrained by this leadership. This is efficient when tasks are not structured.
Supportive leadership	If tasks are highly structured and become frustrating leader supports his subordinates and make them feel more comfortable. This type of leadership is efficient when team is working under pressure or stress.
Participative leadership	This style gives subordinates the possibility to choose their task. Also subordinates have the possibility to be involved in taking decisions. This leadership is efficient when task are structured.

CHAPTER 4 LATEST TRENDS IN LEADERSHIP

Both soldiers and their leaders have encountered difficulties in achieving tasks during abroad missions. New challenges which appeared on territory imply and enforce leaders to adjust their leading style in accordance with latest tendency in leadership. There are some aspects that we have to improve in our leadership. Learn to analyze a situation and take decisions together with our subordinates in order to be actively involved during the entire mission. Leaders should appeal to


personal example if they want to impose discipline and respect. Another aspect would be overcoming the situation “commander-subordinate”, attempting to support and reward subordinates when they have productive ideas. “Engage-and-create” style is replacing “command-and-control” style. Leaders performing this type of style

A CASE STUDY. CONCLUSIONS

The research was performed on a group of student from terminal year because they represent the future of Romanian army. Students picked to actualize the research were in charge of a platoon, company or battalion and had different responsibilities. Among those students we also picked a number of students which got involved in all kind of extracurricular activities.

The purpose of the research was to observe students behavior when they are in charge of other students but also their behavior as subordinates. The importance of the research is detection the way young officers deal a problem. Another purpose is overlook leader skills and identifying those gifted students. This aspect can be the most important because motivation and desire to accomplish a task or making sacrifices for their country is extremely important for a good leader and that qualities have to be acquired during military training in school.


Among others the purpose of the research was also to highlight leadership styles preferred by future officers. The results of the research were evaluated on two levels considering that we queried two types of student: leaders and subordinates.



In this first chart are represented leadership styles preferred by students which were leaders:

- 48% preferred participative style
- 31% preferred selling style

- 11% choose directive style
- 10% delegating style which students did not have the opportunity to apply



In the second chart are represented leadership styles preferred by students which did not have the possibility to lead.

We can conclude that there is a difference between leaders and subordinates if we refer to their conception. In order to make things better than they are leaders and subordinates should reach to an agreement.

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ETHICS AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

LTC Ioan SOMEȘAN

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays when the whole world is struggling for resources of all kind trying to ensure them for now and for the future, to satisfy the increasing demands of a fast growing population, all governs around the world are trying to repair what went wrong, to implement new policies aiming for a better use of the existing resources, for a reduced consume and for a rational apportion, so that the society to regain its stability. The first condition for that to happen is to make sure that the managers really want to do that and they are honestly trying to do their best in the interest of the society. Why is that necessary? Because it is obvious that the reasons of the nowadays crisis are mainly unethical behaviors namely the greed associated with and irresponsibility of financial actors and governs.

Mr. Michel Camdessus, former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund considers that “at the root of the crisis is greed and lack of ethics”. He also said that ethical reforms are needed and these should aim to end the overexploitation of the resources and of the economic mechanisms. He concluded saying that, "we have to return to the old ethical values, in special to three of them: global responsibility, solidarity and sense of global citizenship. This is the unique way to follow to overcome this crisis"[1].

When things are going fine in a society no one would care much about a small brake of some ethical rule if of course that won't affect our state of comfort. But when things are going wrong and our state of safety and sufficiency is affected or somehow threatened, then we will all try to see what went wrong and resolve the problem. Exactly this is happening now around the financial crisis. The situation is so serious and so deep rooted in the economical and political systems that no one tries to find who is to be blamed or accountable for this situation. Each and every government is simply trying to find a way out of this situation. In this paper I am trying to show that whatever measures will be taken or solutions adopted they must have a strong ethical component otherwise there is a big chance to have chosen a wrong solution or a less effective one, and more than that there is a big chance that sooner or later to come again to the same situation.

I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I.1. Definitions of ethics

Latin *ēthicus* , Greek *ēthikós*, equiv. to *ēth* (*os*) ethos + *-ikos* -ic

- A system of moral principles: *the ethics of a culture*. [2]
- The rules of conduct recognized in respect to a particular class of human actions or a particular group, culture, etc.: *medical ethics; Christian ethics*. [2]
- Moral principles, as of an individual: *His ethics forbade betrayal of a confidence*. [2]
- That branch of philosophy dealing with values relating to human conduct, with respect to the rightness and wrongness of certain actions and to the goodness and badness of the motives and ends of such actions. [2]
- A social, religious, or civil code of behavior considered correct, especially that of a particular group, profession, or individual; [2]
- The moral fitness of a decision, course of action, etc. [2]

As shown above there are many possible definitions however they are all showing that ethics is a set of rules and principles, a code of behavior considered correct, right or fair by a certain group, or organization. It is important to be noted that these rules are part of the culture of the organization. The manager should always be aware of the main traits of the organization's culture.

I.2. Moral Theories

Generally speaking the ethics aims to define the value of an action – good or bad – in respect of means and goals and in this view there are two main positions. The deontological ethic says that the moral value of an action consists of obeying the rule no matter its consequences, and the teleological ethic which says that the moral value of an action is given by its final goal.

The supporters of teleological ethic claim that the happiness is the supreme goal of the life, even if the means to achieve it may differ. The hedonism (Aristae, J. St. Mill) promotes the absence of pain of body or soul and the eudemonism supports the rational seek of the happiness (Plato, Aristotle). Both theories favor the idea that the value of the means is determined by the value of the goal and focuses on the content of the moral action.

Socrates (469-399 BC) who is considered to be the father of ethics was saying that the virtue can be learned and it is the most precious teachings. To do good you should know what good means, to be just, modest and brave you should know what justice, modesty and

bravery really are. He also believed that “Our true happiness is promoted by doing what is right”. For Aristotle the moral education should aim to achieve the virtue of the logical reasoning, to become a man of a good judgment, who is thinking before doing, being wise.

. The deontological ethic (Immanuel Kant 1724-1804) appreciates that no matter the final goal, the actions have moral value only if they are governed by principles which if obeyed are ensuring the necessary and universal character of an action. He also states that the actions with moral value are only those resulted from an autonomous act of will. He also defines the concept of duty which characterizes the action fulfilled necessarily with respect for the laws sourced from autonomous will which are valid only if they can be adopted as universal law.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) is one of the supporters of the utilitarian approach. He considers that an action is good in the measure it contributes to the happiness of a maximum number of individuals. Starting from the principle of utility in achieving happiness which in fact consists of the pleasure, he stresses upon the difference between the quality and the quantity of the pleasures and he justifies that the spiritual pleasures are more desirable than other not through themselves but through their consequences. The inferior spirits can achieve easier the state of happiness because they are satisfied with pleasures much easier to be obtained, unlike the superior spirits whom are much more difficult to be satisfied but they have the advantage of a lasting, sureness and intensity.

I. 3 Theories of ethics and business

In his famous "The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of the Capitalism" ", the German sociologist Max Weber was warning that in the 21st century the world of capital may permanently divorce of the moral values. Weber was seeing the two categories of human activities under the sign of two fundamental concepts different in what concerns the ethics and undoubtedly opposite. He names these “the ethics of convictions” (the moral) and the “ethics of responsibility” (the business). The ethics of conviction shows a pure moral attitude; the one who acts on its basis, obeys strictly his own convictions, without considering the consequences of his actions. The ethics of responsibility belongs to the business man, who owes to predict not only the immediate expected consequences of his action but also unexpected ones.

Even if sometimes Weber’s concept was interpreted as the affirmation of the conflict between business and moral, in fact Weber was pleading for the fusion of business and moral, saying the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction are not excluding each other, they are complementary, together creating the authentic business man the one with

vocation. However this is placing the business man in the middle of a dilemma: should he assume the risks and responsibilities of his actions inherent to his economic action or he should just stay within his moral judgment out of any responsible approach? This dilemma leads the discussion to the business man code of conduct from morals to the ethics of responsibility. This happens because in business some of the common moral values like mercy, altruism, love of the other, philanthropy, etc. can lead to the bankruptcy and ruin with all the consequences derived from it. Nicolo Machiavelli's collocation "the goal excuses the means" is specific to business and is acceptable as long as is not crossing the limits of the society's system of values. In reality each business has to obey to some "rules of the game", which if respected are maintaining the actions of the business man within the coordinates of the business ethics. Crossing over the limits of the economical and legal rules brings the behavior of the business man in a conflict area and raises doubts regarding his responsibility. In the same time certain sociological constraints, like excessive taxes, excessive control, weak power of buying, corruption, etc. may lead to reduced responsibility and poor ethics.

The business ethics defines a system of values, principles and codes of conduct, based on the company's philosophy, which are imposed as moral imperatives which have to be clearly expressed. Even though common ethical values are naturally integrated in the company, but in order to make them really functional and credible they must be associated to the objectives of the business. Specific for the moral values in business is that those have to express the responsibility for the success of the company. In business the moral rule implies a clear defining of desirable values and their measure.

II. Ethics and the resources management.

II. 1. Positive influence of ethics

A high level of morality and ethical standards is bringing together the following characteristics and advantages in the same time:

- The employees are doing their best by themselves without being supervised or waiting special motivating incentives. As a result the effort on the control and motivating means can be significantly reduced and use the released resource on the productive area of the organization;

- High level of discipline easily achieved with almost no special effort of the organization. Responsible and honest personnel would understand the importance of respecting rules, schedules, deadlines and naturally obeying and meeting them;

- Good accurate reports and correct use of the information channels. Honest, just and modest employees would always try to stay in respect of the truth without any exaggeration or abuse of the communication channel.

- Good cooperation and work environment. Respecting and supporting each other, having a natural respect for value, will create a healthy work environment encouraging cooperation and mutual respect.

- The correct distribution and use of the resources of all kind. Loyal and just employees would try to get the best result out of the resources available and they will not allow any subjective reason or “invisible string” to influence their judgment.

- At times of change and crisis, there is often no clear moral compass to guide leaders through complex conflicts about what is right or wrong. Ethics ensure a moral behavior during unstable times.

- having implemented ethics at the workplace ensures for the employees a healthy, safe climate. Employees feel full confidence they can admit and deal with whatever may come to happen because they are confident that they will be fairly treated and the best solution will be adopted.

- Ethics ensure that the implemented policies are legal. The respect for ethics ensures highly ethical policies and procedures in the workplace. It is much better to pay the cost of mechanisms which would ensure ethical practices than to be brought in the situation to pay the costs of litigation. The personnel policies have to ensure ethical treatment of employees, regarding the hiring, evaluation, firing, etc.

- Ethical programs may detect ethical issues and violations early on so they can be reported or addressed. In some cases, when an organization is aware of an actual or potential violation and does not report it to the appropriate authorities, this can be considered a criminal act. However, the ethical guidelines potentially lower fines if an organization has clearly made an effort to operate ethically

- the concept of total quality management gives a high importance to some moral operating values, like trust among stakeholders, reliability, integrity, and correct feedback.. There are companies which are integrating the ethic programs in their strategic planning process.

- Ethical management programs are also important in managing diversity. Starting with the color of the people’s skin, and religious specificity and going all the way to acknowledge, respect and integrate all different values and perspectives in the ethical rules, would ensure a sound management program.

- The fact that an organization is constantly giving attention to its ethics can project a strong positive image to the public. For the general public is more important how the companies are treating their people than the companies' profit. However managing ethics should not be done only for reasons of public relations, but it is of high importance to align the behavior with the ethical values

The list may continue because there is no specific process in an organization which may not be influenced by the ethical behavior of the human resource. However I would like to emphasize that the higher position in the organization the higher the need for a high level of ethics. This comes together with the implied level responsibility of making decisions over people, material resources and environment.

As shown above all the advantages of high level of ethics has a totally positive influence over the activity of the organization, being almost a guarantee for success.

II.2. Why is it important to apply ethics in the resources management?

Most of the companies and most of their employees are normally doing good, right honest and legal things and so it has to be, otherwise:

- The reputation of the company and the reputation of each employee is at stake. As soon as a significant ethical mistake has been done you will see that the partners and the clients of your organization are one by one leaving you for other companies, which is obviously not good for both the organization and its employees.
- If the company is losing transactions it will have to reduce the activity and thus the number of the employees. In the same time, the organizations which have understood the importance of respecting ethics in business will not tolerate any ethical error of their employees.
- When it comes about ethics each every individual is responsible and everything matters, and everybody should align his/her action with the ethical rules, and with their promises.

The cost of not implementing ethic principles in the life of any organization may be as high as the complete failure of the business. From one end of any business process to the other the lack of ethics may result in direct and indirect losses. Starting with the sourcing of the business and finishing with the delivery of the final product or service, at all stages the process may be compromised. To name a few of many possible examples I may mention:

- costly or useless acquisitions;
- hiring unqualified personnel;
- waste of resources;

- abuses of any kind;
- faked quality controls;
- misuse of resources;
- failure to meet deadlines;
- failure to meet the quality standards;

Nowadays when all the organizations and governs are striving to reduce their expenditures, to ensure an effective way of use of the resources, and to distribute them as good as possible, having an ethical environment and ethical managers is vital.

No matter which is the ethical breach of the system, if not immediately addressed it will result in increasing costs, losing customers, failing the sponsors, and in the end the death of the business. Unfortunately for the state owned companies and governmental institutions when failing to meet the ethical principles, the loss will become public, harming the entire society. One may try to hide the problems of the system but the reality of the life shows that sooner or later the problem will pop up.


II. 3. Implementation of ethics

Most of the ethical principles are rules of common sense. However because the common sense is not common to everybody the managers have to issue written rules and regulations which are meant to establish how one should behave, how responsibility is established, what is considered fair and normal to be done. These books of rules are usually called codes of ethics or codes of conduct. The minimum level of an ethical rule is to make sure that all your actions are legal. They should encourage the employees to always respect the truth, to respect and support each other, to respect the real values of the organization and to take responsibility for their actions. They should also encourage the right way of managing a conflicting situations.

After having established the code of ethics the most important rule is that this code should be always obeyed and especially by the managers. In order to promote them, all the issues of this kind should be made known to all employees and periodically reminded. The best way to promote an ethical behavior is by promoting the positive examples showing the good outcomes of a certain ethical attitude or action. Today most of the big companies are making public their internal code of ethics trying this way to increase the trust of the customers in their company and why not to attract ethical employees.

As shown in the picture below all managers should aim to place and maintain their organization in the area where the business process observes the legal requirements of the society, complies with ethical norms and rules and keeps the organization profitable (or cost

effective if state owned). Most of the time this is pretty difficult but it is the only way to ensure a healthy environment, satisfied stakeholders and a long lasting business.



There are some guiding principles of ethical action which may be used as a starting point for creating a code of conduct or just to promote an ethical behavior:

- Do what is accepted by the local culture;
- What you don't like , don't do for the others;
- Do what you would like all people to do in same situation (Kant's imperative);
- Do what is in agreement with the rules of your organization;
- Do what is supported by other colleagues or members of the same profession;
- Do what is supporting or protecting the others autonomy.

When it comes to taking decisions, an ethical manager should try to make sure that his/her decision would maximize the benefits and minimize the bad consequences. Also the manager should aim to keep a fair balance between benefits (rewards) and the tasks. On a day to day basis the utilitarian approach would be a good guiding principle in the sense that if one always tries to choose the decision which will bring biggest amount of good for the biggest number of people he /she will always get the biggest amount of satisfaction of both clients and stakeholders. Especially for those managing and apportioning resources this should be the golden principle.

II. 4. How to ensure that an action is ethical?

Before any action or implementing any plan or decision you should verify its rightness or fairness. Ask yourself the following questions and if the answer for one or more of them is not then you should try to find another solution:

- Is it legal?
- Is it in agreement with our rules and regulations?
- Does it respect our organizational values?

- Would I be feeling guilty if I did it?
- Does it correspond to our commitments and declared guarantees?
- Would I be doing that to my family or friends?
- Would I be feeling good if someone did this to me?
- Would the most virtuous person I know do this? [3]

Respect is one of the most important ethical concepts. It is something what should be applied to people, to the resources of the organization and to the environment. This implies treating everybody (clients, colleagues, partners, etc.) with respect. It also means that you should use the resources, the equipments, the money and the time efficiently and only in the interest of the organization. Showing respect to the environment means that in any circumstances you should protect and improve the working environment and to respect all the existing legal provisions regarding the protection of environment.

Donaldson and Davis pointed out that managing ethical values in the workplace legitimizes managerial actions, increases the trust of the individuals in their relation with the groups, enforces the coherence and balance of the organization's culture, supports greater consistency in standards and qualities of products, and cultivates greater sensitivity to the impact of the enterprise's values [4].

III. Conclusions

In today's world resource management is one of the highest responsibilities of the managers but not only for them. The behavior of each every employee is important when we are striving to achieve better and better levels of efficiency and effectiveness. To make sure that we are on the right way we should always observe and follow the ethical principles.

There are huge and vital benefits of implementing ethical principles, being a guarantee for a strong organization and healthy work environment. It is at the hand of the managers to implement the ethical policies and ensure the compliance with the rules and more than that to practice everyday an ethical leadership stile, which by Socrates will lead the organization to the state of "happiness".

In the past 30 years the importance of ethics has continually increased, new positions and departments responsible for ethics have been created in most of the companies and organizations. Despite this tendency, the business world's race for bigger and bigger rates of profit, bigger production with lower costs, the fast pace of developing of new technologies, are putting a high pressure on the managers and generally speaking on the employees of all companies whom here and there found themselves in the situation to make compromises, or

to take decisions which are not quiet right and ethical. When this pressure comes together with the greed and lack of responsibility it is obvious that wrong decisions are taken and in the end both people and organizations are suffering. This doesn't mean that the effort of implementing ethics should stop. In my opinion there is a great need for more practice of ethical behavior. In most of the companies and organizations there are issued codes of conducts and internal rules of behavior but they are not really practiced and especially by the managers. And this is not because the mangers are less moral or ethical but because over them that pressure is much higher. Acknowledging this they should understand that the results are important but more important than that is how are you achieving them, and for that they have to permanently check if their decisions and actions are ethical and in agreement with the codes of conduct they have established. Do not build big houses on moving sands.

Now, when the whole world is passing through the most serious financial crisis after the 2nd World War all governments in the world are analyzing the status of their economies, and reviewing their strategies, their policies in order to find solutions for actual problems and more, to resume the ascendant march of their economies and ensure a healthy and secure environment for their citizens. At these times any possible source of improvement should be carefully considered. However no matter what the new way to go will be chosen, ethics should be taken along.

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LEADERSHIP IN DEFENSE

LTC Cătălin TÎRTAN

'Leadership is the art of accomplishing more than the science of management says is possible'

General Colin Powell

Chairman (Ret), Joint Chiefs of Staff

INTRODUCTION

Leadership is a complex multifaceted topic which demands many different qualities in the operational and in management environments. There is no simple answer to what makes an effective and respected leadership, which draws upon history, philosophy, science and real life experiences.

In a dynamic and diverse defense environment, it is important to continue to analyze and develop our own leadership skills and, equally importantly, educate and encourage others¹.

CHAPTER 1

1.1 The Strategic Context

Although it is now used across a very wide spread of institutions, business, public services and charitable foundation, the word strategy is military in origin and instinctively linked with the higher organization of Defense. Carl von Clausewitz in his modern strategic study defined military strategy as *'the employment of battles to gain the end of war.'* B. H. Liddell Hart's definition put fewer accents on battles, defining strategy as *'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy'*. Hence, both gave the pre-eminence to political aims over military goals. Nowadays a business definition of strategy which is relevant in the context of Defense activities beyond the war fighting domain was formulated and adopted as follow:

'Strategy is the direction and scope of the organization over the long term which achieves advantage for the organization through its configuration of resources within a

¹ General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of U.K. Defence Staff, Foreword to *Leadership in Defence*, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Defence Leadership Centre, Shrivenham, U.K., 2004, p. iii

*changing environment to meet the needs of the markets and to fulfill the stakeholders expectations*²

1.2 The leadership role. Leading in the strategic environment of defense, as in any other large corporate enterprise, involve careful thoughts as to the future direction of the organization when few issues are clear cut. It is about weighing the balance of risk between the followership and other stakeholders with a necessary course of action. It is also about engaging others in the vision, winning their support for the necessary changes to accomplish it, persuading the stakeholders of the values of defense within the social contract and justifying its opportunity cost. Strategic leaders need to develop networks with the wider community of Defense stakeholders using their powers of influence and persuasion. These stakeholders and their organization can have a significant impact for good or ill on the achievement of Defense goals.

1.3 Strategy, Operations and Tactics. Three different levels of context – team or tactical, organizational or operational, and top or strategic must be used as a framework for analysis and responsibilities. These levels are distinct and sequential in theory but in practice the boundaries between them are rarely tidy and frequently overlap. The notion of strategic leadership is avoided in favor of the idea of leading in the strategic context. In addition to their duties in this area senior leaders will have to perform direct leadership tasks in respect of their immediate teams.

Team or Tactical Level – leadership at this level is concerned with groups of various sizes up to but not generally exceeding 100 people. The teams work on specific projects within fixed margins of time and resources and are concentrated in one or few locations. Leaders in this environment have a direct influence on the quality of the products and the ability to affect directly the actions of team members. External relationships are straightforward and simple with the main focus being one level up and a single remove sideways involving cooperation with other similar teams.

Organizational or operational level. The intermediate environment will typically involve responsibility for wide range of multi-disciplined groups, often with different and sometimes competing set of priorities and resource requirements, as well as being geographically dispersed. Numbers reach into thousands and leaders are removed from the direct control of events. They are unlikely to be able to intervene personally to rectify the mistakes of others but still need to work through their colleagues, trusting in their judgment and adherence to the organization's commonly accepted way of doing business. Leaders at

² Gerry Johnson and Kevan Scholes, Exploring corporate Strategy, 6th edition, Prentice Hall, England, 2003

this level are able to gain a sufficient first hand view of the state of the organization from selected personal visits as well as routine performance reports.

Top/strategic level. Leadership challenges in the strategic environment are marked by a larger scale of input and effect. At this level, groups of intermediate organizations within dependent roles are bound loosely together within an overarching corporate mission. Whilst there may be the capability to react with alacrity to sudden opportunity or threats, many decisions will take time to effect because of the requirement to marshal resources and synchronize the actions regionally or globally separated subordinate organizations. Leaders are removed from the activities of the organizations by several layers of Command or Management and their personal influence beyond their immediate circle is attenuated. There are multiple sources of information and leaders need to be selective in where they direct their searchlight when seeking to find out what is going on in the territory beyond head office. External stakeholders other than costumers occupy a substantial amount of attention and effort at the expense of employees. This arena is characterized by complexity and ambiguity.

The character of the strategic level in defense. In some situations actions at the lowest tactical level may have a direct and immediate significance impact at the highest one. Strategy as perceived in Defense refers to activities which consistently affect the organization as a hole or its principal elements. These latter parts could include as an example the single services and the major command headquarters of the fleet, land command and air force strike command or equivalent, and the principal support functions of logistic, personnel, scientific research, procurement and finance. Defense strategy is concerned with the long term and resources are defined by scales or quantity, value or effect.

The strategic context sees contact with a large number of external stakeholders including Government, Parliament, defense industry, the media and the general public. In addition there are foreign governments and their defense communities to be considered, along with international organizations such as the UN, EU and NATO and increasingly many NGOs and special interest groups. Each has its own agenda in dealing with Defense and these will often be at the variance. The strategic level is thus characterized by ambiguity and complexity. It is long term in its scope, broad in its focus and is marked by significant scale of effort and effect.

- Strategic direction means the development of a long-term vision of the organization's strategic intent;
- A charismatic leader can help achieve strategic intent;
- It is important not to lose sight of the strengths of the organization when making changes required by a new strategic direction;

- Executives must structure the firm effectively to help achieve the vision.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Leadership Trends in Strategic Context

As seeming human actions are likely to be the crucial determinant of the outcomes. Historically, leaders and their ideas - positive and negative—were among the biggest game-changers during the last century. Individually and collectively over the next 15-20 years, leaders are likely to be crucial to how developments turn out, particularly in terms of ensuring a more positive outcome. As we have emphasized, today’s trends appear to be heading toward a potentially more fragmented and conflicted world over the next 15-20 years, but bad outcomes are not inevitable. International leadership and cooperation will be necessary to solve the global challenges and to understand the complexities surrounding them. This study is meant to be an aid in that process: by laying out some of the alternative possibilities we hope to help policy makers steer us toward positive solutions.

Key Uncertainties	Potential Consequences
<p>A global multi-polar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of non-state actors—businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks—also will increase.</p>	<p>By 2025 a single ‘international community’ composed of nation-states will no longer exist. Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new leadership rules of the game while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will weaken. Rather than emulating Western models of political and economic development, more countries may be attracted to China’s alternative development model.</p> <p><i>Trend: Chinese leadership prototype appears to be unfamiliar to many western democracies but very active and present.</i></p>
<p>The unprecedented shift relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East now under way will continue facing the post economic crisis consequences.</p>	<p>As some countries become more invested in their economic well-being recovery, incentives toward geopolitical stability could increase. However, the transfer is strengthening states like Russia that want to challenge the Western order.</p> <p><i>Trend: Russian leadership approach in terms of European energy supplier and foreign policy major player will uphold a innovative leadership model that style need to be reconsidered.</i></p>
<p>The United States will remain the single most powerful country but will be less dominant.</p>	<p>Shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic versus foreign policy priorities</p> <p><i>Trend: No major predictable changes in US leadership style.</i></p>

Key Uncertainties	Potential Consequences
Continued economic growth - coupled with more than 7.5 billion people by 2025 - will put pressure on energy, food, and water resources.	<p>The pace of technological innovation will be the key to outcomes during this period. All current technologies are inadequate for replacing traditional energy architecture on the scale needed.</p> <p>Trend: <i>Defense leadership will have to cope with a new spectrum of resilience³ operations beyond belief until now, where the military niche capabilities will be extensively used.</i></p>
The number of countries with youthful populations in the ‘arc of instability’ will decrease, but the populations of several youth-bulge states are projected to remain on rapid growth trajectories.	<p>Unless employment conditions change dramatically in <i>parlous youth-bulge⁴</i> states such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen, these countries will remain ripe for continued instability and state failure.</p> <p>Trend: <i>Military leaders must adapt techniques and procedures to face many synchronized concurrent civil conflicts consequences that effects on massive illegal, chaotic and aggressive migration, beyond the competency of Ministries of Interior.</i></p>
The potential for conflict will increase owing to rapid changes in parts of the greater Middle East and the spread of lethal capabilities	<p>The need for the US to act as regional balancer in the Middle East will increase, although other outside powers—Russia, China and India—will play greater roles than today.</p> <p>Trend: <i>Many unknown models of leadership are expected to shape the global future.</i></p>
Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could lessen if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorists that are active the diffusion of technologies will put dangerous capabilities within their reach.	<p>Opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, or less likely, nuclear weapons will increase as technology diffuses and nuclear power (and possibly weapons) programs expand.</p> <p>Trend: <i>The practical and psychological consequences of such attacks will intensify in an increasingly globalized world challenging the leadership far beyond known experiences; Joint effort is the key.</i></p>
Whether an energy transition away from oil and gas - supported by improved energy storage, bio-fuels, and clean coal - is completed during the 2025 time frame.	With high oil and gas prices, major exporters such as Russia and Iran will substantially augment their levels of national power, with Russia’s GDP potentially approaching that of the UK and France.

³ Refers to ability to respond to *disruptive challenges* at the national, regional and local levels. A *disruptive challenge* is a situation or series of events that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security
Source: *Joint Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience* The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence Shrivenham SWINDON, Wilts, SN6 8RF

⁴ Source: Lionel Beehner *The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil Conflicts*, 2007

The term was coined by German social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn in the mid-1990s but has gained greater currency in recent years, thanks to the work of American political scientists Gary Fuller and Jack A. Goldstone. They argue that developing countries undergoing ‘demographic transition’—or those moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates—are especially vulnerable to civil conflict. ‘A large proportion of young adults and a rapid rate of growth in the working-age population tend to exacerbate unemployment, prolong dependency on parents, diminish self-esteem and fuel frustrations,’ writes Richard P. Cincotta, a consultant to the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit.

Key Uncertainties	Potential Consequences
	<i>Trend: Arab or South American leadership prototype appears to become familiar to many western democracies.</i>
How quickly climate change occurs and the locations where its impact is most pronounced.	Climate change is likely to exacerbate resource scarcities, particularly water scarcities. <i>Trend: Defense leadership will have to cope with a new spectrum of resilience operations where the military niche capabilities will be extensively used, mostly due to natural disasters.</i>
Whether mercantilism stages a comeback and global markets recede.	Descending into a world of resource nationalism increases the risk of great power confrontations. <i>Trend: Conventional wars become plausible. Wars are perceived as solutions due to the increasing lack of political education of the population that in certain condition give confidence to extreme nationalism. Various top military leaders may be seduced by this perspective.</i>
Whether advances toward democracy occur in China and Russia.	Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification. A growing middle class increases the chances of political liberalization and potentially greater nationalism in China. <i>Trend: Cooperation and presence of Chinese and Russian leadership prototypes becomes more likely and natural to many western democracies.</i>
Whether regional fears about a nuclear armed Iran trigger an arms race and greater militarization.	Episodes of low-intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict. <i>Trend: Global transition away from oil and gas to renewable energy may temper Iran's level of ambition if major players in the region will prevent abrupt changes or turbulences.</i>
Whether the greater Middle East becomes more stable, especially whether Iraq stabilizes, and whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved peacefully.	Turbulence is likely to increase under most scenarios. <i>Trend: US leadership as major player in the region will prevent abrupt changes or turbulences. Revival of economic growth, a more prosperous Iraq, and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute could engender some stability as the region deals with a strengthening Iran and global transition away from oil and gas.</i>
Whether Europe and Japan overcome economic and social challenges caused or compounded by demography.	Successful integration of Muslim minorities in Europe could expand the size of the productive work forces and avert social crisis. <i>Trend: Lack of efforts by Europe and Japan leadership to mitigate demographic challenges</i>

Key Uncertainties	Potential Consequences
	<i>could lead to long-term declines.</i>
Whether global powers work with multilateral institutions to adapt their structure and performance to the transformed geopolitical landscape.	Emerging powers show ambivalence toward global institutions like the UN and IMF, but this could change as they become bigger players on the global stage. Asian integration could lead to more powerful regional institutions.
	<i>Trend:</i> NATO leadership faces firm challenges in meeting growing out-of-area responsibilities with declining European military capabilities. Traditional alliances will weaken.

Table 1 - Global Trends – 2025, *Relative Certainties Likely Impact*⁵

It becomes predictable that in accordance with the global trends from the political levels leadership may get new dimensions and consequently organizations must prioritize investments in leadership development. On the other hand organizations must create and implement both a leadership strategy and leadership development strategy along with the renewed leadership competencies. Obviously leadership development now targets all leader audiences it must be globalized in a proactive manner considering that being technologically based is the key to an effective leadership. Not least leadership development solutions need to evolve as a process, not a one-time event. All these consequences affect on defence and the military business.

2.2 Suggested way ahead

This leads to the following policy recommendations⁶:

Interventions should be carefully weighed. The guiding principle should be pragmatism rather than humanitarian considerations. The core interest guiding interventions should be to establish stability in the country intervened.

Security first, governance second. In order to facilitate stability and development, anarchy needs to be changed to order by the establishment of a monopoly of violence. Rather than viewing the willingness to implement democratic governance by one of the warring factions as the reason to support this faction, considering the ability of this faction to uphold a monopoly of violence should guide peace-building efforts.

⁵ Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Global Trends – 2025, A Transformed World, GPO Stock #041-015-00261-9; ISBN 978-0-16-081834-9, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html

⁶ Julian Lindley-French Defence Academy of the United Kingdom British Strategic Leadership: Food for thought, The Shrivenham papers, Number 2, October 2006

Focus on good leadership rather than management. Liberal democracy is the product of a long development experienced in Europe and North America. Notions of legitimacy are normative products of these developments. They are not necessarily shared values. In order to establish security, it is thus necessary to seek legitimacy within the normative boundaries of the country intervened into. This demands a close examination of the political leadership. The questions who are in power and why do they have power must be answered. Answers do not necessarily lie within the boundaries of western notions of legitimacy. Legitimate leadership is furthermore not necessarily held by an elected government.

Change through pragmatism rather than idealism. Once stability is achieved, the guiding interest of the external actors should not be to question the legitimacy of a government. The government should be recognized as such. In negotiations with the government in question the guiding principle should not be to change the governance of a country, but negotiations based on mutual interests, i.e. trade and economics. European and North American nations remain the economically most powerful, and are thus the most interesting markets. The negotiation power of pragmatic interest is more likely to instill change than combining negotiations with normative demands in relation to the governance of a country. With stability in place, domestic development should remain the responsibility of domestic actors.

Good leadership. Although the quintessential role of leadership is acknowledged by those seeking to promote good governance, little research on how good leadership may contribute to nation-building is conducted. Further research should seek answers to:

- What is leadership comprised of in different cultural contexts?
- What does good leadership mean in different cultural contexts?
- How can external actors support this leadership?
- How can external actors influence this leadership?

CHAPTER 3

3.1 The Meaning of Leadership

Leadership has been described as the ‘*process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task*’. Other in-depth definitions of leadership have also emerged. Alan Keith of Genentech states that ‘*Leadership is ultimately about creating a way for people to contribute to making something extraordinary happen*⁷.’ There is no prescription for leadership and no prescribed style in

⁷ Chemers M. (1997) *An integrative theory of leadership*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. ISBN 9780805826791

leading. This concept of leadership appears to be driven by myths: *leaders are borne, not made; leaders must be charismatic and have immaculate private lives; leadership is management by another word; leadership is for bosses generals and politicians.*

Yet history, experience and observation contradict such generalization. Leadership still attracts suspicions, with overtones of a hierarchical and militaristic authoritarianism that is out of tune with the contemporary culture of the new millennium. Military leadership itself still appears to be related, without escape, to the caricature. Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Defense Leadership Centre's definition⁸ is: '*Leadership is visionary; is the projection of personality and character in order to inspire people to achieve the desired result.* There is no recipe for leadership and leadership style. Leadership is a combination of example, persuasion and compulsion dependent on the situation. It should aim to transform and be underpinned by individual skills and an enabling philosophy. Successful leader is an individual who understands him/herself, the organization, the environment in which they operate and the people that they are privileged to lead.'

Key elements of this definition are defined below:

Vision. The purpose of a vision is to generate understanding of the ultimate goal of the leader and those led by him. The vision must be directed towards the future and inspire. Vision must be feasible and even if at that time are not concrete modalities; they must be realistic and reasonable. As the vision is realized, a new shape should be targeted as future efforts. In conclusion, it is eminently strategic vision.

Projection of personality and character. Personality is that fund inherited and acquired characteristics that distinguish each of us from one another. Its design is a matter of individual style. In short, '*personality is just plain you*'.

Great men inspiring people. To inspire means to infuse thoughts and feelings in someone else. In this context, refers to rising people above their self-interests by changing the system of values and goals. Inspiration can be achieved through words or actions. Sir Winston Churchill, speech in the House of Commons gives us the essence on how a leader should inspire his followers while in crisis.

'I have myself full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. [...] We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall

⁸ Leadership in Defence, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Defence Leadership Centre, Shrivenham, U.K., 2004, p.

*defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender and even if, which I do not for the moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, will carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old'*⁹.

And Sir Winston Churchill was not the only one to address the emotional side '*It is as necessary for the heart to feel as for the body to be fed.*' Before the Battle of the Pyramids (1797), Napoleon addressed his army with these words, '*Soldiers, forty centuries are looking down upon you from these pyramids...*'

While addressing the soldiers prior to battle, is there anything to say to compensate for uncertainty, fatigue, doubt, fear, and monotony? How to stimulate them? We will show up for a pay packet, and go through the motions, but it's the emotional factor that amps the vigour and their willpower. Counter intuitively, your self-motivated personnel need it the most. Leadership both supplies motivation and channels it in the right direction. How do you lever your own emotions? Again, Napoleon wrote, '*A leader is always wrong who speaks in anger.*' Anger is the sentiment most likely to hijack rationale, both when you experience it and when you pass it on, verbally and/or nonverbally. It's toxic, contaminates the field, and accomplishes the opposite of what you want. Most expected to occur while you are in times of stress, it diminishes or removes the ability to think clearly, make good decisions, and function efficiently. Anger is a good way of knowing what you want, and not a good way of getting it. '*To conduct [business] both internally and to the public,*' said Napoleon, '*deep thought, profound analysis, and the faculty of long-suffering attention are necessary.*' You can't focus when you're flooded with passion. A leader must also be able to set priorities, yet stay flexible, continually examine to see if your plan is successful.

Rigid obedience to a roadmap that isn't bringing outcome is madness. The deep analysis doesn't end when the plan is formed; it's just beginning. '*You cannot treat the entire world at once,*' Napoleon said. The leader's job is crisis-management, and even crises must be prioritized. Harry Truman knew that the leaders use to be alone with their conscience in front of the option to get. Most of the decisions are to be taken in complex situations characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty and comes together with risk to assume; and it will be none to share with the failure. '*To be able to lead others, a man must be willing to go forward alone.*'

3.2 Coping with complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty. The smog of bureaucracy and the friction of events is sometimes as much an issue for leaders operating in strategic

⁹ Winston Churchill, speech in the House of Commons, June 4, 1940

context outside the domain of war fighting as it is for battlefield commanders. Clausewitz observed: *‘Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is beyond belief... Countless minor incidents- the kind that you can not really foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance’*.¹⁰ There will hardly ever be a complete selection of the necessary data for important decisions and the leader will have to assess the degree and the nature of the risk involved using a variety of tools including his or her intuition based on training and experience, supported by judgment. And there is the human factor; individuals, the least important of whom, may...make (events) go wrong.¹¹ The ability of the Media to force apparently the minor actions at the lowest levels onto the strategic agenda creates turbulences for even the most elegant and comprehensively planned strategy.

3.3 Delegation. Efficient delegation is put up on thrust supported by clarity of intent and a mutual understanding of the lack of restrictions and constraints under which each party is working. In other words Mission Command. Thus: ‘Delegation is supremely important but senior leaders must also understand where they should provide their own inputs and it is important for them to recognize where their knowledge, their skills can add their own value to what their team is doing’.¹²

3.4 Joint effort. Joint effort leftovers crucially significant at the strategic level of the organization: ‘Boards of Directors... need the skills of teamwork even more than first line employees if the organization is to function effectively’. Organizational interests will often need to be set aside if the strategic goals of the whole organization are to be furthered. Sometimes term *joint effort* can successfully be replaced by the *teamwork*, mainly but not limited to tactical or operational level.

3.5 Helicopter view. Leaders in the strategic context need to be able to step back and adopt a perspective, a big picture of the total landscape in which their organization operates – a helicopter view. John Adair the author of this concept said that *‘is good for nothing to go up with the metaphoric helicopter unless you have a trained analytical eye and some competence as a map maker in your field.’*¹³ Leaders must have an understanding of what they see based on professional knowledge and the ability to interpret information which is relevant to the circumstances. Strategic thinking is the ability to focus on long terms effects or outcomes. It is about being able to visualize how various disparate developments might be brought together and offer the opportunity for achieving a significant change in the direction of organization.

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, Chap. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University; New Jersey, 1984, pp.119-121

¹¹ Ibid Von Clausewitz

¹² General Sir Sam Cowan, Former Chief of Defence Logistics, Defence Leadership Centre Interview, 2003

¹³ John Adair, *Effective Strategic Leadership*, Macmillan; London, 2002, p.98

3.6 From past about the future

Until lately, leadership was labeled as being linked with charisma and a strong, dominating style of command and control. Leaders were looked up to and could rely on the authority which comes with their position and their rank to get things done. Organizations were generally in characters which smooth the progress of social conformity and appreciation of the leader. For example throughout British Armed Forces, Crown immunity shielded military from the responsibility of their actions in many instances. Accountability was opaque. These days we live in an age where people are better informed and more willing to challenge authority, traditional values and convention. Today, and in the future, Defence will be held to account for its actions. It must justify any requirement to deviate from societal norms or for exemption legislation and be ready to recognize when it does not. Some of the greatest people in history have denied themselves food, sleep, family, friends, hobbies, home comforts and more to achieve their goals. While there have been exceptions, many of the greats of all time put these comforts low on their list of priorities compared to what was needed to accomplish their life goals and missions. How many executives today give up anything - except maybe sleep¹⁴?

Today, people in Defense are increasingly diverse in their origins and social customs and attitudes. Diversity helps innovation but challenges some organizational preconception. Hierarchical structures are viewed as impeding the organizational agility necessary to adapt to new requirements: smaller forces and the need to streamline operational and logistical structures in the quest for increased efficiency, challenge long-established single-service convention on organizational responsibility.

Ethical issues, from corporate liability to the legitimacy of force of arms are set to test the resolve of the leaders. Globalization will expose people in Defense to broader interests and influences which are not supportive of the national Defense mission. Rational arguments may not hold sway in winning support for Defense activities, where people's safety is threatened. Knowledge will be more influential on attitudes to work and commitment to the organization. Above all, the future is the realm of the unexpected.

Conclusion

There is as yet no definitive formula for successful leadership and many of its secrets are likely to remain elusive. Few of the theories examined in this paper are more authoritative than any others and some lack conclusive evidence to confirm their validity. In the actual

complex strategic context we can perhaps subscribe to the idea that leadership will succeed on the basis of a judicious, and sometimes lucky, blend of qualities which shape attitudes. These may be refined into behavior to fit the actors, stakeholders and the situation of the moment but research and real life example will continue to stimulate new variables in the quest of a solution. Without at least an outline understanding of the theory of leadership and an exploration of first principles, leaders in Defense will be unable to reflect honestly on their own aptitude. In addition they will be unable to articulate anything but the most simplistic notion to those who look to them for their development. Also, they will be unable to contribute intelligently to the national leadership debate which has grown extensively in recent years on the role of leaders in the effective delivery of public services.

Let Clausewitz¹⁵ to have a final say on theory:

‘...theory need not be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action... It is an analytical acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience... Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out material. It is meant to educate the commander, or more accurately to guide him in himself-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.’

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MOTIVATION – THEORIES AND PRACTICES IN THE MILITARY

CDR Sorin VOINEA

INTRODUCTION

Any human activity, regardless of its nature or complexity is taking place for a number of reasons. Among these is found the human motivation, the “engine” that sustains the accomplishment of actions.

From the ancient times the discipline of troops and good leadership were considered required and enough to ensure an adequate behavior of the troops on the battlefield, and soldiers’ motivation was a given.

Though some military leaders like Napoleon Bonaparte made efforts to increase the level of involvement of their troops it was not until the beginning of World War I when a more consistent and rational attempt to improve the military training methods, including use of propaganda and by improving living conditions of the lower ranks. After the end of WWI it became visible the importance of psychological factors in combat and in molding the military behavior.

Only during and after the WWII study of military personnel behavior and attitude took a coherent and organized form, and has found its rightful place within the military doctrine ever since.

Though morale and motivation are two different concepts, there was a tendency to confound or treat them as synonyms. While research on motivation was done mainly with nonmilitary purposes, especially in learning and perception areas, the military specialists focused on the concept of morale.

I. MOTIVATION FUNDAMENTALS

The most often used definition of motivation is related to the processes influencing an individual's actions, intensity, direction and persistence of effort towards attaining a goal

Motivation is the term used to describe processes by which people try to satisfy their needs and personal goals, which elicit human behavior. This definition emphasizes the process itself, instead of focusing of motivating factors (or triggers) and includes both instinctive drives (hunger, sleep, sex, etc.) and rational aspirations and needs (achievement, recognition, self fulfillment, etc.)

Motivation as a concept is about what drives a certain person or a group to work with a certain amount of enthusiasm and effort in order to accomplish their job. It is related to job satisfaction, and influences the people's performance at work. Taking into account the organization itself, motivation and job satisfaction contribute essentially to the effectiveness and efficiency of the institution.

From the psychological perspective, motivation could be studied from two different perspectives:

- As a concept of human behavior;
- As a concept of management practice, requiring study from managers and then practical implementation into the institutional environment, on employees.

Motivating employees has always been considered as one of the basic management functions. However there are still few misconceptions about motivation:

- "There are people who are not motivated." Every person is motivated but not by what the manager wants the worker to do. The same "lazy" person may spend extra hours working with great intensity on different projects.
- "Motivation is something the managers do on their subordinates." Actually motivation is an internal state that directs the individual to certain goals and objectives, and managers cannot influence directly that state. They can only create expectations from workers that their motives will be satisfied by doing institution's work and then employees' needs will be rewarded.

Failure to understand these may lead the managers to use motivation to manipulate subordinates. A much more effective way of managing motivation is through understanding the needs of the subordinates.

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation:

Intrinsic motivation is driven by a personal interest or pleasure of doing the task itself, and exists within the person rather than being generated by external pressure. Intrinsic motivation is usually associated with educational achievement.

Extrinsic motivation comes from external environment of the individual. Common extrinsic motivators are usually rewards, coercion and fear of punishment. Psychological research has demonstrated that extrinsic rewards can lead to a subsequent drop in intrinsic motivation.

Extrinsic motivators can be costly and ephemeral. People quickly become worn to the extrinsic motivator, loses its efficiency and performance returns to its earlier level.

Key elements of human motivation are:

- Needs, drives, stimulus, triggers;
- Goals, desired outcomes;
- Approach versus avoidance (“pleasure” versus “pain”);
- Performance, response, effort;
- Attractive values, incentives;
- Expectations (of reward or satisfaction);
- Abilities, intelligence, awareness of options;
- Perception of reality;
- Personality differences;
- Management attitudes, assumptions about people.

In theory the mechanism of motivation works as follows: when humans experience a need, drive or some stimulus they set on an appropriate goal or desired outcome, either inviting satisfaction or for avoidance of pain. The extent of this setting depends on their level of awareness of options. Even if the goals are not identified consciously the drive will produce in the individual a response leading to achievement of a performance level. The response level is in accordance with the value that person sees in performing the given activity (the incentive).

The stimulus triggers the motivation process, and it can be either a basic need or something more subtle, like a need for success or appreciation. The satisfaction of basic physical needs/drives/appetites leads to a state of equilibrium, while the satisfaction of higher,

more sophisticated needs does not have such a temporary effect of fulfillment and it appears to increase the individual wish for having more of the same.

The higher order needs are what differentiate humans from animals, and their fulfillment, at work or in any other situation will shift employees' attitude towards work and management in a positive direction. It can be assumed that success could also have beneficial effects on workers' perception of themselves. When people are unsatisfied by the outcomes they may experience frustration, leading to negative attitudes towards employment and their leaders. This negative, even anti-social behavior may be triggered by seemingly irrelevant shortcomings in the workplace or working conditions.

Most people seem to become demotivated when they are not properly recognized or rewarded.

When they appear, the employees' complaints may be like the tip of an iceberg. The complaints are the visible aspect of their sentiments of neglect and isolation. On the contrary, when people feel that they are appreciated and important and their work is correctly valued by their leaders/commanders they can produce high performance even if the working conditions are less than perfect.

II. THEORIES OF MOTIVATION

Along the years several theories have been proposed by researchers in the field of psychology, but to date there is no coherent body of motivation theory. However, the existing theories who gained support from the research community can be grouped into two main categories:

- **Content theories**, focusing on the needs and drives of the individuals;
- **Process theories**, studying the processes taking place when individuals decide on what things are important to them.

Because of the large number of existing theories I am not going to make a comprehensive analysis but I would like to shortly mention only those who gained the most circulation worldwide.

Perhaps the most well-known theory is A. Maslow's theory (the **hierarchy of needs** theory), stating that people's needs are hierarchically arranged, with the basic (like physiological and safety) needs having to be satisfied before the higher needs (social, affiliation, esteem, self-actualization, curiosity and the need to understand).

Douglas McGregor proposed two distinct theories, which he called **Theory X** and **Theory Y**, both of them regarding the way managers perceive their employees. Theory X has a predominantly negative view of managers on the attitude of employees towards work, while the second does the opposite, starting from positive assumptions on the same subject.

More recently David McClelland formulated the **theory of needs** (also known as **the theory of achievement**), starting from the idea of determining what are the psychological factors that could drive the individuals to performance. His theory focuses on three needs:

- Need for achievement - Some people strive for personal achievement rather than other rewards for success. They are perfectionists trying to do their job better or more efficiently.
- Need for power - Some people want to be influential and control the others, are more concerned with prestige and gaining influence than performance.
- Need for affiliation - Individuals falling in this category prefer cooperative situations and are seeking for situations where they could find a higher degree of mutual understanding.

Incentive theory is promoted by behavioral psychologists, and treats motivation of the individual as it is influenced by beliefs, like engaging in actions that are likely to be beneficial. If someone's actions are positively received then people are more probable to act in this manner, while if negatively received the person is likely to act in a different way.

The **drive reduction theory** is based on the concept that people have certain biological drives, such as hunger. If not satisfied, the strength of the drive will increase as time passes, but is reduced upon satisfying it. The theory is rooted in ideas from various theories, as of Freud or the ideas of feedback control systems.

Cognitive dissonance theory, suggested by Leon Festinger, asserts that people have a motivational need to reduce conflict occurred when a person experiences discomfort resulting from two incompatible cognitions. They do this by shifting their attitudes or actions, or by justifying, blaming, and denying.

Two-factor theory, or **dual-structure theory**, proposed by Frederick Herzberg asserts that certain factors could result in professional satisfaction, but they won't lead to frustration, if absent. He differentiated between:

- **Motivators**, which give positive satisfaction, *and*
- The so-called **hygiene factors**; (status, job security, salary, etc.) that do not motivate, but, if absent, will demotivate.

Goal-setting theory states that persons sometimes have a drive to reach an end state clearly defined, which is a reward in itself. The goal's efficiency is affected by its proximity,

difficulty and specificity. For an ideal goal the time between the initiation of actions and the end state is close. Also, the goal should be moderate, not too demanding or too easy to accomplish. The goal should be neutrally defined and intelligible for the individual.

III. MOTIVATION PRACTICES IN THE MILITARY

At the origin of any motivated action are found the needs, seen as the psychic states reflecting the discrepancies between the human and the environment. As the needs create an internal state of tension which will require satisfaction in order to achieve relaxation or adaptation. Excepting the basic, instinctual drives (for food, shelter, reproduction) all are learned, acquired or cultivated through education. In the military also these needs, for social contact and usefulness, communication, work and knowledge are manifest, and they can be activated or enhanced through the specific military education.

The needs differ in intensity, duration or the mode of manifestation for every person, influencing the behavior of that individual. However, they manifest in a grouped manner and there must always be a balance in satisfying them, as the excessive fulfillment will turn off or direct the needs unilaterally, while the lack of satisfaction could lead to psychic trauma.¹

The greatest challenge for the military leaders is to inspire the soldiers to do things which they wouldn't do naturally, to execute dangerous missions for the greater good of their unit and their country.

Motivated soldiers will do everything they are capable of in order to accomplish their mission and it will cause them to make use of their skills and initiative as they see the necessity to act. A good commander and leader will motivate the soldiers by challenging them during training, rewarding successes, developing a cohesive team, and charging them with the responsibility they can handle.²

From the military perspective we motivation and discipline are the causes of action in the specific conditions of the battlefield. Motivation gives soldiers the will to do what they have been ordered to accomplish the mission. If the subordinates support the cause and have confidence in each other, they will be genuinely motivated. Confidence is a powerful motivating force, rising the morale and the will to fight. Also, having been properly trained to fight as a team will create motivating effect. Knowledge, discipline, cohesion and skill combat fear and increase confidence.

¹ *Pedagogie Militară*, Editura Militară, 1980, p. 180;

² FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, US Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1990, p. 12;

The military commander must not allow himself to consider that soldiers are only motivated by fear but to keep focused on human nature and motivation. It is also wrong to believe that soldiers are all naturally motivated to work hard to do what they are expected.

There are few ways a military leader can motivate his people:

- By serving as the ethical standard bearer. Soldiers need their leader to be the example they can look up to and compare his behavior to their own. They want to rely on the commander to provide them the moral force and to show them what are the values our society demands. The soldiers want a leader which is job proficient, but also decent and honorable. By setting and enforcing the ethical standards, the leader motivates and helps the soldiers to discipline themselves and to develop the will to fight courageously regardless of danger.
- Developing cohesive teams. Working hard to make the profession of arms meaningful for subordinates will develop cohesive teams. It takes time and a lot of work to teach and train the soldiers, but this creates trust and mutual respect. As part of a team soldiers are confident in their comrades, commanders, their equipment and training.
- Rewarding and punishing. The expectations of reward or punishment greatly affect soldiers' behavior. Anyone who has been rewarded for doing something good or punished for unsatisfactory performance knows the feeling and how it changed his behavior. Rewards and punishments serve different purposes. Rewards are meant to promote desired behavior; while punishments must decrease the occurrence undesired behavior. Properly used, rewards and punishments can adjust the behavior of the soldiers to be conforming to the prescribed regulations.

Praise, a letter of recommendation or any form of recognition has a great importance for a soldier. To the soldier, rewards are the visible confirmation that his leader and his country are grateful for his bravery or hard work and are important as everybody strives for recognition from his peers. Well-chosen rewards normally boost the motivation to continue working for more appreciation. This principle can be applied in various ways:

- By attaining recommendations on rewards, awards, and training.
- By choosing a reward prized by the person receiving it.
- The highest motivational power will be offered by the rewards that appeal to personal pride.
- By using the system of rewards established by military regulations in force.
- By presenting awards at a unit ceremony so that all can see that hard work is rewarded.

- Support good soldiers needing assistance.
- The desired behavior must be rewarded without delay.
- Encourage soldiers trying to do things right - even if they are falling short. It's not his failure being rewarded, but his honest endeavor to do the job correctly. Recognition will strengthen his efforts and motivate him to try harder.
- Explore new ways of recognizing good deeds that motivate most part of the unit.
- Encourage people who work hard, sway others to achieve required standards, and show the potential for increased responsibility.
- Distinguish soldiers who reach standards and improve their performance.

At the same time, soldiers who don't try or fail deliberately to meet standards must be punished. This has to be done with the clear purpose of changing their behavior and showing everybody what is to be expected if they decide to perform in a similar undesirable manner. Soldiers learn from the consequences of others' mistakes. Seeing what happens to those unwilling or unmotivated can have the same effect on behavior as personal experience.

Punishment can be applied bearing in mind a few principles:

- The soldier must be aware that his commander is displeased about the actions, not about him and he expects more from him.
- Soldiers must be aware that their commander will tell them how they are doing.
- Soldiers who are not capable to perform a task shouldn't be punished, but only those reluctant or unmotivated to do well.
- Punishment has to be done as quickly as possible after the unwanted behavior, in private. Soldiers shouldn't be humiliated in front of others.
- Make sure that the punished soldiers understood what behavior led to the reprimand.
- Punishment shouldn't be excessive or irrational. Certainty of punishment restrains soldiers as efficiently as its severity.
- Do not hold resentment after punishing.
- Keep your temper under control.

People generally act in accord with their beliefs. Beliefs, principles, and norms have great motivating power. The leader influences decisively the leadership environment, discipline, cohesion and combat effectiveness of his unit. Leaders can transform soldiers' motivation from self-interest to gallant service to their nation.

Subordinates will feel satisfaction and responsibility when they successfully complete a task which has been given to them. Delegation indicates commander's trust in subordinates

and will determine them want more responsibility. The leader is also a teacher and is responsible for developing the subordinates.

War fighting is a team activity. Soldiers need to rely both upon their commander's leading abilities and in their abilities to behave as a team. At any time there must exist a team spirit that motivates the soldiers to go readily and confidently into battle in a rapid evolution from peace to war. The unit becomes a team only when the soldiers trust and respect the commanding officer and each member as skilled professionals and are conscious of the importance of everybody's contribution to the unit.

Soldiers must understand what is expected from them, what the standard is, and when it has to be done. Supervising will allow the commander to know if soldiers understood the orders, show interest in them and in mission accomplishment. Performance that meets or exceeds required standards deserves rewarded, as performance that does not meet established standards has to be corrected.

When subordinates are held accountable for their performance, they become aware of their responsibilities as persons and as a team.

The leader can influence the beliefs of the soldiers by setting the example and by planning, conducting, and evaluating training. Proper training occurs when soldiers and leaders alike mutually experience realistic, strenuous conditions that prepare everybody, as a team, for the stress of fighting

CONCLUSIONS

In the last years we have witnessed the penetration of the economics logic in all aspects of the social life. That means that even the military institution tends to be viewed more often as a firm, and as a consequence the human resources policies are subject to rules of the work market and the institution itself has joined the competition for attracting the workforce.

Meanwhile there is a shift in the image of the military career and the motivation of people to join the military.

Even if it has not vanished yet, the traditional values of "esprit de corps", nationalism and other military traditions seem to give way in front of the recent image of the military specialist, the professional employed in the service of the civil society.

The personnel, when deciding whether to join the armed forces or to leave, take increasingly into account the ratio between their efforts and the benefits they receive.

From the employer's perspective it is important to determine what are the major factors influencing people's motivation at work in order to assess what changes can be made within internal organizational environment to produce what is called a "motivated workforce".

Motivation is not influenced purely by the individual's needs but also by the type of personality, ability level or personal values system, as well as by the work and domestic environments. For this reason, the managers/commanders must be able to evaluate the motivational needs of their subordinates by recognizing the various personality types and differing skills and talents.

But this is not all. Given the conditions met on the battlefield the commanders must provide their subordinates with purpose, direction, and motivation required to meet the demands of the mission. Purpose gives soldiers the motive why they should attempt to accomplish difficult tasks under dangerous conditions. Direction shows them what has to be done. The desired end-state should be clear and understood by all. Motivation will drive soldiers to act to the limit of their capabilities in order to accomplish a mission.

The leader's obligation is to set the example for subordinates through his behavior. In his attempt to motivate the subordinates the leader himself has to demonstrate motivation. Theoretical knowledge will have no meaning to troops if it is not reinforced by actions. Actions give life to motivation of soldiers and units through the tough strain of battle.

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